

UNIVERSITÄTS-BIBLIOTHEK BONN

Bei Empfang der Dissertation durch den Benutzer eigenhändig auszufüllen!

Der Unterzeichnete verpflichtet sich, entnommene Gedanken oder wörtlich übernommene Stellen aus der von der Universitätsbibliothek Bonn entliehenen maschinenschriftlichen

Sahu, Sreenivasa

Dissertation The theological metaphysics of Bengal Vaisnavism with
U 4° 53 special reference to Baladeva Vidyabhusana.
465 Bonn, Math.-nat. Diss. v. 23. Dez. 1953

durch genaues Zitat, wie es bei der Benutzung gedruckter Literatur üblich ist, als Quelle zu kennzeichnen sowie die Dissertation nicht an Dritte weiterzugeben oder diesen sonst zugänglich zu machen.

Ort und Bibliothek	Datum	lesbare Unterschrift und Anschrift	Zusätze der Verwaltung
Kiel, Univ.-Bibl.	17.12.65	E. Neuendorf Indogerm. Seminar d. Univ. Kiel	

THE THEOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS OF BENGAL VAIṢNAVISM

with special reference to

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa.

Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Submitted at the

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität

Bonn

by

Sreenivasa Sahu

from

INDIA.

To
Prof.Dr.Saileswar Sen, D.Phil et Litt.,

to whom I owe
much more

than the gratitude of a student.

C O N T E N T S

		Page
Chapter	1	Introduction 1
"	2	Epistemology 17
"	3	The Sources of Knowledge 34
"	4	Ontology: 47
		The Theory of Causation 49
		The Doctrine of <u>Śakti</u> 54
		The Nature of <u>Viśeṣa</u> 59
		<u>Svarūpa</u> 67
		The Categories 69
		Cosmology 71
		The Individual Soul 80
"	5	God: 90
		Image (<u>Vigraha</u>) 91
		God's <u>mādhurya</u> and <u>aiśvarya</u> 94
		The Incarnations 100
"	6	The Nature of Devotion (<u>bhakti</u>) 108
		<u>Bhakti</u> and <u>prapatti</u> 112

Abbreviations.

- BP . . Bhāgavata Purāṇa *engl*
BS . . Bhagavat-sandarbhā of Jīva. Calcutta, 1926
CB . . Caitanya-bhāgavata of Vṛndāvana Dāsa, Calcutta, B.E. 437.
CC . . Caitanya-caritāmṛta of Kṛṣṇa Dāsa Kavirāja, Cal. 1924. *engl*
CB . . Govinda-bhāṣya of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Calcutta, 1894.
IHQ. . Indian Historical Quarterly. *engl*
PR . . Frameya-ratnāvalī of Baladeva, Calcutta, 1927. *engl*
PrS. . Prīti-sandarbhā of Jīva. Ed. Prangopal Gosvāmin,
Noakhali.
PS . . Paramātma-sandarbhā of Jīva, Murshidabad, 1928. *engl*
SB . . Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, Ed. Durga Charan Sarma, Calcutta
SkS. . Śrīkṛṣṇa-sandarbhā of Jīva, Navadvīpa, 1925.
SR . . Siddhānta-ratna of Baladeva, Benares 1924/27.
SS . . Sarva-samvādinī of Jīva, Calcutta, 1920.
TS . . Tattva-sandarbhā of Jīva, Calcutta, 1911.
VS . . Vedānta-syamantaka of Rādhā Dāmodara, Lahore, 1935.

Bengal Vaiṣṇavism centres round the person of Caitanya. He himself however does not lay any claim to starting a new religion or a new philosophy. His object was to revive the teachings of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa - to teach men the way of devotion (bhakti) as opposed to the way of reason and ritual. Most of what he taught was not new to the Indian soil. It was contained in the teachings of the Bhāgavata Cult - in ancient works like the Harivaṃśa, Nārāyaṇīya and the Pañcarātra āgamas, as well as in the devotional hymns of the Ālvārs and Nāyanārs of South India.¹ It will also be noticed that just as the Bhāgavata cult rose as a reaction against the ritualism of the later Brāhmaṇic religion and for the establishment of the new method of devotion (bhakti),² so also that of Caitanya rose as a reaction against the logistics (tarka) of the Nyāya school prevailing in Bengal during his time.³

Bengal at the time of the birth of Caitanya was dominated by the Nyāya and the Śākta schools.⁴ Navadvīpa where Caitanya was born, was one of the strongholds of the Navya-Nyāya school and among the teachers then propagating its doctrines were stalwarts like Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others. They were busy trying to analyse words and their usage. The Śāktas who were more or less absolutists indulged in ritualism. The atmosphere was not conducive to the development of bhakti or devotion, though under the patronage of some of the earlier kings of Bengal, Jayadeva had given it a fillip. There were a few sporadic cases of Vaiṣṇava devotion and Caitanya's own house was one of the centres of Vaiṣṇava congregation. His father Jagannātha Miśra was so sceptical about the value of

1. J.N. Farquhar - Outlines of Religious Literature of India, pp.220-238. Oxford, 1920.
2. H.v. Glasenapp - Die Philosophie der Inder, p.176. Stuttgart, 1949.
3. G.Grierson - IHQ. Vol.37 (1908) p.251 ff. The discussion about the early history of the bhakti cult and how it came to be centred about the names of Vāsudeva, Kṛṣṇa and Viṣṇu is outside the scope of the present work. To those who are interested, the following literature is recommended: H.C. Raychaudhuri - Materials for the Study of the early History of the Vaiṣṇava Sect - University of Calcutta, 1920. F.J. Schrader - Introduction to the Pañcarātra, Madras, 1916. Mṛṇāl Dasgupta - 'Early Viṣṇuism and Nārāyaṇīya Worship' - IHQ Nos. VII, VIII and IX, 1931 and 1932: Also Grierson, "The Nārāyaṇīya and the Bhāgavatas", IHQ. Vols. 32 & 33. Nanimadhab Chaudhury, "Some aspects of the Worship of Nārāyaṇa", IHQ, Sep 1944.
4. CB, p.11.

note JAS

of education prevailing at that time (ie., training in the methods of Navya-nyāya) that he did not care to give his son the best of the teachers available.¹ The father's faith, had however an imperceptible influence on the boy. Among the close associates of Jagannātha were certain other Vaiṣṇava devotees like Śrīvāsa and Advaitācārya, and Caitanya as a boy had occasion to visit them and was a witness to the devotional practices that were going on from time to time.² Thus, as a child Caitanya was brought up in an atmosphere of religious devotion.

Some attribute Caitanya's Vaiṣṇava leanings to the influence of Madhva, on the ground that the Puris, who were said to be the predecessors of Caitanyism, were Madhva sannyāsins (ascetics) and that Caitanya himself was initiated into the Madhva sect.³ There is however difference of opinion. In the Caitanya-caritā-mṛta, it is said that he was an advaita-sannyāsin:⁴ but the author of this biography, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja had no other means of knowing the details of Caitanya's life except through tradition. And so much of mystery is woven round the life of Caitanya, that it is difficult to separate truth from tradition. The difficulty is all the more because he was not primarily interested in metaphysics but in devotion and love of God. In fact his main objection against the school of Madhva was that it emphasized knowledge (jñāna) and the performance of ones duties (karman) to the detriment of devotion (bhakti).⁵ The difference is only one of emphasis, for Madhva was as much sectarian as Caitanya. In fact, as we shall see in the sequel, the later writers of the Caitanya school, gradually identified themselves with Madhva and when we come to Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, there is acceptance of Madhva's teachings in toto. This could not have happened if Caitanya had not accepted some of the metaphysical conclusions of Madhva, though he differed from the latter in the practice of the devotion to or Love of God.

Of the two central doctrines of Caitanya's teaching, one is humility and the constant dependence on God which it engenders. The pride of learning and the self-importance of the śākta and

1. CB, p.32.

2. l.c., p.106 and 201.

3. C.Hayavadana Rao-Śrīkara Bhaṣya- Vol.1, p.133. Bangalore, '36
For the opposite view see, S.K.De- Early History of the
Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal- Calcutta, '42. p.10.
Also Amarnath Roy- Indian Culture, 1938-39. Vol.V. p.103.

4. CC, p.204.

5. CC, p.236 et seq. The followers of Madhva are called tattva-
vādins.

the Advaitin identifying themselves with God they worship, only removes one farther from Him. Recognize your smallness in the scheme of things and you will see the Glory of God and His Goodness. One who sees it cannot bear separation from Him even for a moment. For this constant attachment, Caitanya could not think of any other analogy than that of love- love that does not even care for the rules and regulations of society, the love that knows no shame. The soul has to shed its false sense of prestige and has to stand naked (like the Gopīs in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) in the presence of God.

The other important contribution of Caitanya was the development of this God-intoxication not by quiet contemplation nor by that passive activity seen in some mystics,¹ but by giving active expression to these emotions in overt conduct. Hence he started religious processions through the town (nagara-kīrtanas) and organized collective songs about God (samkīrtanas) parties of emotionally worked up devotees singing and dancing along the streets of the town in complete abandonment- unconscious of everything else, except God.²

Thus religious awakening and not metaphysical disputation being the object of Caitanya, his teachings had to be made available to the man in the street who knew no Sanskrit, which remained the language of the learned despite the development of various regional languages. This might be one of the reasons why Caitanya never wrote anything. Further, what he had to say, had already been said in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. It was in his biographies that his teachings were made available to the lay man and these biographies were written mostly in the vernacular (Bengali). Though even before Caitanya, religious works were sometimes written in Bengali or other Indian vernacular languages, they were often in the form of literary compositions as in Candīdāsa, Vidyāpati or earlier, among the Ālvārs of South India, or the writers were outside the pale of orthodox Hinduism, like Kabīr. Hence the vernacularisation gave a fillip not only to the religious consciousness of the people, but also to the development of vernacular literature.³ That this popularisation was the motive which made them write in the vernacular is clear from a verse attributed to Narahari Sarakāra (1478-1541) one of the members of Caitanya's inner circle of friends.⁴

1. Evelyn Underhill, "Mysticism", p.306. London, 1911/49.

2. CB, p.106.

3. D.C.Sen: Vaiṣṇava Literature of Bengal. Calcutta, 1917.

4. D.C.Sen: Caitanya and his Companions. Calcutta, 1917.

Caitanya however was not altogether oblivious to the need of apologist writings. Along with the revival and popularisation of the sentiment of devotion, the permanent back-ground of a sound philosophical system had to be developed. Hence he commissioned Sanātana and Rūpa to stay at Vṛndāvana and propagate his teachings.¹ His choice was very wise, as can be seen from their learned works. They wrote in Sanskrit. This was necessary because the lingua franca at that time was Sanskrit and all polemics had to be written in a language that could be understood not only in Bengal but in other parts of India as well. Thus two centres of Caitanyism developed - one at Navadvīpa, whose object was the continuation of the cult and the other at Vṛndāvana, whose object was to rationalise the doctrine.

Continuation of the Cult- the Vernacular School of Navadvīpa: This school consisted of the group of Caitanya's followers at Navadvīpa and some later writers who never saw Caitanya and were not directly influenced by his emotional frenzy. They wrote devotional poems and biographies of Caitanya in touching emotional spells. Some of these poems(padas) are sung even today during devotional gatherings. Though in the beginning there was an attempt at making Caitanya's life more or less human, later on he came to be identified with God Kṛṣṇa Himself. His biographies contained many passages from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and gradually incidents in his life were identified with those of Kṛṣṇ's sport(līlā) as described in that Purāṇa. This process reached its climax in the 19th century with Nṛsimha's Caitanya-mahā-bhāgavata written exactly on the lines of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and like it in twelve chapters(skandas).² Sometimes in drawing exact analogies between the life of the young Kṛṣṇa of the old Purāṇa and the middle-aged Caitanya, the authors strain their imagination to the extent of absurdity. If Kṛṣṇa had some auspicious signs on his feet, Caitanya must be made to have the same: if Kṛṣṇa sported with the Gopīs of Vṛndāvana, the women of Navadvīpa must also be made to love Caitanya: if ŚrīKṛṣṇa received the humble gift of his friend Sudāma, Caitanya must be described as doing the same with Śuklāmbara and so on. The result of this tendency was that ultimately the image of Caitanya began to be worshipped by³

1. CC, p.351.

2. See Chintaharan Chakravarty- Descriptive Catalogue of MSS in the Vāṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad, Calcutta.

3. S.K.De, op.cit. p.320 ff.

his followers. We cannot however here enter into the history of the school interesting though it be in itself.¹ If we search for the philosophical background, we cannot find much that is systematic or original. We have to turn to the Vṛndāvana school and the Gosvāmins for this purpose. The Navadvīpa school may in fact be said to be anti-rational. The only thing that mattered for them was the name of God. One could even utter it as he pleased. The heart needs no instruction and obeys no rules of logic.

Rationalisation of the Doctrine- the Sanskrit School of Vṛndāvana: As opposed to the Navadvīpa school, this one attempts at systematising the teachings of Caitanya and to support it with authoritative texts, i.e., to bring it in line with the Hindu tradition. Thus instead of stirring poetry and moving music, we find huge compendiums replete with references and plenty of hair-splitting classifications. We do not find any trace of Caitanya-worship. Indeed, the Vṛndāvana school also admits that Caitanya is an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa but does not let him replace the latter. Even the laudatory verses (namas-kriyā) which one employs in beginning any great work, contain references to Caitanya only indirectly or through the interpretation of passages from the Bhāgavata or other ancient works which are said to predict the incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, in the form of Caitanya. We do not also find the worship of Rādhā or even of the paired (yugala) image of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa.² Nor is there mention of the extremely esoteric doctrine that Caitanya is the Universal Lover (Gaura-nāgara-bhāva). One of the most important doctrines of the school of Navadvīpa, namely that of the importance of the name (nāma-māhātmya) is only sometimes mentioned by the Gosvāmins. Later we find this point either altogether left out of some of the works or just mentioned as essential for people of weak intellects (of the decadent kali age). On the other hand as the alignment with orthodox views went further, karman (deeds) and jñāna (knowledge) discarded by Caitanya were once again given importance. Whereas Caitanya

1. The following books will be found to be informative:
D.C.Sen: "Vaiṣṇava Literature of Bengal" (1917), "Caitanya and his Companions" (1917) and "Caitanya and his Age" (1922) all published by the Calcutta University. The most exhaustive historical account so far is De's book mentioned above.
2. The idea of Rādhā as the ideal soul or as the beloved of God came from a different source. We do not find it either in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa or in Madhva. At the same time it is older than the latter, at least in northern India. Jayadeva's famous lyrics is proof thereof.

wanted that the devotee must altogether forget himself in ecstasies of emotion, one of the Gosvāmins Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, in his "Hari-bhakti Vilāsa", would have it that the true (Vaiṣṇava) worshipper of Viṣṇu (ie., Kṛṣṇa) must be careful as to what offerings he gives to Him and what hymns (mantra) he recites and so on. Of course, discussion of that emotional oblivion in the contemplation of God, is not left out. We find it carefully analysed and classified with the help of Sanskrit Poetics (alaṅkāra-śāstra). But it is all theoretic (if not quite scientific) discussion. The emotional frenzy of the Navadvīpa school is absent. And still later, when we come to Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, we shall see that the pendulum had swung back to knowledge (jñāna). The inherent opposition between knowledge and devotion, that made Caitanya renounce the former, had been forgotten and an alliance was instituted between the two: devotion (bhakti) came to be regarded as a special type of knowledge¹. We must however remember that it is not knowledge in the sense in which the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya use it. It is not even the knowledge of God as the Universal Ground of the world (Brahma-jñāna): it is the knowledge of God as the Supreme Person (Bhagavad-jñāna).

The important leaders of the school are the six Gosvāmins and of the later writers we have three of importance, Viśvanātha Cakravartin, Rādhā Dāmodara and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. The lives of the six Gosvāmins and an appreciation of their works, which are more sectarian than philosophical, is given by De.² In the following pages we shall deal only with three, viz., Jīva Gosvāmin, Rādhā Dāmodara and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, as they alone have a bearing on the later chapters of the present work.

Jīva Gosvāmin: None of the other Gosvāmins had contributed as much as Jīva to the metaphysics and theology of the school. For more than a century his teachings and his explanations of spiritual texts were the only foundation of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. He is reputed to have written more than twenty works, but the most important ones are the six topics (ṣaṭ-saṁdarbha) and a compendium of four of them called the sarva-saṁvādinī.

In Jīva we find the difference between the two schools still further accentuated, though he does not go so far as to subsume devotion (bhakti) under knowledge (jñāna). And instead of esoteric commentaries we find Jīva discussing real philosophical

1. SB, I-40.

2. Op.cit., pp 83-122.

problems. The nature of God as a Person (bhagavat), God as the ground of all that is (Brahman) and God as the Supreme Soul (Paramātmā), the relation between the individual soul (Jīva) to these, the Incarnation of God, the nature and the goal of human life and the means thereof are all discussed in philosophical terms. We find also that Jīva condescends to discuss epistemology which the older writers always avoided except for giving a list of the valid sources of knowledge (or the sources of valid knowledge) as enumerated in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

Naturally Jīva came under the influence of the other Vedāntins. The predecessors were many, but some like the later Advaitins were the prominent opponents (often mentioned along with the nihilist (śūnya-vādin) Buddhists) and others like Nimbārka and Vallabha were not mentioned by Caitanya. The two commentators that have had great influence on Jīva, were Rāmānuja and Madhva (though sometimes even Śaṅkara is quoted with approval when basic ideas do not come into conflict).¹ He was however independent and did not accept any one of them as the source. There are many occasions when he quotes from both of them without explicitly mentioning their names.² He does not also accept the doctrine of particularity (viśeṣa) of Madhva, as Rādhā Dāmodara and Baladeva did in later times. Nevertheless the influence of Rāmānuja and Madhva on his philosophy is very great.

Rādhā Dāmodara: He was a Kanauji Brāhmaṇa and was Baladeva's spiritual guide or guru.³ He must have been a younger contemporary of Viśvanātha Cakravartin, for it is said that Baladeva also studied under the latter. We do not know much about Rādhā Dāmodara, save that he is the author of the small hand-book on Vaiṣṇava philosophy called Vedānta-syamantaka. The book is conceived on the lines of orthodox Vedānta and carries further the rationalisation of the doctrine. It is divided into six kiraṇas or rays. The first deals with the valid sources of knowledge and the remaining five, with the five realities, God, the individual soul, matter (prakṛtī), time (kāla) and the effect of previous action (karman). A peculiarity of the book is that it does not cite a single book or reproduce a single passage from any of the works of the previous writers of the school-

1. For instance SS, p.22. See also De, op.cit., p.202.

2. We find some of the arguments of both these philosophers and specially those of Rāmānuja employed in his SS. Nevertheless, we find that he is still anchored fast to the Purāṇas.

3. SR, VIII-34.

not even from the works of the Gosvāmīns! It depends entirely on the Vaiṣṇava śrutis and smṛtis (ie., Scriptural testimony) accepted by the school to be authoritative. We find however, that the influence of Madhva is as great on him as upon his pupil Baladeva. For the first time we find that the doctrine of speciality (viśeṣa)¹ is taken from Madhva and the peculiar standpoint of indescribable or non-rational compresence of difference and non-difference (acintya-bhedābheda) between the world and God is explained with its help.² Also for the first time devotion (bhakti) is not stated to be a method opposed to or independent of Knowledge, but is described as a species of knowledge (jñāna). Indirect knowledge of God that we get from the reading of the Scriptures is knowledge and the direct encounter with God which is possible through the elevating (Hlādinī) and the instructing (samvid) powers (śakti) of God is devotion.³

It is sometimes held that this book was not written by Rādhā Dāmodara, but by Baladeva himself and passed off in the name of his Guru.⁴ No strong reasons are given by those who entertain such a view except that there is a tradition to that effect. The following reasons may however be adduced:

- i. That the views expressed in the Vedānta-syamantaka are the same as those held by Baladeva and that both show overt influence of Madhva.
- ii. The style of the book is like that of Baladeva's, simple and without circumlocutions.
- iii. In the colophon we find a verse ("nitya nivasatu . .etc") which we find also in almost every known work of Baladeva.

But an examination of both the works reveals certain fundamental differences as well. Besides, the above-mentioned arguments taken by themselves are not adequate to prove such a serious charge.⁵

1. Baladeva always starts his discussions with the object (prameya) God and justifies the means of knowing Him (pramāṇa) last of all: and thus both in his Siddhānta-ratna as well as

1. See below, p. 59.

2. VS, pp. 11 & 12.

3. l.c.p. 31.

4. *was in general* ARṣaya Kumār Sāstrin: Introduction to PR. C. Chakravarty also mentions it in his "Bengal's Contribution to Philosophical Literature in Sanskrit", IHQ, 1930. But in his "Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS in the Vāṅīya Sāhitya Paṇḍit", he attributes it to Rādhā Dāmodara.

5. Baladeva mentions the book in his commentary on his own book (SR, III-15). But he does not say anything about its authorship.

in his Frameya-ratnāvalī. In the Vedānta-syamantaka the first chapter is on the nature and number of the valid sources of knowledge.

ii. There is also a difference in the terminology. For example the word ancient lore (ārṣa) is understood in different ways by the two authors. Baladeva uses it (as is more usual) in the sense of secondary scriptures (Purāṇas etc) and thus accepts it as a valid source of knowledge, though not independent. But Rādhā Dāmodara uses it in a sense all his own. According to him it is the evidence of sages (Rṣis) like Kaṇāda, Jatañjali and others and so he refuses to accept it as a valid source of knowledge.¹

iii. The similarity of the treatment, either of the theme or that of the ideas propounded, is not by itself adequate ground to father the work on Baladeva. The views of the teacher and of the student are more likely to be similar than otherwise.

It would be more correct therefore, in the absence of any conclusive evidence, to say that Rādhā Dāmodara is the author of this little work, which though small, is important in the sense that its whole method of approach is different and thus weans his student Baladeva from the more cumbrous and unsystematic approach, influenced as it is by the Purāṇas, of Jīva.

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa: Nothing definite is known about his date or place of birth. As he was a student both of Rādhā Dāmodara and of Viśvanātha Cakravartin, we may say that he was born about 1700 A.D. As regards his land of origin, some say that he was a native of Orissa² and others that he was a native of Bengal.³

There are no very convincing reasons for one or the other view and in accordance with Vaiṣṇava humility, the author does not say anything about his private life. We might however say that his name is a typical Oriya name and is very rare in Bengal. We know that even during the time of Caitanya, this name (and its equivalent Balarāma) was common in Orissa. Among the five Oriya disciples of Caitanya (known as the five companions-pañca-sakhā) was one Balarāma Dāsa, who translated the Sans-

1. Mr. U.C. Bhāṭṭācārya in his Introduction to the VS, interprets ārṣa as the evidence of Purāṇas and then charges the author with self-contradiction for quoting from them. But as we have shown that was not the author's intention.

2. De, op.cit., p.12.

3. Svāmī Prajñānanda: History of Vedānta (Bedanter Itihāsa in Bengali) Vol.III, p.284. Calcutta.

krit Mahābhārata into Oriya. To whatever part of India he might have belonged, he was a very prolific writer. In this respect he is comparable to Jīva and like the latter, he wrote not only on philosophy, but also on poetics, dramaturgy etc. Besides, he also wrote a large number of commentaries. "Like Rūpa and Jīva, he was a polymath writing on a variety of subjects - Philosophy, Rhetoric, Prosody etc."¹

The following is a list of his philosophical works:

1. Govinda-bhāṣya (Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras) and a sub-commentary sūksmā. (There is however some doubt as to the authorship of the latter).
2. Siddhānta-ratna or Bhāṣya-pīṭhaka (introduction to the main doctrines contained in 1, but really introducing certain new ideas and arguments) and its commentary.
3. Prameya-ratnāvalī.
4. Gītā-bhūṣaṇa - Commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā.

There are then the commentaries on Jīva's Tattva-saṃdarbha, on Rūpa's Laghu-bhāgavatāmṛta and on ten of the upaniṣads. There are still six other commentaries and three other original works, but mostly dealing with rhetoric, ritual or poetics. We shall deal only with the four mentioned above and see how far they reveal the development of Baladeva's thought.

Govinda-bhāṣya: This is perhaps the last of the commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Caitanya as well as the later writers including Jīva, did not find the necessity of commenting on the Sūtras, because they accepted the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as the commentary thereon, and as they further believed, written by the sage Vyāsa himself for the edification of the weaker understanding of the people of the Kali age. But this was not accepted in the circles of learning and they refused to accept Caitanyism as a separate school (saṃpradāya) at all. The conditio sine qua non of a separate school was that it must possess independent commentaries on the three basic works (prasthāna-traya) viz., the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā and the Vedānta Sūtras. It is said that confronted with this awkward situation in the course of a debate in a Vaiṣṇava conference, Baladeva wrote the commentary in a month.

In the commentary, though we can discern the influence of Madhva, it is not very much more marked than that of other

¹. C.Chakravarty, "Bengal's Contribution to Philosophical Literature in Sanskrit", IHQ. 1930.

older commentators, say for example Rāmānuja. Baladeva had not yet become a devotee of Madhva as in his later works. He does not do salutation (namaskriyā) to him as one of the older teachers. Svāmī Prajñānanda Sarasvatī says that Baladeva, in writing his commentary, has followed the foot-prints of Madhva, on the ground that he (Baladeva) explains the fifth section (adhikaraṇa) of the first chapter (pāda) (I,i-5 to I,i-11) exactly as Madhva does. It is true. And it is also true that this is one of the important points of similarity. But if we examine the whole commentary carefully, we shall find that on equally important points, he differs from Madhva and is in agreement with others, particularly with Rāmānuja. For example in interpreting sūtra I,i-18, Baladeva follows Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in taking it to be dealing with the material ground (pradhāna) of Sāṅkhya philosophy, whereas Madhva interprets it as being directed against inference as a reliable source of knowledge. This is a very important point of difference, because if Madhva interpreted it like-wise, he would then have to establish God as the material Ground of the Universe (which he does not admit). Thus it leads to totally different concepts of God as the Creator and thus of the consequent relation between God and the world.

Then again sūtra I,i-24 is taken as an independent topic by Madhva, but Baladeva does not accept him. In interpreting sūtra I,i-1, Madhva says that the word atha (then) means auspiciousness, but Baladeva (in agreement with Śaṅkara but for different reasons) refutes the interpretation. In many sūtras (eg., I,ii-2, I,ii-4, I,ii-9 etc.) the subject (viśaya) attributed by Madhva to the author of the sūtras is very different from the ones accepted by other commentators. But Baladeva is not usually at one with Madhva. The latter's commentary smacks throughout of sectarianism and is obviously an attempt to prove the supremacy of Viṣṇu as against the counter-claims of the other sectarian God, Śiva. Baladeva, though as sectarian as Madhva himself, nevertheless treats the sūtras in a more philosophical manner and thus is more in line with tradition. We thus find that Baladeva's commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, is an independent piece of work and does not show the influence of any one of the predecessors in this field, though verbal quotations from Rāmānuja are to be seen in many places.¹

1. The book was printed in 1894 in Calcutta (Ed. Syāmalāl Gosvāmin) in Bengali characters. It is however never reprinted. An English translation was published from Allahabad, 1912.

Siddhānta-ratna: It is a commentary on his own previous work, where the essential conclusions are set down in eight chapters(pādas). This book was written before the more detailed word for word sub-commentary called sūkṣmā was prepared. There are occasions when he refers in the latter to Pīṭhaka-bhāṣya (ie., siddhānta-ratna)¹. At the time when this book was written, Baladeva was still independent of Madhva. We do not find any mention of his name in the salutation whereas, as already mentioned, the name of Kādhā Dāmodara occurs. But Baladeva was reading more and more of Madhva, specially the short polemics against the Advaitins, like the māyāvāda-khaṇḍana, upādhi-khaṇḍana, tattva-saṃkhyāna etc. And in the course of his examination and refutation of the Advaitins' arguments, nay even in the statement of the opponent's standpoint, he quotes profusely from Madhva (as also from Rāmānuja). He might not have done so with intention, for scarcely is the name of the source mentioned, but he certainly remembered, often word for word, of what he read.

For example the fifth chapter (pāda) of the book is supposed to be extremely argumentative (yukticchala-prācurya). But all the arguments have the unmistakeable stamp of the pamphlet "māyāvāda-khaṇḍana" of Madhva. In this pamphlet, Madhva quotes Gītā, XV-21 ff. as the proposition to be established (siddhānta) and the same is quoted by Baladeva at the end of the fourth chapter, and the fifth starts as an objection raised by the Advaitin: the conclusion thus finally established being a re-assertion of the original statement. The reply to the Advaitin that Baladeva gives is exactly the same as that of Madhva. We give below a few citations to show the extent of similarity between the two arguments:

The first answer given by Baladeva runs as follows(para 2): "tad-advaitam brahmātiriktam brahmātmakam vā? nādyah advaita-hānāt. tad-atiriktasya mithyātvena śāstrasyātattva-vedakatvā-pātāc ca. satyatā ca bhedasya. mitho-viruddhāyor anyatara-niṣedhasya anyatara-vidhi-vyāptatvāt. nāpy antyah. ātmanah sva-prakāśatvena nitya-buddhatvāc chāstrasya siddha-sādhana-patteh".

Now compare this with Madhva: (the order of the argument is changed a little to bring home the likeness, but the words are all his): "nāhi brahmany aikyasya yathārthyam tat-pakṣe.

1. Sūkṣmā on II,ii-32 and II,ii-36.

advaita-hānaiḥ svarūpātireke . . .mithyāṭve caikyasya atattva-
vedakatvam āgamasya syāt. satyatā ca bhedasya. anātireke sva-
prakāśatvād ātmanah siddha-sādhana-tā."

As will be seen, the same dilemma is placed before the Advaitin. Is the Non-dual (Advaita) something other than Brahman or not? It cannot be the former. For, if this other is a real something then there could be no non-duality: if it is merely an appearance then the Scriptures must be said to be misleading. Further, in that case difference must be admitted to be real. The second alternative is equally wrong: for if it is nothing other than Brahman, then what is the point in the teaching of the Scriptures? Hence, the basic standpoint of the Advaitin is wrong.

This example does not stand alone. It is extremely instructive to read the fifth chapter (pāda) of Baladeva's Siddhānta-ratna along with Madhva's Māyāvāda-khaṇḍana. Even the method of argument as stated by the two writers is identical. The object of both of them is to exhibit that according to the non-dualistic interpretation of the Scriptures, neither the goal nor the subject-matter (prayojana and viśaya) can be justified. Hence the discipline itself is meaningless and without relation (sambandha) to anything. We may again cite the exact words:

Madhva: "ajñānāśambhavād eva tan-matam-akhilam aprākṛtam. Evam
eva prayojanam api nirastam . . viśaya-prayojanābhāvād eva
sambandho 'pi."

Baladeva: "Evam ca viśaya-prayojanayor-abhāvād adhikārāt tad-
abhāvāt sambandhaś ca nirastah". (V-12)

Thus so far as the polemics against the Advaitin is concerned Baladeva drew heavily from Madhva. But what we notice in this book is not only the influence of Madhva but also that of Rāmānuja. Specially, so far as the analysis of knowledge and experience (anubhūti) is concerned, Baladeva like Jīva before him, takes the lead of Rāmānuja.¹ Thus when we come to the end of the book, the seventh chapter in particular, where Baladeva tries to meet the Advaita standpoint that experience is pure act devoid of an object (kevalānubhūti), we find that he is drawing heavily from Rāmānuja. The source here seems to be that part of the Mahā-siddhānta in Rāmānuja's Śrī-bhāṣya (I,1-1) where he deals with the same subject.

1. In the SS also, Jīva quotes profusely from Rāmānuja.

Once again one or two passages would reveal the extent of the similarity.

Baladeva: "kiṃ ca sā(anubhūti) sidhyati na vā? ādye sa-dharma-katā tasya prāptā. antye kha-puṣpādi-vat tucchatāpattiḥ. siddhir eva seti cet kasya kam-pratīti vācyaṃ. yadi na kasyacit-kamcit-prati tarhi na siddhiḥ. siddhir hi putratvam iva kasyacit-kamcit-prati bhavati."(VII-6)

Rāmānuja: "api ca samvit (ie., anubhūti) sidhyati vā na vā. sidhyati cet sa-dharmatā syāt. na cet tucchatā pāṇa-kusumādivat. siddhir-eva-samvid iti cet kasya-kampratīti vaktavyam. yadi na kasyacit-kamcit-prati sā tarhi na siddhiḥ. siddhir hi putratvam iva kasyacit-kamcit-prati bhavati."(SB,I,i-1)

Not only the argument but even the examples and the analogies are identical! We shall take one more passage to show the extent of Baladeva's indebtedness to Rāmānuja.¹

Baladeva: "nanu mihira-kirāṇa-gaṇasya svābhivyāngya pāṇi-talābhivyāngyatva-vat jñānābhivyāngyāhaṃkāra-vyāngyatvam jñānasya bhaved iti cet na. tasya pāṇi-talābhivyāngyatvābhāvāt. pāṇi-tala-pratihata-gatir asau svayam eva sphuṭataram upalabhyate."

Rāmānuja: "sva-prakāśayā anubhūteḥ katham iva tad-abhivyāngya-jāda-rūpāhaṃkāreṇābhivyāngyatvam iti mā vocaḥ. ravi-kara-nikarābhivyāngya-kara-talasya tad-abhivyāngjakatvopadarśanāt. jālaka-randhra-niṣkrānta dyumani-kiraṇānām tad-abhivyāngyenāpi kara-talena sphuṭatara prakāśo hi dr̥ṣṭacarah."

The object of both Rāmānuja and Baladeva is to show as against the non-dualist that the Self (ahamārtha) is not something that merely appears (adhyasta) in knowledge, but is revealed by it and thus real. The argument as well as the language is strikingly similar. It is however difficult to say whether Baladeva was directly indebted to Rāmānuja or whether he arrived at these arguments through the study of Jīva, in whose works also many such passages can be seen.

There is just one more point to be noticed in connection with this work. Rādhā Dāmodara's definition of devotion (bhakti) as an exalted type of knowledge is maintained.

Gītā-bhūṣaṇa and the commentaries on the Upaniṣads: We cannot say precisely if they were written before or after the SR. They might have been written at different times. The commentary

1. These similarities have made some scholars assert that the philosophy of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is the same as that of Rāmānuja. See below, p. 47.

on the Gītā was written probably about the same time as the SR, for devotion is defined as exalted or ecstatic knowledge.¹

Sūksmā or the Commentary on the Govinda-blāṣya: This was probably written after the SR. Here we find for the first time that a verse is dedicated to Ānanda Tīrtha (ie., Madhva) and a list of the previous teachers of the school is given—starting from Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the first teacher to Caitanya, the last. And in this list, not only is the name of Madhva mentioned, but also of some of his followers like Jayatīrtha.² But as this is only a commentary on his previous work, we do not find any change that is remarkable.

Irameya-ratnāvalī: This is perhaps one of Baladeva's last works. It is said that he wrote this extremely short work to state in a nut-shell the main dogmatics of the school. But the views expressed here are in a greater measure identical with those of Madhva. He salutes him before starting the work and repeats the list of the forerunners or the former gurus once again. He strives also to justify the necessity of such a list of names. Quoting a verse from the Padma Purāṇa, he holds that no ritual and no sacred words (mantras) could be efficacious which do not have the support of a long line of teachers. The emphasis on the guru is in line with that of the Navadvīpa school. But whereas the latter identified Caitanya with Kṛṣṇa, Baladeva traces the long line from Kṛṣṇa through Madhva down to Caitanya.

Further in this work, Baladeva quotes more Madhva literature and at the very outset stating the philosophy of Caitanyism in a single verse, he quotes a frequently repeated verse attributed to one of the followers of Madhva and a later pontificate, Vyāsarāya.³ He approves of the five differences emphasized by Madhva. Though karman or the performance of duties like rites and rituals were said to be useless and so denounced by Caitanya, Baladeva while admitting the sole efficacy of devotion (bhakti), nevertheless admits that the performance of ones daily duties (nitya-karman) expedites

1. Gītā-bhūṣaṇa Ed. Dāmodara Bandopadhyāya, p.9. Calcutta.
2. De, l.c., p.11, fn.3., says that the list occurs in the GB. We think that as the sūksmā was written later, it would be incorrect to say so.
3. H.v.Glasenapp cites it as the motto to his study of Madhva. See his "Madhvas Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens, p.1. Bonn and Leipzig, 1923.

the achievement of the goal.¹

One might now legitimately ask, if Baladeva was so dependent on Madhva and Rāmānuja, where and how do we find the Philosophy of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism? Is it merely a reproduction or is there anything new? Does Baladeva merely repeat what Madhva (or Rāmānuja for the matter of that) says: or is there anything original in his thought? It is to clarify this that the following chapters are written, and we shall endeavour to show at the relevant places, the value of the contributions that Baladeva himself made.

1. PR, VIII-12.

Chapter II Epistemology.

Knowledge according to Baladeva always means the knowledge of some one about some object. He holds along with Rāmānuja and Madhva that experience reveals three elements, knowledge, the knower and the object of knowledge.

So far as the nature of knowledge is concerned, the views held by the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism are almost identical with those of Rāmānuja. As against the epistemology of the Advaita school, Baladeva (like Jīva before him)¹ specially exploits Rāmānuja and employs his arguments in the language of the Śrī-bhāṣya. Can there be knowledge (jñāna) independent of Subject and Object? This is one of the main points of dispute between the Advaita and the non-Advaita Vedāntins. As abstract idealists and monists, the Advaitins say, that knowledge as it is in itself (svarūpa-jñāna) is pure 'act' (bhāva)² and as there is nothing else besides knowledge, it does not admit of differentiations either internal as between subject and act, or substance and attribute: or external as between subject and object (sajātīyādi-bheda-traya-śūnyam.)

The word knowledge (jñāna) may etymologically be explained in three different senses. It may mean 1) the knowing agent (kartr) 2) the means of knowing (kāraka) or 3) merely the act (bhāva) of knowing. If it is taken to mean the knowing agent, there arises the question of modification or transformation of knowledge which thus becomes merely a non-conscious (jāda) instrument of a conscious agent. And then it ceases to be knowledge. If it is taken in the second sense of that which reveals (kāraka-sādhane), then, there arises the distinction between the subject to which it is revealed, the object that is revealed and the means thereof: and as a consequence knowledge becomes limited. This is against the teaching of the Scriptures which says that knowledge is unlimited. It is therefore the third of the above interpretations which is consistent with the Scriptures, in which it is described as infinite (satyam jñānam anantam).

1. SS: pp.101-103.

2. SR: VII-1. Baladeva is here stating the Advaita standpoint as he understood it. The word 'act' here has nothing to do with the 'Akt' of phenomenology. For the latter view see Marvin Farber: The Foundation of Phenomenology, Ch. XII. Cambridge, Mass. 1943. For a different interpretation of the term, see S. Alexander - "Space, Time and Deity", Vol. II, p. 118. London, 1920.

Against this Jīva and Baladeva argue that even though knowledge be taken in the third sense, it does not follow that it is a subject-objectless abstraction. The world of things and events will be unintelligible if it were such an abstraction, as indeed it turns out to be in the notion of indescribability (anirvacanīyatā) of the world. The only possible alternative is to describe knowledge as Power (śakti) or dynamic act.¹

Another argument of the Advaitin to prove that there is no internal differentiation (between the 'act' and the 'subject') is that knowledge can never be known as the knowing subject without becoming an object of knowledge and thereby ceasing to be the knowing subject. As against this, it is argued that experience (anubhūti) has two aspects-² first, it is revealed unto itself through its own existence (sva-sattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam) and second, it is also revelation of an object (viśaya-sāadhanatvam).³ It cannot reveal an object without being revealed unto a subject, nor can it be revealed unto a subject without revealing an object.⁴ When there is no external object to be revealed, it itself becomes an object of revelation unto itself.⁵ This self-objectification does not make it non-conscious, for it retains its character as experience (na ca anubhūtair anubhūti-gocaratve śabdādivaj jādyāpattiḥ). There is a direct revelation of the Self. The Advaitin is wrong in saying that consciousness would cease to be consciousness if it were to be self-conscious, that is to say, an object of consciousness. On the contrary, if it were not self-conscious, it could not be conscious of the not-self. All knowledge is therefore, knowledge of a subject about an object. "The form of consciousness cannot be expressed by any single term which does not recognize the duality of subject and object."⁶ In other words, knowledge is not a mere 'that' (sat), but is always also a 'what' (tattva) (tattva-svabhāva-virahe tattvāsiddher anubhāvāntara-gocaratvāc ca tucchataiva syāt.)⁷

Again it is said by the Advaitin that knowledge itself has no knowable characteristics (bodhya-dharmāḥ) and at the same time

1. Jīva himself refers to the Śrī-vaiṣṇavas (ie., the school of Rāmānuja) to whom he owes the argument. SS, p.29.
2. The terms jñāna and anubhūti are used almost interchangeably.
3. SS, p.98. SR, VII-4. Cf. SB, pp.79 and 88.
4. sva-sattayaiva ghaṭādi-prakāśakatvam netyarthah . . anubhūter viśaya-prakāśakatva-svabhāva-virahe sati sva-prakāśakatvāsiddheh - SR, VII-4 (tika). 5. SR, VII-21.
6. J. Ward, "Psychological Principles", p.24. London, 1933.
7. SR, VII-4.

Against this Jīva and Baladeva argue that even though knowledge be taken in the third sense, it does not follow that it is a subject-objectless abstraction. The world of things and events will be unintelligible if it were such an abstraction, as indeed it turns out to be in the notion of indescribability (anirvacanīyatā) of the world. The only possible alternative is to describe knowledge as Power (śakti) or dynamic act.¹

Another argument of the Advaitin to prove that there is no internal differentiation (between the 'act' and the 'subject') is that knowledge can never be known as the knowing subject without becoming an object of knowledge and thereby ceasing to be the knowing subject. As against this, it is argued that experience (anubhūti) has two aspects-² first, it is revealed unto itself through its own existence (sva-sattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam) and second, it is also revelation of an object (viśaya-sāadhanatvam).³ It cannot reveal an object without being revealed unto a subject, nor can it be revealed unto a subject without revealing an object.⁴ When there is no external object to be revealed, it itself becomes an object of revelation unto itself.⁵ This self-objectification does not make it non-conscious, for it retains its character as experience (na ca anubhūtair anubhūti-gocaratve śabdādivaj jāḍyāpattiḥ). There is a direct revelation of the Self. The Advaitin is wrong in saying that consciousness would cease to be consciousness if it were to be self-conscious, that is to say, an object of consciousness. On the contrary, if it were not self-conscious, it could not be conscious of the not-self. All knowledge is therefore, knowledge of a subject about an object. "The form of consciousness cannot be expressed by any single term which does not recognize the duality of subject and object."⁶ In other words, knowledge is not a mere 'that' (sat), but is always also a 'what' (tattva) (tattva-svabhāva-virahe tattvāsiddher anubhāvāntara-gocaratvāc ca tucchataiva syāt.)⁷

Again it is said by the Advaitin that knowledge itself has no knowable characteristics (bodhya-dharmāḥ) and at the same time

1. Jīva himself refers to the Śrī-vaishnavas (ie., the school of Rāmanuja) to whom he owes the argument. SS, p.29.
2. The terms jñāna and anubhūti are used almost interchangeably.
3. SS, p.98. SR, VII-4. Cf. SB, pp.79 and 88.
4. sva-sattayaiva ghaṭādi-prakāśakatvam netyarthah . . anubhūter viśaya-prakāśakatva-svabhāva-virahe sati sva-prakāśakatvāsiddheḥ - SR, VII-4 (tika). 5. SR, VII-21.
6. J. Ward, "Psychological Principles", p.24. London, 1933.
7. SR, VII-4.

it is claimed that it is self-evident and eternal. These two are contradictory statements. To be sure, eternity and self-evidence are characteristics of knowledge which can never be abstract. It can exist only as possessed of characteristics. It may be contended that by calling it eternal and self-evident what is meant is that it is not non-eternal and not unconscious, and not that it possesses the qualities of eternity and self-evidence. The contention is however untenable. To say that it is ~~not non-eternal~~ and not unconscious is the same as saying that it possesses the negation of non-eternity and of unconsciousness as its characteristics. A determination may be a negation or an affirmation. In other words, a characteristic may be negative or positive. Whether we say that negation presupposes affirmation or that negation is like other qualities inherent in affirmation, we have to admit these characteristics which are of the nature of negation (abhāva-rūpāḥ dharmāḥ). Otherwise the Advaitin's statement of denial of non-eternity and of unconsciousness makes no sense. Therefore the theory of pure undifferentiated consciousness (nirviśeṣa-jñāna) is untenable.¹

Further, there can be no proof for the existence of such pure undifferentiated knowledge. A proof is different from its probandum. And if there is a proof for this abstract knowledge, it cannot be identical with it, but must belong to it or be connected with it as its mark or characteristic. It therefore follows that pure uncharacterisable knowledge (nirdharma-ka-jñāna) cannot admit of proof without ceasing to be so.²

According to the Advaitin what is called the knower or the Subject of knowledge cannot be the knowledge nor the Self (ātman) which is of the nature of knowledge itself. To be the knower is to perform the function of the knowing agent (jñāna-kriyā-kartṛtvam) and as such it must be capable of change and activity. But since the Self is unchangeable, the function of the knowing agent cannot be exercised by it. What then is the knowing agent? If it is not the Self, it must be the egoity (aḥaṁkāra). But the latter is itself non-conscious and non-real. Knowerhood therefore is not natural or essential to the Self but is only a case of projection (adhyāsa) in the pure Self.³

The Advaitin would further argue that the 'knower' is not the Self, as is evident from the judgment "I am the knower", in which the knower is identified with 'egoity', which again

1. SR, VII-5. Cf. also VI-59 (tīka). 2. SR, VII-6. Also SS, p. 89.
3. SR, VII-3. Also SS, p. 100.

as the Sāṃkhya says, is an evolute of the "Great" non-spiritual principle (mahat-tattva). That this 'egoity' is unconscious is also evident from the judgment "I am fat", in which it is identified with the body. If it were the same as the Self or consciousness, there can be no consciousness when it falls asleep. Since however that is not a fact and there is continuity of consciousness when the man wakes up, it must be admitted that, the Self as consciousness is different from the knower which is nothing more than the above-mentioned 'egoity'. Jīva¹ while admitting that the knower is not the physical body, would nevertheless find nothing objectionable in the description of the Self as consisting of two aspects (aṃśāh), one that witnesses and the other that is witnessed: and such manifoldness is justified, as we shall see later, by his concept of uni-location (samānādhikarānya). Baladeva² in the same strain would say that it is a matter of fact ~~and~~ that the quality of 'knowerhood' is an eternal quality of the Self, for it is related to the very origin thereof (autpattika-dharmatvāt).³

Among the other objections that have been raised by Baladeva, in common with Rāmānuja against the exclusion of "knowerhood" (jñātrtva) from knowledge or the Self, mention may be made of the following:

1) What is called the knower (jñātr) is not the knowing agent (jñāna-kartr), but is the locus or substratum of this knowing (jñānāśraya).⁴ The point that knowledge or the Self which is of the nature of knowledge (jñāna-svarūpa) can be a substratum with the power of knowing as its attribute, is explained by means of an analogy. Just as the sun which is of the nature of light also possesses the power of illuminating other objects and just as this illuminating power is non-different from the sun, so also the Self, which is of the nature of knowledge, possesses the power of knowing other objects and this power is non-different from it.

1. SS, p.102.

2. loc. cit.

3. It is to be remembered that the Advaitin would also admit such a distinction, but would only relegate it to a lower level, insisting that the two levels must be kept separate. See P. Deussen, *System des Vedānta*, p.105, Leipzig, 1906. Some would admit that the self is an object of itself in self-consciousness, but would conclude therefrom that, it is not the real self. See Bhācker, "Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda, 1. Die Schüler Śaṅkaras", p.47. Wiesbaden 1951. The fundamental difference between Advaita and the Philosophy of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is based on this—the naive interpretation of the latter and the insistent logical transcendence of the former.

4. SR, VII-3, 8 and 9.

To put it in other words, what is meant by the 'knowing agent' is not that the Self produces knowledge with the help of the mind and the external object, in the same way as the potter produces a pot with the help of clay and the wheel. It would be right not to call the Self, 'knower' if such were the case. Such however is not the case. What is meant is that knowledge is always there in the Self and is related to it through the peculiar relation of viśeṣa.¹ The function of the mind which is active, is only to manifest it (abhivyanjakam).² Hence when there is any such manifestation of say, a physical object, the knower is indeed the Self.

2) A distinction should be drawn between the pure or the subtle egoity (śuddha or aprākṛtāhaṁkāra) and the gross egoity (prākṛtāhaṁkāra). The former is the Self and it is the latter that is the product of matter (Mahat) to which the Advaitin refers.³ He (the Advaitin) says that there is no other egoity except the latter and that in the judgment "I am knowing", the 'I' stands outside the knowledge and is of the nature of a non-ātman or non-self. If however the knower 'I' is a non-self, why is it apprehended by the I-cognition (aham-pratyaya) and not by it-cognition or you-cognition (yuṣmad-pratyaya) by which a non-self is ordinarily apprehended? The sense in which "I" can be an object of knowledge to myself is entirely different from the sense in which a chair or a table can be an object of knowledge. The "I" is the Subject and is known as such, but the chair is always known as a non-subject. Though we can always say that I am the same Person of whom I am thinking, the same cannot be said of any other object of knowledge. To say that the "I" (aham) can be known as a non-subject is a contradiction in terms.⁴

3) The reflection of knowledge in the inner sense or the egoity and the consequent appearance of one or the other as the Illuminator is impossible. Knowledge cannot be reflected in the egoity, for neither of them according to the Advaitin possesses materiality or ostensity (rūpa). When all knowledge is described as abstract and qualityless, the question of reflection does not arise. Some other Advaitins maintain that

1. Baladeva sometimes uses Rāmānuja's term "dharma-bhūta-jñāna" See GB, II, iii-26. For viśeṣa see below, p. 59.

2. SR, tika, p. 302.

3. Cf. Jīva Gosvāmin, PS, p. 107.

4. yo hy aham-jānamīti pratīti-siddhau jñātāram yuṣmad-artham bruyat tasya tu prasur-me-vandhyeti vyāhatārtho vyāhārah- SR, VII-7.

one of them appears as the knower by superimposition (adhyāsa) of one on the other. But the question arises, who is the author of this superimposition? The inner sense cannot be the author, for it is unconscious and cannot appear as a conscious agent prior to the superimposition; nor can the author be knowledge, for (according to the Advaitin) it is non-dynamic and cannot appear as a conscious agent prior to superimposition. The Self according to Baladeva is however by nature a conscious agent.¹

4) For similar reasons, the argument of the Advaitin that just as iron which has no property of burning objects, may appear to have that property imparted to it by contact with fire, so also the inner sense which has no property of illuminating objects, may appear to have that property imparted to it by its contact with knowledge, also falls to the ground. The analogy is false. The property of burning objects, imparted by fire to iron, is a natural property of fire. But the property of illuminating objects, imparted by knowledge to the inner sense, is not admitted by the Advaitin, to be a natural property of the former. How can X impart to Y, a property which X does not possess? If however the Advaitin says that knowledge has the property of illuminating or revealing objects, he must then abandon his theory of pure quality-less or undifferentiated knowledge (nirdharmaka-jñāna).

From the above, it follows that besides the gross 'I', there is a subtler (aprākṛta) 'I' which while being of the nature of knowledge is the knower (jñātr) as well. It is the ever present witness (sākṣin) of all that happens. It is there in all states of consciousness. It exists not only in waking consciousness (jāgrat-avasthā) and in dream-consciousness (svapna) but also in the state of deep sleep (śusupti), when there is no knowledge, no awareness whatsoever. No doubt in deep sleep knowledge does not witness external objects. But this happens not because it loses its witnessing nature, but because there are no external objects to be witnessed by it, in that state, or there are no objects to be realised. The Self is the knower as well as the content of the knowledge.²

Baladeva's conception of Sākṣin is borrowed from Rāmānuja and differs not only from the Advaita theory, but also from that of Madhva. According to the Advaita,³ the Sākṣin is the

1. SR,VII-8(ṭīkā). 2. TS(ṭīkā),p.112: GB,II,iii,26-28.
3. Deussen,op.cit. p.230, 350.

pure Self. It is the witness of all knowing in the sense that it is the presupposition of all knowing. As such it is itself never witnessed. As regards Madhva, it may be noted that he considers the witness (sākṣin) to be a sense,¹ in addition to manas (the sense organ for internal perception) and the five external senses. It is called a sense organ because it is the means by which pleasure, pain, time, space and the Self itself are perceived or intuited. The concept of this Witness as a sense forms a very peculiar and special feature of Madhva's philosophy² and is not accepted either by Jīva³ or by Baladeva. The latter would not make it a sense, for that would mean to limit its function, whereas it continues even in the state of release. Nor is it as the Advaitin says never known. In fact it is known in every act of knowing. To witness (sākṣitvam) means to know without the medium of anything else, say the sense organs which we employ in waking consciousness. It is unmediated (and not merely immediate) knowledge (sākṣāt-jñātrtvam). It thus denotes the Self (aḥam-ārtha). Knowledge that reveals objects of the outside world other than the Self, requires the medium of the sense organs. But unmediated knowledge (sākṣād-jñānam) requires no sense. It is itself the witness. This also explains how we are aware of ourselves even in deep sleep, that is, how we are aware even of the absence of knowledge (ajñāna-sākṣitva). No sense is active when we are asleep and yet we wake up and say "I did not know anything. I was sound asleep." The sākṣin is thus the Self and is the witness both of our knowledge as well as when that knowledge (of the outside world) is absent.⁴

There is still another difficulty if the Self is taken to be pure unqualified knowledge, and it consists in the difficulty of explaining the operation of the final true knowledge of the Self, which according to the Advaitin is the means of salvation. He would explain it by saying that since knowledge is self-revealing, the operation of knowing or the object-form mode of the mind (vṛtti-vyāpti) is required only for removing the ignorance about the nature of the Self.⁵ When this is done, there is no further need for this object-form

1. pratyakṣam sapta-vidham sākṣi-ṣaḍ-indriya-bhedena-
Sarvamūla, Vol.1, p.235. Nirṇaya Sagar Press Ed.
2. M.Hiriyanna- Essentials of Indian Philosophy. p.197. London
3. SS, p.6. 1951.
4. SR, VII-12. Also SS, p.102. Jīva also calls it ajñāna-sākṣin.
5. SR, VII-21(ṭīkā)

mode of the mind and the Self, undifferentiated and without Subject-Object distinction shines by its own light. This is what is meant by the Scriptural statements which enjoin Self-knowledge as the means of salvation and not that it must be an object of itself. This is further borne out by Scriptural statements like "that which the mind cannot comprehend" (yan mano na manute) etc. To this Baladeva replies that the order of sequence as stated by the Advaitin is wrong. It is not right to say that the ignorance is removed first and then there is the illumination of the true nature of the Self. On the contrary, the illumination must first take place, before the ignorance can be removed. Further, if the ignorance is removed where is the need for further illumination? Lastly, as the inner sense (antahkarana) is destroyed as soon as true knowledge arises, how can there be any form or mode (vyāpti) of knowledge, be it functional or otherwise? Hence the very notion of knowledge as pure existence (sat) devoid of all differentiation, is wrong.

Then again, ones introspective knowledge of the Self is not of the nature of mere 'being', but of the nature of a knowing self. My immanent perception reveals not mere existence, but a concrete Self. When I think of myself as the same person that in my childhood had seen my father and today in my old age see my grand-children, I see myself not as mere being but as a self having such and such experiences, in the form of recognition (anubhavitur+evāsmadarthasya tattvena pratyabhijñānāt).¹

Now let us turn to the Object. Can there be knowledge having an unqualified something for its object? This is another point of dispute between advaita and non-advaita vedāntins. The advaitin says that while in determinate knowledge (savikalpaka-jñāna) the object is something qualified, in indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka-jñāna) it is something devoid of all qualities i.e., it is mere sat. This is very similar also to the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas, but Rāmānuja gives a different explanation. For him knowledge is always of something qualified- always determinate. What is meant by indeterminate knowledge is knowledge, devoid of some of the qualities and not of all qualities as such. There is never any reception (grahana) of knowledge that is devoid of all qualities. When anything is known, it is always known as possessing some qualities like triangularity or cowness and so on. The distinction

1. SR, loc. cit.

between the two forms of knowledge, indeterminate and determinate is explained by him in the following manner: the first perception of a cow for example, consists in perceiving a 'this' qualified by 'cowness', that is, as possessing a dew-lap and so on. The next stage is where there is repeated experience of the object and we find that this 'cowness' is not peculiar to this concrete object but is common to other individuals as well. The first is indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and is so called because it consists in perceiving a 'this' qualified by 'cowness' not known to be an invariable concomitant (anuvṛtta). The second is determinate (savikalpa) and is so-called because it consists in perceiving a 'this' qualified by 'cowness' known to be an invariable concomitant (anuvṛtta) of all such objects.¹ It is in this distribution of the feature cognized (in this case- 'cowness') that the savikalpakatā consists. Nirvikalpaka for Rāmānuja does not mean devoid of all qualities, but perception of an individual as such and its attributes have no reference except to itself. It follows therefore that savikalpaka or determinate knowledge is general while nirvikalpaka knowledge is concrete: but both of them have a qualified something for their object.

The distinction between indeterminate and determinate knowledge is drawn but not explained by Jīva.² It has however been held that according to him nirvikalpaka-jñāna is indeterminate knowledge or simple apprehension and savikalpaka-jñāna is determinate perception of a qualified object.³ No reference is given, but a passage which might be so interpreted runs as follows: "nirvikalpatayā sāksāt-kṛtaḥ prāthamikatvāt, brahmanas ca bhagavatā eva nirvikalpa-sattā-rūpatvāt vicitra-rūpādinirvikalpa-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭasya bhagavatas hi sāksāt-kṛtas-tad-antarajatvāt tadīya-svarūpa-bhūtam tad-brahma tat-sāksātkāra-spadam bhavatīty arthah"⁴. All that is here meant is that Bhagavat is the proper object of direct cognition, for Brahman is included in the former's essence and is merely its initial

1. nirvikalpakam nāma kenacid-viśeṣena-viyuktasya grahanam, na sarva-viśeṣa-rahitasya . . . tatra prathama-piṇḍa-grahane gottvader anuvṛttākaratā na pratiyate dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-grahaneṣv evānuvṛtti-pratītiḥ - SB, I, 1-1. p.69.
2. SS, p.6. Strangely enough on p.98, Jīva says that nirvikalpaka jñāna is free from error. No further light is however thrown on the subject.
3. S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.761. London, 1948.
4. BS, p.18.

indeterminate perception. Brahman is the unvariegated existence or being of Bhagavat. It follows from the cognition of the latter who is qualified by wonderful ostensity and such other determinate qualities (vikalpa-viśeṣa). What Jīva is here interested in, is to describe Brahman as an object of unmediated knowledge (sākṣātkāra) with the object of proving the comparative poverty of immediate knowledge of Brahman (ie., God as the logical ground) as distinguished from the immediate knowledge of Bhagavat (ie., God as Person). The former is related to the latter in the same way as the first and the second apperceptions of Rāmānuja. Further in the same context Jīva shows that the knowledge of Brahman, cannot be the perception of mere existence. Even if we say that it is merely of the nature of knowledge and bliss, it must possess the quality of being the counter-correlate (pratiyogin) of unconsciousness and sorrow.¹ So all that Jīva means by indeterminate knowledge is knowledge of a qualified object but without awareness of all the properties.

The next question that we have to answer is this. Does knowledge prove itself (svataḥ-pramāṇa)? The question is answered in the affirmative by all vedāntins - advaita and non-advaita. Whenever knowledge arises in the mind, it always does so with a conviction or belief that it is true (yathārtha)². Now what are the conditions that are to be satisfied in order that the correspondence of knowledge to its object may be a true correspondence? In other words, in order that knowledge may be true knowledge? Again how is it known whether or not these conditions have been satisfied in a given case. The first question relates to the origin of validity (prāmāṇya-utpatti) and the second to the recognition of this validity (prāmāṇya-graha). Each of them has elicited two different answers. In reply to the first question, the Nyāya says that the conditions of knowledge may be divided into two classes - general and special. The general conditions are the conditions of all knowledge true and untrue. The special conditions may again be divided into two classes viz., special conditions of true knowledge and special conditions of untrue knowledge.

1. pratibodha-mātram iti ajasra-sukham iti ca jadasya dukkhasya ca pratiyogitayā pratiyate- BS, l.c. SS p.39.
2. Cf. "Our principle should be to accept the deliverances of experience (both perceptive and introspective) as to the nature of reality except when they contradict one another."- Dawes Hicks. Mind, July 1925, p.179.

Let us take the case of perception. The general condition of all perception true and untrue, is the contact of the sense with the object. The special condition of a true perception is the contact of sense with a qualified object (viśeṣya) connected with a quality (viśeṣaṇa). The special condition of an untrue perception is a defect (doṣa) in addition to the contact with an object qualified by a distinct attribute. The conditions from which the truth or the untruth of knowledge arises are different from the general conditions of knowledge. The Naiyāyika theory about the origin of validity and invalidity is therefore called the theory of dependent validity (para-āp-
prāmānya) and dependent invalidity (parataḥ aprāmānya). By dependent is meant "from conditions which are different from the general conditions of knowledge."

The Naiyāyikas maintain that knowledge is neither self-revealed nor self-validated. The knowledge of a jar reveals the jar but not itself. For its own revelation it is dependent on another knowledge called self-operative-knowledge (anūvya-
vasāya jñāna).¹ This knowledge is of the form "I know the jar" and reveals three objects, the 'I' or the self, the jar and the knowledge of the jar. That by which the jar is revealed is different from that by which the jar-knowledge is revealed. The former is revealed by the jar-form knowledge (ghaṭa-jñāna) and the latter itself is revealed by the self-operative knowledge. Just as the jar-form knowledge is revealed not by itself but by another moment thereof, so also its validity is not revealed by itself but by another knowledge. The knowledge by which its validity is revealed is called the validity-form knowledge (prāmānya-jñāna) and is different from the former. The two moments of knowledge are different, for they arise from different conditions. The knowledge of the jar arises from the contact of the senses with the jar, but that of its validity arises from the knowledge of its leading to successful activity (saphala-pravṛtti-janakatvam).

The Nyāya theory is rejected by all Vedāntins on the ground that if knowledge of validity of a knowledge were dependent on another knowledge, it would lead to a regressus ad infinitum. The knowledge of the pot is therefore identical with the know-

1. Cf. Alexander's distinction of "enjoyment" and "contemplation". Russell would seem to discredit any such distinction. He says, "if an experience is one thing and knowing it is another, the supposition that we always know an experience when it is happening, involves an infinite multiplication of every event"-An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth, p.49. London, 1948 .

ledge of its validity. In other words any item of knowledge is self-validating.¹ Cognizing a jar consists not only in perceiving it but also in believing in the validity of the jar-perception. Our belief in the validity of the perception is invalidated when the appropriate effect does not result from our acting in that belief: that is, "unless we are compelled by some contrary evidence to doubt their validity or to infer their falsity."² Thus while belief in the validity of a knowledge is natural and arises of itself (svataḥ) independently of any other knowledge, disbelief in its validity is mediated or dependent (parataḥ), that is to say it arises from the knowledge of its failure to produce the desired effect.

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Baladeva all agree in holding that knowledge is self-illuminating(svayam-prakāśa), in the sense that it is itself revelation or light (prakāśa) and that as such it can reveal other things but cannot be revealed by them. But can knowledge be an object of its own illumination? This is a point over which there is difference of opinion between the Advaitins on the one hand and the non-Advaitins on the other. The former say that the self-revealing nature of knowledge militates against its being an object of illumination, not only by other things but also by itself. Knowledge cannot be produced either by the physical influence of the things around or even by some inner operation. It is sui generis. Baladeva, while agreeing that knowledge is sui generis, would contend that it is illuminated by itself though not by other objects.

Baladeva argues that the Advaitin's contention that if consciousness were to be an object of consciousness, it would become non-conscious(jada) and therefore cease to be consciousness does not stand to reason. For whenever consciousness itself is apprehended, it is apprehended as consciousness and never as non-consciousness.³ What really is meant by saying that knowledge is self-illuminating, is that it reveals objects unto itself, that is, that it is an end unto itself. It does not reveal the objects for the enjoyment of some other entity. There is therefore no contradiction involved in saying that knowledge is always bi-polar and that it always reveals itself. The sun, which is of the nature of light, does not become non-light, by becoming the object of the eye, which is of the nature of light.

1. Though as mentioned above all Vedāntins hold this view, there is however difference of opinion between the Advaitins and the non-Advaitins: See Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Calcutta. 1927.
2. Dutta & Chatterjee, Introduction to Ind. Phil. p. 377.
3. SR, VII-21. Calcutta, 1944.

If knowledge is self-illuminating and self-validating, how is it that erroneous cognition takes place? Why should error be at all? Different answers have been given by different schools of Indian Philosophy. The works of Jīva and Baladeva do not however throw any clear light on this problem. It is indeed mentioned by Jīva here and there in his writings, but never as a problem by itself. It is only in the obiter dicta that we can glean something of his theory. But all that we could gather from his statements here and there is that unless there is similarity between X and Y, there can be no illusion of one in the other. We perceive a shell as silver because there is the common element of whiteness in both of them. This is however merely a psychological or genetic explanation of the origin of erroneous perception or illusion. This is clear from another example he gives in the same place. We see the sky as blue because of the scattered, extremely fine rays of sunlight.¹ What Jīva here intends is only to point out that no illusion or error is possible without the foundation of a qualified something. It is the white colour which is the basis of my shell-silver error. Some more light is thrown on the problem by Jīva in his Paramātmā-sandarbhā, when he says that it is only when some real object is perceived as something else that error arises. An imaginary object like a "sky flower" (kha-puṣpa) is never the ground of erroneous perception.² It is always a shell, or a rope or some such object that is at the bottom of the illusion. Two points therefore follow from this. According to Jīva, the ground of error is 1) something real and 2) something qualified and not empty being.

Baladeva also does not think it necessary to state this problem explicitly. Only in his commentary on the Tattva-sandarbhā of Jīva do we find a reference to this problem. Heva denounces perception as a valid source of information just for this reason- viz., that it is liable to error (bhrama).³ He defines error as the perception of something in something else (atasmin tad-buddhiḥ). This something that is perceived here is not unreal but is real elsewhere (anyatraśiddha). We do not however get any further light. How does the object that exists elsewhere, come to be perceived at all? Is it due to a kind of memory (smṛti-rūpaḥ) as Śaṅkara says, or is it due to some special form of intuition (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa) as the

1. SS, p. 98.

2. PS, p. 191.

3. TS, p. 20 ff.

Nyāya says or is it something entirely different? We do not get an answer to this question.

We may however note here that the theory as it is fragmentarily given by Jīva and Baladeva is in certain respects different from that of both Rāmānuja and Madhva. According to Rāmānuja, the so-called illusory silver, in a case of a false perception of shell as silver, is externally real and exists here and now. Both in shell and in silver there are shell and silver elements commingled with one another. Why then is a thing called shell and another silver? A thing is called shell when the shell-elements preponderate over the silver-elements. Contrariwise it is called silver when the silver-elements preponderate over the shell-elements. In the so-called silver illusion, an unreal silver is not perceived as real silver, nor is an internally real silver (ie., a mental or a subjective something) perceived as externally real, nor is something existing elsewhere now brought in contact with my senses by some unintelligible means. What in this case happens is that silver which forms a non-preponderating element, is perceived as a preponderating element. According to him therefore, since everything is immanent in everything else, there is no question of something being seen for something else. From the account that we have given, it is clear that Jīva and Baladeva do not seem to assent to such a theory.

Madhva's theory is also different from theirs. According to him, though there is the mistaking of something for something else, it is the unreal(asat) that appears as the real (sat). He would not ofcourse with the Buddhists admit that the wholly unreal appears as the real, but that what is unreal here and now, appears to be real here and now.¹ The status of the object of the erroneous cognition is that it is unreal. It is neither internally nor externally real. Such a standpoint ought to lead to a nihilistic theory of the world. Jīva and Baladeva avoid such a strange and apparently contradictory theory, by accepting a more or less naive theory of error, which resembles the anyathā-khyāti-vāda of the Nyāya realists, but would not presumably go to the bitter end.

1. atyantāsadeva rajatam doṣa-vaśāt śūktikāyām āropyate- The word aropyate is explained by Satyadhṛma Tīrtha as sad-rajatatvena jñāyate- Tattva-saṃkhyānam, Folio 6 (Madhva Vilas Book Depot, Kumbakonam.) Glasenapp however says that the object of erroneous cognition is not unreal(unwirklich) like the hare's horn. (Op.Cit. p.17). This is not clear unless we interpret the word as inconceivable. It is because of this that R.N.Sarma says, that Madhva came very near Buddhist nihilism- See "The Reign of Realism in Ind. Phil." p.626. Madhva Vilas Book Depot, Kumbakonam.

Now arises a further question. How, if the validity of the object perceived is revealed by knowledge itself, can it be later negated by a subsequent knowledge? Wherein does the power of the later cognition lie that it can negate the former? And then what exactly does it negate? This leads to the problem of the nature of the negating perception (bādhaka-pratyaya).

So far as the first question is concerned, it is clear from what we had already said that the badge of its validity is not external to knowledge but is natural to it. When one realises the true nature of an object, after an erroneous perception, the subsequent moment of knowledge arises along with a claim for its validity and since the former state or former object is in contradiction with it, it is said to be erroneous. But then when we say not-silver, what exactly is it that the bādhaka-pratyaya negatives? Does it negate the reality of the object, does it negate the entire psychic state of knowing or does it negate merely the locus of the object?

The Advaitin would say that the negating perception (bādhaka-pratyaya) denies not only the silver but also the silver-cognition. It is the entire psychosis that is negated. The non-Advaitins all agree that it does not deny the silver-cognition as such. But to the further question, does it deny the existence of the silver (ie., the object of illusory cognition) or not, different answers are given.

Rāmānuja says, what the bādhaka-pratyaya denies is the preponderance of silver here and not the existence of silver altogether either here or elsewhere, for the silver-element does exist in the thing called shell and also in other things.¹ As against Rāmānuja, both Madhva as well as Baladeva agree in holding that it denies the existence of silver. But while Madhva says that it denies the existence of silver here and now ie., the silver that is the object of my erroneous cognition, absolutely, here as well as elsewhere, Baladeva says that it denies the existence of silver here in the shell and not its existence elsewhere.

According to Baladeva not only are the objects seen in erroneous cognition real, but so also are the dream-objects.² All cognition is cognition of the real and dream-cognitions are no

1. Bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvo 'pi bhūyastena upapadyate, SB, p.200.

2. GB, II, ii-29.

exception. In saying this Baladeva is here in substantial agreement with Rāmānuja. In fact, if we compare the dream-theories of Rāmānuja, Madhva and Baladeva, we find that all the three agree in many respects and where there is difference, Baladeva is one with Rāmānuja. According to the latter,¹ dreams are, as distinguished from cognitions of waking consciousness, vitiated by sleep and such other defects (doṣas) of the senses and are contradicted in the waking state. This contradiction does not mean that the cognition itself is negated, for we still say "I saw a dream", but what is negated is the object.² The negation of an object seen in a dream (svapna-padārtha) does not however make it unreal. It is created by God and so is real. Only, it is real at a different level of creation. Rāmānuja further explains the origin of dreams in the following way:

Dream-objects are created by God for the duration of the dream period and presented before the individual for his enjoyment in fulfilment of some minor deserts (karman) or the effects of good and bad actions. Since God is both the agent as well as the material cause of these objects, it follows that they are independent altogether of the physical world. They are also independent of the public world of other men, for the instrumental cause (karana) is the good and evil deeds of the dreamer alone. These dream-objects are therefore private though real. In short, the dream-world is as well a creation of God, as the physical world and therefore as real, but whereas the former is created for the individual according to his deeds, the latter is created for all according to the karman of all.³

Madhva's explanation of dreams is similar in its epistemological aspect, though somewhat different from Rāmānuja's in its metaphysical aspect. When we awake from a dream, we say "it was all a dream: it was not a snake at all". Such judgments negative the existence of the dream-object. Nevertheless, it is not unreal (asat) like the silver in the erroneous cognition of shell⁴, for they are created by God with the intent of giving a man his deserts. He would however differ from Rāmānuja, in so far as God, according to him, is not both the material and efficient cause of the dream-objects (as is also the case with him so far as the physical world is concerned.)

1. svapna-jñārāni hi nidrādi-doṣa-duṣṭa-karana-janyāni bādhitāni - SB, II, ii-28.

2. arthasya badha na jñānasya - SB I, i-1.

3. SB, III, ii-1 to 5. Also see P.N. Srinivasachari, "The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita", p. 51. Madras.

4. Madhva-bhāṣya, II, ii-29

Baladeva in developing his theory of dreams refers with partial approval to the view that the objects perceived in dreams are memory-images of objects previously perceived. They are of a short duration and are negated in the waking state.¹ Epistemologically however the dream-objects are perceived in the same way as the objects of daily life. Further, the objects perceived in dreams, produce the same results or have the same pragmatic efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritā) as objects perceived in the waking state. For example, the perception of the beloved in a dream produces the same pleasure as ones perception of her in waking consciousness. Hence for Baladeva also dream-objects are real but private.² They are not however sublated (bādhita) in the same way as the silver in the shell-silver cognition, for all that negation here means is the disappearance of the object.³ (That is, there is no inherent contradiction, as in the case of an illusion.) Since God wills its existence, He can cause it to disappear as well. The non-existence in this case, which is due to a fiat of God, is not therefore the negating factor of the objects seen in a dream cognition nor of the cognition itself.

Thus while for the Advaitin, the function of the bādhaka-pratyaya of a dream is the same as that of the negating factor of erroneous cognition ie., to negate the existence of the dream-object as well as of the ignorance that produced it, for Baladeva its function is not to cause the non-existence either of the object or of the dream-cognition. In fact dreams are a means of communication with objects (which are supernatural) that are not to be perceived due to limitations in the waking consciousness.

We find therefore, that Baladeva, as opposed to the Advaitin and in partial conformity with Madhva and Rāmānuja, tries to establish a realistic and more or less naive epistemology. The main features of this epistemology are that, all knowledge is knowledge of the real, including the knowledge obtained in erroneous cognition and in dreams, that all knowledge reveals qualified objects and not pure existence and that in this process, the Self always reveals itself as the knower or the Subject of the experience.

1. GB, II, ii-29.

2. svāpna-draṣṭṛ-pum-mātrānubhavyam: Loc. cit.

3. parasyeśvarasyābhidyānāt samkalpāt tirohitam svāpnikaṁ rathādī na tu śukti-rajatavad tasya bādhā: GB, III, ii-5.

Chapter III

The Sources of Knowledge.

We shall devote this small chapter to the discussion of the sources of knowledge - a subject which is discussed more by theologians as the problem of Revelation, than by philosophers, but which is always given an important place by philosophers in India under the section pramāṇa.

Now, the means of valid knowledge are not the same as the means of invalid knowledge. But the relevant question for us is, what are the different kinds of means from which valid knowledge (pramā) arises? The word pramāṇa is used in two different senses- sometimes to denote knowledge and sometimes the source of its origin, but we shall be using it, as is more common, only in the latter sense.¹ Jīva gives a list of ten pramāṇas,² a list which is said to be taken from the ancients (ie., a list that we meet with in the Purāṇas). They are:

- 1) Perception (pratyakṣa)- knowledge derived from the contact of the object with some sense-organ, as in seeing, hearing etc.
- 2) Inference (anumāna)- knowledge derived through the sign's invariable association with the signata (vyāpti-jñāna), which is the means of inference.
- 3) Testimony (śabda)- The statement of or direct communication with a trusted person (āpta-vākya).
- 4) Ancient lore (ārṣa)- the statements of the ancient sages (ṛsis) and the gods (devas).
- 5) Analogy (upamāna)- knowledge derived from the similarity of a familiar object to an unfamiliar object.
- 6) Presumption (arthāpatti)- perceiving an unintelligible fact that leads to the presumption of another fact for its explanation.
- 7) Non-cognition (abhāva-pramāṇa)- knowledge derived from the non-cognition of something.
- 8) Implication (sambhava)- the cognition of something by the cognition of something else in which it is implied, as say 10 is implied in 100.
- 9) Tradition (aitihya)- a body of knowledge that is handed down from person to person, from generation to generation.³

1. Madhva for example draws a distinction between what he calls, kevala(chief) Pramāṇa and anu(subsidiary) pramāṇa. The former is God and the latter are what we mean by the pramāṇas.

2. SS, p.5.

3. It is thus different from śabda. The āpta or trusted person is one who has had direct knowledge of what he says, but in aitihya, the person who speaks has no direct knowledge. He himself had learned it from his forbears.

10) Gestures (ceṣṭā)- knowledge obtained from the gestures of another.

In spite of this long list which are all accepted as capable of producing valid knowledge, not all are said to be of the same importance. Different systems of Indian Philosophy have given different sources of knowledge and what one school accepted as valid and authoritative was not accepted by another. The scale varies from the extremely sceptical soft-speakers (Cārvākas) who would accept no other source than perception as valid, to the Paurāṇikas who accepted any source, so long as it was consistent with their faith. If one examines the sources mentioned above, one can find that they overlap and the classification is not really scientific. We find therefore that attempts are made by all the three leaders of the Caitanya school to reduce the number to a smaller and less unwieldy one.

Jīva Gosvāmin does not explicitly say that these ten pramāṇas are to be reduced to three as the latter writers do. But we find that in trying to assert the supremacy of testimony (śabda) as a source of knowledge, he points out the fallibility of perception and inference and the independence of śabda. Having done that he thought it not necessary to prove it in connection with the other sources of knowledge because when perception and inference are discredited, there is no need to examine the rest. Thus it is implicit in Jīva, that of the ten mentioned above, the really important ones are three viz., perception, inference and testimony.¹

When we come to Rādhā Dāmodara, we find an explicit statement that the sources of knowledge are three.² He does so, by first stating that there are nine pramāṇas and excludes ārṣa which he considers misleading³ and then by showing that the list is overlapping and that they can really be reduced to only three. Let us see how it is done.

1) So far as comparison (upamāna) is concerned, it is not different from inference. It consists in the knowledge that the name yak (gavaya) is applicable to this object which is similar to the cow (go): and it arises from the statement "as is a cow, so is a yak", which is after all only the invariable concomitance (vyāpti). As dependent or derived from such a relation, it cannot be said to be different from inference. If it is said (as the advaitin does) that the knowledge of similarity of

1. SS, pp.5-11.

2. VS, kirāṇa:I.

3. See above, p.9.

this animal to a cow is due to sense-object contact, then it becomes a case of perception and therefore nothing is gained by admitting it as a separate source of knowledge.

2) Presumption (arthāpatti) is also an inference. It is of the form "he must be eating at night, for he is getting fat despite his not eating during the day". This argument also is based on the invariable concomitance between growing fat and eating. The former is the sign and the latter is the signatum, and since eating during the day is excluded, a fortiori must he be eating at night. Hence it is a case of inference.

3) Non-cognition (anupalabdhi or abhāva-pramāṇa) is also a form of cognition. The negative character is not due to a special feature of the cognition itself, but due to the perception of the back-ground qualified by the absence of the object in the fore-ground.¹ We have already stated that according to all the writers of the school, perception does not mean the perception of a mere 'existence', but is always that of a qualified something. The non-existence of the jar at a given place (ghatābhāva) is perceived as a quality of the ground, between which and my eyes there is actual contact.

4) Implication (sambhava) is also inference. Here too is the knowledge derived from the invariable relation of inclusiveness, say between 10 and 100.

5) Tradition (aitihya) taken in its literal sense is not a reliable source of knowledge at all, because it produces doubt (samsaya) on account of the absence of the author of the source. If however it proceeds from a trusted person (āpta), then it is the same thing as testimony (śabda).

6) Gesture (ceṣṭa) is the same thing as perception. (Baladeva in the list of pramāṇas which he gives in the last prameya of his PR, leaves ceṣṭa out.)

The reduction of the long list of the sources given in the more popular Purāṇas to three is nothing new. Some Naiyāyikas had accepted these three as the only correct sources, long before.² As opposed to the Advaitins and the Mīmāṃsakas, the sectarian commentators of the Brahma-sūtras had accepted exactly these three, perception, inference and śabda as the only valid sources. It is not important to find out who was first responsible for this triple source of knowledge. It is likely that it was once again due to the influence of Madhva and Rāmānuja, who accept these three alone.

1.. The argument is the same as that of the Nyāya, against the acceptance of anupalabdhi.

2. For example Bhāṣvarāja. See S.Radhakrishnan: L.C., Vol.II, p.40.

Not all the three are however given the same importance. Perception and inference though useful cannot have the same validity as testimony. The reason why perception is not so valuable a source as testimony is that it depends on the individual's senses, which are liable to go wrong. And inference is also unreliable for it depends on perception. Testimony, being independent of the senses, and being the statement of a "trusted person" is invariably right.

There are according to Jīva, four defects of the cognizer that vitiate perception and through perception also inference. They are:

- 1) Susceptibility to error (bhrama). For example on seeing a head produced by the trick of a magician (though we know it to be so and not real) we perceive it as real, as an object and say "it is a head". (To give another example, though we know that the moon is one, we still see it double when the eye-ball is pressed). Thus the senses can never be trustworthy.
- 2) Inattention (pramāda). Sometimes due to sheer inattention (asāvadhānatā) we perceive something as something else or we may fail altogether to perceive.
- 3) Intention to deceive (vipralipsā). Jīva does not explain this. It is therefore difficult to say what exactly he means - whether this desire to deceive (vañcanecchā) is self-deception or deception due to the agency of some outside agent.
- 4) Limitation of the senses (karanāpātava). The external senses on which we depend for perceptual knowledge are limited in their capacity. Distance, smallness of the objects, darkness etc., are conditions that limit the extent of our perceptions, or do not permit the senses to obtain valid, certain knowledge.

On account of these limitations perception is not reliable and the same therefore applies to inference. When I see smoke on the mountain and with the help of my knowledge of the invariable connection (vyāpti) between smoke and fire, say that there is fire there, I am making use of the inferential method. But the perception of the smoke itself may be wrong: or my perception of the vyāpti may be inadequate. In this case the smoke may be due not to burning wood, but it may be rising from fire that has just been put out. The inadequacy of perception (due in this case to the great distance) is responsible also for the falsity of the inference. It is clear therefore that neither perception nor inference can give us absolutely certain knowledge. As long as we entertain doubt, we cannot be said to be in possession of knowledge.

Testimony (śabda) is thus the only source that is devoid of all defects mentioned above and thus is the only reliable source of knowledge. Any statement of any person cannot however be accepted as testimony. The other person may be as much deluded as myself. In fact Locke did not accept this as a valid source of knowledge on the ground that a) he who gives the testimony may be mistaken or b) he may be an impostor.¹ But śabda is not to be understood so naively as that. The clue to the proper understanding of this source that has been accepted by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy, consists in the understanding of the word āpta (trusted person) and in a phenomenological analysis of the state of knowing.

An āpta is described in the following words in Vātsyāyana's commentary on Nyāya-sūtra, I,i-7: "An āpta is one who has direct knowledge of what he teaches and is actuated merely by the desire to convey the information to another."² Having direct knowledge does not mean, mere perception of an object, but consideration and cogitation. The āpta assimilates knowledge after due thought and pondering over the implications and thus his knowledge is a firmly established (sudṛḍha) one and is not doubtful.³ According to the Naiyāyika testimony is the statement made by any learned and trusted person.

The Vedānta had however from the beginning used śabda in a more narrow sense. Already in the Upaniṣads, we find statements that the Real cannot be ever known by perception and inference i.e., through Reason. It is only through testimony in the sense of the Scriptures (the Vedas and the Upaniṣads) that true knowledge can be obtained. Thus the source of all knowledge came to be regarded as God Himself- or to put it in other words, the Word of God or Revelation. The only āpta therefore is God (Himself or through His Incarnations). We find that in some of the definitions of śabda given by the later Vedāntins (the sectarians), the fact that there could be any other source of knowledge is excluded by definition. Vedānta Deśika, a well-known follower of Rāmānuja, would define testimony as knowledge that is never contradicted and is never taught by any one other than the āpta or God.⁴

1. Essay on Human Understanding, IV, Chap. 15 & 16.

2. aptaḥ khalu śaksātkṛta-dharmāḥ yathā-dṛṣṭārthasya cikhyāpayiṣaya-prayuktaḥ upadeṣṭā.

3. sudṛḍha-pramāṇena avadhāritāḥ śaksāt-kṛtāḥ dharmāḥ. l.c.

4. abadhitārthakatvam anāptānukṛtītvam iti- Nyayapariśuddhi of Vedānta Deśika with the Nyāyasāra of Srinivasa, p. 561 Chowkhamba Ed.

Jīva Gosvāmin gives five reasons for the superiority of testimony (ie., the Scriptures) over the other means of knowledge:¹

- 1) All other sources of knowledge are subject to doubt and error. The knowledge revealed by the Scriptures however are not subject to the same limitations. (No doubt can be entertained about what one receives as a matter of faith.)
- 2) It is independent of the other sources of knowledge. The converse is not however true. (No perception and inference is possible unless we have learnt already on authority from parents)
- 3) The function of the other pramāṇas is only to act as ancillaries and aids (sācivya-karṇa). ie., only to unfold the information obtained therefrom.
- 4) Testimony can negate the other sources of knowledge, even as the testimony of astronomy negates the perceptual knowledge of the heavens. But the latter cannot negate testimony.
- 5) It alone is capable of giving us information about supernatural (alaukika) objects, which are absolutely inaccessible to the senses.

We thus notice that the dogmatism of the religious beliefs gain ground and even perception becomes subordinate to testimony. This however is not something new. There have been many sectarian philosophers before Jīva who had done it. Śrīnivāsa for example, following Vedānta Deśika also says the same thing. He draws a distinction between the perception of the ascetic (yogi-pratyakṣa) and of the non-ascetic (ayogi-pratyakṣa) and says that the former is established only through (the study of) the Scriptures (āgamaika-siddham).² Jīva draws a similar distinction between scriptural (vaiduṣa) and non-scriptural (avaiduṣa) perception. The former is knowledge derived from the Vedas. The latter is likely to be wrong and does not always carry conviction like the former which is the source even of testimony (śabdasyāpi tan-mūlatvāt)! Jīva goes to the extent of establishing the superiority of testimony not only in regard to matters supernatural, but also in so far as the objects of daily life are concerned. He holds that even in daily life perception might mislead (at least sometimes) but testimony does not. One may not be convinced of what he sees or hears because one has been deceived, time and again by his own senses. But of what one hears from a trusted person, from one about whose veracity there is no doubt, one can legitimately have no uncertainty.

1. SS, p.5 ff.

2. Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p.72-73.

Take for example statements like "there is snow (hima) in the abode of snow (himavat ie., the Himālayas)" or "there are pearls (ratna) in the bed of the pearls (ratnākara ie., the sea)". These statements can never be wrong. Though they deal with normal objects of experience and are not supernatural, still we cannot all verify the truth of these statements, nor can we arrive at this knowledge by perception. It is beyond the capacity of every person to go to the Himālayas and see the snow there. We have to accept it as true when another person, who has had the experience and whom we trust, describes it as such and such. (The spirit of the argument seems to be that since the individual cannot expect to have direct cognition of truth, particularly of facts like the existence of pearls in the ocean, which is known only to the pearl-diver, he must depend on the statements of the experts.)

Even in simpler cases we can point to occasions when what has not been observed, suddenly is revealed when some one points it out to us. For example, when a man is counting a party or team and by mistake leaves himself out and is wondering as to what the matter is, and then some one points out "you are the tenth man", then the truth suddenly dawns on him. It is not perceived. It is revealed directly through what the other man says. Similarly testimony is capable of negating even inference. When on seeing the smoke swirling over a distant mountain, some one infers that there is a jungle on fire and is informed at that moment by another person that the smoke is not coming out of fire, but is due to the rain that has put the fire out, the truth that there is no fire is atonce revealed. What inference could not do, is here performed by testimony, by the heard word.²

It would appear from the above that Jīva's arguments commit the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam. It is true that perception and inference might sometimes go wrong, but is it ground enough to denounce them altogether and subordinate them to a more dogmatic and less sure means of knowledge? Does not testimony also sometimes mislead? Jīva's attempt seems to be a flight from doubt and insecurity into the arms of naked dogmatism. Such doubts have been common throughout the world of

1. The examples chosen by Jīva, "himācale himam" and "ratnākare ratnam" are of such a nature, that one would suspect a trick: for one could take these statements merely as analytical and thus bound to be formally true, in the same way as the statement, "the blue sky is blue". Baladeva also repeats the same examples, GB, II-i, 27.
2. The emphasis on the heard word was never so great as in the Caitanya school. In the form of ritual, it is found in the practice of the priest uttering the name of Kṛṣṇa, in the ear of the householder.

philosophy and sometimes naturalistic explanations of the source of this Authority have been given. For instance, Ward traces it to "intersubjective intercourse", Taylor to "consensus gentium" and Alexander says that "beliefs get sorted out" by "clash of minds". Such naturalistic explanations, even if they were available to Jīva, would not have satisfied him. For him, the only source of incontrovertible knowledge is the Word. The basis of all knowledge is the word, as we see for example, in the case of children. We also notice that wolf-children are dumb and stupid, for they do not have the opportunity of hearing anyone use the words. The eternal Word therefore, that is, the Scriptures, is the absolutely dependable source.¹

It might be asked, how is perception which is prior (jyēṣṭha) be untrustworthy and yet testimony which is posterior (kanīṣṭha) be trustworthy? Jīva answers in the words of Vācaspati (whom he quotes anonymously, perhaps because he is an Advaita philosopher): "It cannot be said that since perception is prior and untrustworthy, testimony which comes after, must also be untrustworthy. In the case of the illusory perception of a rope as a snake, the prior perception of the snake is wrong and the posterior perception is correct. Further testimony is independent of individual experience (apauruṣeya) and so is devoid of all imperfections."²

In giving such importance to the Scriptures or to testimony, Jīva seems to be going even beyond Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. In so far as the physical objects of the world are concerned, Śaṅkara would consider perception an adequate means of knowledge.³ Madhva holds that perception is the most important source of knowledge and that testimony (śabda) depends on it. According to him perception and inference are the supporters (upajīvyā) and testimony is the supported (upajīvaka). Scriptural testimony by itself cannot produce knowledge unless there is unmediated realization (sākṣad-anubhava).⁴

The above difference would appear more fundamental than it actually is, unless we remember that Jīva's definition of perception (pratyakṣa) is different from that of the other schools

1. SS, p.8 ff.

2. Bhamati (with Kalpa-taru and parimalā) Ed. Mm. Akṣaya Kumār Śāstrin, p.9. Calcutta.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, op.cit. II, p.515.

4. See Viṣṇu-tattva-nirnaya. Also R.N. Sarma, op.cit. p.268.

of Vedānta. The Vivaraṇa school of Advaita, Rāmānuja and Madhva would all define perception as direct revelation. It might be obtained by sense-object contact or by hearing without sense-object contact. Jīva (and Baladeva after him) adopt the Nyāya definition that all perception involves sense-object contact.¹ Even in the state of deep sleep, the occurrence of dreams etc. is possible because of the presence of the subtle body (linga-śarīra). We have already pointed out in the previous chapter that in deep sleep there is no experience because there is no object to be experienced, but the self (with the subtle body) is there. No mode of knowledge is possible without the subtle body and no perception without presentation.

Though Jīva accepts the Nyāya definition of perception, he would not admit that Scriptural testimony is based on perception as the Nyāya would argue.² Of course, the origin (utpatti) of the understanding of scriptural statements is based on perception - that of the words and syllables. But the origin being dependent does not mean that its meaning or its validity (pramiti) is also dependent on perception. It is true that the significance comes after the perception i.e., the hearing, but it is more fundamental than the latter and in fact it is perception which is purified by the study of the Scriptures.³ Just as the true perception of the (real) shell comes after the perception of the (false) silver, and yet succeeds in supplanting the latter, so also the perception of the letters or hearing them, does not last after the origin of their significance, which is really independent.⁴ Nor do Jīva and Baladeva accept the theory of the Nyāya that the Vedas or the Scriptures owe their authorship to God. They are eternal. They are the embodiments of Knowledge and Truth and are not the products of any individual (apauruṣeya).

Though testimony is thus the most powerful source of knowledge, it does not come into conflict with our normal (sām-vyavahārikam) perceptual knowledge and destroy its validity.⁵ In this normal day to day world we accept what is general or common.⁶ Only so far as the ultimate reality (tāttvika-vastu) is concerned have we to renounce perception, as we do when faced with supernatural (alaukika) phenomena like the efficacy and occult powers of magical chants (mantra) etc. This again

1. TS, pp 196-200: also SR (tīkā), VI-60.

2. S.C.Chatterjee: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p.127-128,

3. SS, p.9.

4. loc.cit.

Calcutta, 1939.

5. na hy āgama-jñānam sāmvyavahārikam pratyaksasya prāmānyam upahanti, SS, p.10.

6. sarvatrikam eva, - SS, p.11.

is quite in conformity with the general standpoint of the other Vedāntins. Rāmānuja explicitly states that there can be no conflict between our knowledge of the worldly things and our knowledge of the preternatural world, for their objects (viśaya) are different.¹

Like perception, inference also is not always reliable. The homotopicity (samānādhikaraṇa) of the major and the middle terms on which inference depends is sometimes wrong. It follows that Reason has only a subordinate part to play in investigating the nature of the Ultimate Reality ie., God. Reasoning (tarka) as Baladeva defines it, is the assumption of (the existence of) the pervaded (or probandum) through the assumption of (the existence of) the pervader (probans).² It consists in asserting Y through the assertion of X (where Y is pervaded by X). That is, we cannot here go beyond X, which we happen to know. But all pramāṇa must possess the quality of giving us something new, else how can its claim to be a source of knowledge be justified? It must lead to the untill-now-unknown (anadhigata-gantrtva).³ Specially when we are concerned with the nature of the Supreme Being which is all-pervasive, how could Reason be of any avail?

Further, we have it on the authority of the Scriptures, that Ultimate Reality cannot be known by the reasoning capacity-naiṣa tarkena matir-āpaneyā proktānyena saññānāya preṣṭheti. It is true that we do make use of Reasoning, but that is only to ascertain the meaning of the Scriptural statements when there appears to be an apparent conflict between earlier and later statements in the Scriptures. It is thus only a tool to be used, but not itself capable of revealing or bringing home truth or knowledge.⁴ The scope of Reason as a method or a source of knowledge is limited. Thus the function of knowledge in the sense of ratiocination, as in Western theology, was only to act as a handmaid to religion.⁵

The question ought logically to come to an end here. But Jīva devotes quite a lot of his skill in further defining what exactly these Scriptures are and in defending sectarian texts. Being a sectarian religion, Bengal Vaiṣṇavism had to assert the exclusive authority of its God viz., Śrī Kṛṣṇa and to point out

1. Vedārtha-saṃgraha, p.8.

2. Baladeva's tika on the TS, p.23.

3. SR, V-6.

4. SR, I-14: also GB, II, 1-11.

5. Cf. "The task of the intellect in revelation is as important as it is extensive. . . but error and confusion result however when the role of the intellect is changed from that of control to that of source of knowledge".-Nathan Söderblom: The Nature of Revelation, p.112.

His superiority over the other Gods in the Hindu Pantheon and specially over Śiva who is the God of the other important school of sectarian philosophers, the Śaivites. Thus here we come to the most dogmatic element of Jīva's philosophy. One cannot really prove this. Jīva does not try to do so either. What he does is simply to propound a theory or rather a belief, which was in fact current long before him and which might have been the justification for the origin of the Purāṇic literature. The authoritative texts as we had shown above were the Vedas and the Upaniṣads which were called the śrutis. Later on due to changes in the social and political atmosphere few people could understand these difficult sources and popular literature in the form of the Purāṇas came into existence. These Purāṇas stated that as in the dark (kali) age which prevails now, men's intellect is bound to shrink, they will not be able to understand the original Vedas. Hence God, having taken pity on mankind established the easier source of knowledge viz., the Purāṇas. Hence while the Śrutis cannot be traced to any person and are eternal (apauruṣeya), these latter works are traced to some Deity¹. And which of the Purāṇas were honoured depended on the particular sect to which a person belonged. Of all the Purāṇas the Bhāgavata Purāṇa came to be accepted as the most authoritative by the Vaiṣnavas. Jīva and Ba adeva, in conformity with the tradition of all Viṣṇuite schools, accept it as the direct revelation of God. Its author is said to be Vyāsa, one of the partial-incarnations of Kṛṣṇa Himself. To prove that the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is really the work of Vyāsa himself (ie., the Supreme One Kṛṣṇa Himself) and that it is the most authoritative commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, what they do is to quote a number of passages from the very same Purāṇa and other Vaiṣṇava Texts, stating it to be so. So far as other works are concerned and the other Incarnations of God, they are explained away as being due to the necessity of deluding the evil ones.² It requires plenty of faith indeed not to see the circle here and to accept that the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is the source par excellence of all our knowledge about God and also about most of the objects that matter here. But one cannot understand

1. These books had the ambitious plan to encompass all that a man could like to know. They might be said to be encyclopaedias and contain cosmology, eschatology, psychology, history, political science and even the fine arts, like the rules of temple building etc. They had therefore a very wide reception and almost replaced the study of the more recondite texts. The scope of the Purāṇas is laid down in the Purāṇa itself- See BP, XII, vii- 8&9.

2. SS, p.9.

their religion unless one remembers the child-like faith they had in the validity of all that the Purāṇas said.

Not only are the esoteric sources of knowledge of the religious beliefs carefully detailed, but the rules of interpretation are also laid down. We shall not deal with these rules of interpretation, because they are not different from those of the other Vedāntins - not even from those of the Mīmāṃsakas. The same six signs (lingas) viz., introduction and conclusion (upakramopasaṁhāra), repetition (abhyāsa), novelty (apūrvatā), goal (phala), supplementary statements (artha-vāda) and concordance (upapatti) are accepted.¹ But what is interesting is that in interpreting the authoritative literature and in making it serve ones end, sometimes extremely artificial and far-fetched meaning is forced out of them. For example, Baladeva would like to explain the name "Nīla-kaṇṭha", which has become almost a proper name of Śiva, to denote Viṣṇu instead.² And this he does by interpreting the term "Nīla" which literally means 'blue' as signifying 'sapphire' and since Viṣṇu is described as having a chain of sapphires round his neck, ergo the term refers to him and not to Śiva, in that particular context! And all this despite the instruction of Caitanya that the texts must always be interpreted literally (abhidhā) and only where it is not possible, is the figurative meaning (lakṣanā) to be sought!³

Nor would Baladeva hold with the Naiyāyikas, that the meaning of a word is merely conventional (sāṁketika). Such a standpoint would make the value of the word ie., the Scriptures non-eternal. He holds on the other hand that the relation between a word and its object is natural (svābhāvika). Every word has a power (śakti) to denote certain objects.⁴ This relation between the word and what it denotes is eternal. He holds with Madhva that the word always has a denotation and a connotation. In fact words have four functions - they signify, an individual, a universal, an action and an attribute. Since therefore a word always conveys something positive, Baladeva is in complete disagreement with the apoha-vādins, who say that the meaning of a word is understood not directly, for words cannot denote anything positive: but indirectly through the denial of things other than what is implied. I understand the meaning of the word 'cow' by realizing that it is not-horse, not-ass and so on. Baladeva says that the object is directly known from the word.⁵

1. SS, p.21: Baladeva also accepts the same: SR, VI-64.

2. SR, III-35.

3. CC, p.186.

4. SR, IV-20.

5. SR, VI-59.

Not only that. The object is revealed directly by the word and not through the medium of any mysterious tertium quid (sphoṭa) as some grammarians want to assert. These grammarians ask, since by the time the second word is uttered the first had vanished, how can the significance (tātparya) of the whole sentence be understood? They answer that each word has a mysterious sphoṭa which continues even after the word had been uttered and which is responsible for the meaning. But this is an unnecessarily devious explanation and nothing is gained by inventing this new entity. It is thus better to say that the words together produce the meaning. And the words are eternal though the individual utterances are not. Thus the eternal words that have been put together by the eternal Kṛṣṇa Himself, for the weak and helpless man of the Kali age, viz., the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is the source of all knowledge.

Thus the most important source of knowledge is the Bhāgavata. Caitanya, during his life-time spent most of his time hearing or reading this book or the other works written by Jayadeva, Vidyāpati and other poets inspired by it. It is however to be remembered that the reading of the Bhāgavata or any other Scriptural Text, does not give rise to knowledge. The Self is not like a receptacle into which knowledge is poured, nor is it like a lump of dead matter which gathers knowledge on reading the Scriptures. Knowledge is inherent in the Self and is eternal. We have already noticed in the last chapter that there is no difference between knowledge and the knower. The latter (ie., the Self) is knowledge and this knowledge which appears to be a quality of the Self (dharmabhūtam jñānam)¹ is eternal. On account however of the Self's turning its face away from God (bhagavad-vaimukhyam) the knowledge remains hidden, in the same way as manhood is dormant in childhood and later manifests itself. Ignorance is the soul's childhood. Due to the reading of the Bhāgavata and the company of the good (sat-sanga) this inherent eternal knowledge manifests itself. The seeing of the words or their hearing etc. are only means of expression, not of origin or production.²

1. Both Jīva and Baladeva use Rāmānuja's expressions dharmabhūta and dharmi-bhūta-jñāna, but they do not mean exactly the same thing. For all the three they are eternal, but whereas for Rāmānuja, the relation between them is one of non-separable quality (aprthak-siddha-viśeṣaṇa), for the other two it is one of śakti and śaktimat. So while for the former there is a relation of difference (bheda) between them, for the latter it is one of bhedābheda. Rāmānuja calls the first a dravya (substance) ! The latter, śakti.

2. indriya-samyoga-rūpa kārana-sāmagrī tu tad-abhivyaṅjikā, GB, II, iii-29.

Chapter IV Ontology.

The ontology of all the Schools of Vedānta, is centered round the question of the nature of identity and difference, and different schools of Vedānta are named after the position they maintain: thus the names non-dual(Advaita), qualified non-dual (Viśiṣṭādvaita), dual(dvaita) and so on, came into existence. Both Jīva and Baladeva call their own system "unthinkable difference cum non-difference" (Acintyā-bhēdābheda) and claim it to be different from the other schools of thought. But examination reveals that it is an eclectic system and has many points of contact with almost all other systems of Indian Philosophy, though explicit allegiance is paid only to Rāmānuja and by Baladeva to Madhva. On account of this eclecticism it is difficult to say that as it stands today, it is similar to this or that school. Different scholars have therefore tried to identify the system with different well-known older schools. Bhandarkar says that it is akin to that of Nimbārka,¹ while Radhakrishnan would align it with Rāmānuja.² While Carpenter agrees with Bhandarkar, others go to the extent of identifying it with that of Madhva.³ Others again say that though the system is syncretic as it stands, it is original and yields a new system.⁴

It is not necessary to give a resumé of the various theories that have been advanced by the various commentators of the Vedānta sūtras from Śaṅkara to Śrīkaṇṭha, but if we compare the commentary of Baladeva with them, we do find many points of similarity to the sectarian ones of Rāmānuja, Madhva and Nimbārka. Nevertheless, the system as it stands is different from any one of them. As in the case of these earlier writers, for Baladeva also, the main opponent is the Advaitin and many of the essential theories, many of the Key-stones of the system are developed in the course of the polemics against the Advaitin. As usual a very large part of the literature is in the

1. R.G.Bhandarkar: Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and other minor Religions p.85. Strassburg, 1913. Glasenapp also aligns it with Nimbārka op.cit: Einleitung, p.44. Dr. Rama Bose says that Baladeva's position is the same as that of Nimbārka, except that the internal difference (svagata-bheda) in God is not admitted. See Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha of Nimbārka & Vedānta-kaustubha of Śrinivasa, Vol.III, pp.224-225.
2. Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.764. London 1923/48.
3. C.Hayavadana Rao, Śrīkara Bhāṣya, Vol.I, pp. 180-183. Bangalore 1936. Svāmī Prajñānanda, History of Vedānta Philosophy (in Bengali) p.836. Calcutta.
4. Gopinātha Kavirāja: Introduction to Siddhāntaratna, Benares, 1927.

form of polemics against the Advaitins and other non-sectarians and non-believers. But we shall refer to them only in elucidating certain points where such polemics throw light on the point at issue. For the rest, we shall seek for what Jīva and Baladeva say.

The positive bases of the system are stated in the form of a verse¹ by Baladeva in his PR(I-8). These truths are nine in number:

- 1) Hari (ie., Kṛṣṇa) is the Supreme Reality;
- 2) The Scriptures are the only source of knowledge about Him;
- 3) The world is real;
- 4) Differences are real;
- 5) The individual souls are real;
- 6) There are differences of degrees of merit and demerit among them;
- 7) Salvation (mokṣa) is the attainment of the feet of God;
- 8) The means of salvation is the disinterested service of God;
- 9) The sources of knowledge are perception, inference and testimony.

Though this summarizes in a nut-shell, the main conclusions of the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism, we shall not be concerned with all of them in this chapter. Points 2 and 9, we have already discussed. We shall confine ourselves in this chapter to 3,4,5 and 6.

In chapter II we have seen that all objects of cognition are real: nothing that is not real could be an object of cognition. Hence for Jīva and Baladeva, God, the individual soul and the world are all real. But not all of them are independent. God is the Supreme Real and the individual souls as well as the world of experience (jagat) depend on Him. They have their being in God. And yet they are real because they are the transformation of the Energy (Śakti) of God. This however does not lead to the conclusion that the imperfections of the world must also be attributed to God. The transformation is not one of His innate (svarūpa) Energy but that of His external (bahiranga) Energy. To understand these theories, we

1. This verse which is quoted anonymously by Baladeva is said to be attributed to Madhva's famous disciple Vyāsarāya. Vide: B.N. Krishnamurty Sarma, "Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Pluralistic Theism"- Journal of the Annamalai University, 1932. Glasenapp cites the stanza at the head of his book on Madhva, cited above.

must first understand what is meant by causation through transformation (ie., the transformation of the material cause out of which the effect arises), and explain the concept of Energy (Śakti) which transforms itself and which plays such an important role in the philosophy of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism.

The Theory of Material Causation:

The central problem in the theory of causation as envisaged in Indian Philosophy, is that of the identity and at the same time the difference of the effect from the cause. This corresponds at the epistemological level, to the novelty and the necessity of the consequent. How can something be produced or said to be produced, unless it be something different and at the same time how can it be said to be produced out of something else, if it is so different from the latter? Generally speaking, two answers have been given. One, that of the non-existence of the ~~of the~~ effect (in the cause) or the asat-kārya-vāda and the second, that of its existence (in the cause) or sat-kārya-vāda. Baladeva, in agreement with the Vedāntins and as against the Naiyāyikas, adopts the latter doctrine. As against the former, he has the following objections to make:¹

- i) If the effect did not exist in the cause (in a subtle form) and came to be at a later stage, we ought to find the effect as having double the mass of the cause. But this is not true. The weight of the pot is not double that of the clay which is its cause.
- ii) If the effect did not exist in the cause, then any effect could arise from any cause. Milk instead of oil can be pressed out of oil-seeds.
- iii) If the effect did not exist in the cause in the form of an energy or power (kriyā-śakti: Jīva calls it karyonmukhatva), no amount of effort will bring it about.²
- iv) If we say that the effect did not exist in the cause and that it came into existence, that would be as good as admitting that it came out of nothing, which is absurd. It is in this sense that we have to understand Scriptural statements that not-real (asat) was there in the beginning. It does not mean that the world of things came out of Nothing, but that they were in a subtle state (sūkṣmāvasthā) and that they became

1. GB, II, i-14: SR, VIII-28.

2. Jīva quotes with approval Śaṅkara to the effect that the Energy (Śakti) inheres in the Cause and the Effect in its turn in the Energy, SS, p.30.

manifest later, as the effect ie., as the empirical world.

So far as the second theory, viz., that of the previous existence of the effect is concerned, there are two varieties of it. The Advaita vedāntin held that this existence was essential and so what appeared to be a transformation was not a transformation at all. The ultimate ground of the world, the Absolute, remains the same and what we experience, viz., the variety of things and beings are only an apparent modification (vivarta) and so are mere appearances (mithyā). The others, to wit Vallabha, hold that there is a real transformation of the cause into the effect. The world-ground in its essence undergoes real modification. We see God as transformed into the various objects of our experience. They are not false; they are not appearances. They are God Himself. Jīva and Baladeva (once again they are in agreement with Rāmānuja) do not accept either of the two alternatives. These theories are based on the assumption that all transformation could be only from similar to similar (sadr̥śa-pariṇāma) - that the effect cannot have any fundamentally new characteristics or that no new qualities can emerge. Baladeva however holds that transformation means, transformation into something dissimilar. He tries to cite examples out of our experience. We notice, he says, that worms come out of honey, moths from caterpillars and so on.¹ The purpose of the examples cited by Baladeva seem to be that even living beings can emerge out of dead matter.² It is evident therefore that the effect can exhibit qualities that did not exist in the cause. At the same time Baladeva will not agree with the Nyāya, in saying that the effect did not exist in the cause prior to its manifestation. In spite of the difference in the characteristics, we have to admit that so far as the existence (sattā) of the effect is concerned, it is non-different from that of the cause.³ In fact the relation between the two is due to this existential bond.

Thus not only is there difference (bheda) between cause and effect, there is at the same time non-difference (abheda) between them. The relation is one of identity-in-difference (bhedābheda). When the clay is transformed into the pot, there is difference between them so far as the form of the clay and

1. GB, II, i-6.

2. Cf. the theories of Alexander and Lloyd Morgan.

3. GB, II, i-7.

that of the pot are concerned, but as clay there is non-difference.¹ As Jīva would say, in the causal relation, the cause is the existential or the non-differential aspect and the effect is the differential aspect.² (The causal relation cannot therefore be said either to be external or internal).

Here however, in the exact determination of the relation between the cause and the effect, we find that the explanation rendered by Jīva and Baladeva is a modification of Rāmānuja's. For the latter, "if the relation (of causality) is not external but internal, internality would lead to the identity of cause and effect".³ As he admitted internal difference (svagata-bheda) within God, or the Ultimate Ground of the Cosmos, such a doctrine was acceptable. That is, for him, the relation was external- there is difference between the cause and the effect, though all these differences are reconciled within God (like the other differences say between substance and quality etc.) Jīva and Baladeva however, do not admit such difference within God. We may therefore say that according to them, the relation is internal as regards the effect, for the effect is non-different from the cause: and external as regards the cause, for the cause is different from the effect. The same clay is made into pot, plate, cup, jar and so on. Evidently the clay or the cause cannot be identical with any one of these. It is over and above the products, but the effect cannot claim the same status.⁴ Hence, God who is the Cause of the world of things is different therefrom, but as completely dependent on Him, it is thus non-different from Him.

Baladeva is insistent that his theory of bhedābheda, (or difference cum non-difference) should be distinguished from that of Bhāskara and his followers (whom he belittles as the new-comers, navīnāḥ) who compare the difference between the cause and the effect (and so also that between body and soul, between quality and substratum and between God and the individual soul) to that between the long and the short pronunciation or uttering of the same syllable.⁵

1. SR, VIII-28.

2. PS, p.202.

3. P.N.Srinivasachari: "The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita", p.255. Madras.

4. Cf. Whitehead: "Thus the general principle which expresses A's ingression in the particular actual occasion a, is the indeterminateness which stands in the essence of A as to its ingression into a, and is the determinateness which stands in the essence of a, as to the ingression of A into a. Thus the synthetic prehension which is a, is the solution of the indeterminateness of A into the determinateness of a."- Concept of Nature, p.199.

5. SR, loc.cit.

The example of the syllable, says Baladeva, does not hold good. It is only when the pot is really manifest that it can be used for bringing water. The mere possibility of clay being modified into a pot does not make it a pot. In the case of the syllable however, the possibility of its being uttered long or short resides in it, forms its true nature and so its actual utterance does not bring about anything. The manifestation of the world is not like this utterance of a syllable. Such a relation would lead to the final identification of God and the individual soul, the cause and the effect. Further if there is such non-difference between God and the finite world, then the individual soul will also claim share in the creation of the physical world, which is absurd. Elsewhere Baladeva clearly emphasizes the difference between the world as the effect(upādeya) and God as the cause(upādāna).¹

Baladeva² would also have his readers, that they distinguish his views clearly also from those of Śaṅkara and of Madhva. Both of them, he claims, hold to a part of the truth; the former to the statements of non-difference and the latter to those asserting difference. The truth is that God, as the cause of all that is, really takes the form of individual souls, of nature, of time and so on. Thus everything as proceeding from Spirit(God) is spiritual. The perception of non-spirituality(jādatvam) is only on the exterior like the gold-plating on a substance. This fact of causation and the corresponding constant transformation of the things of the world is the reason why Baladeva admits that they are not deserving of the term "exist"(asti).³ This does not however mean that they are false, but only that they have no independent existence. What is deserving of the term "exists", is the Spirit (cid-amśa). Matter is constantly changing (pariṇāmī). Since the cause is that which must be perceived both before and after the pariṇāma, it is the spirit(cit) that is the cause.

We may therefore say, that the cause is not exhausted in the effect. The equality of the cause and the effect was based on a wrong notion of Substance which Descartes in his reaction against Scholasticism held and which Spinoza also adopted. Leibnitz, who saw that Descartes' Substance could not account for change and motion, tried to solve the problem by substituting "power" or "spontaneity" for "Substance".⁴ And in doing

1. GB, II, i-6 & 7.

2. SR, VIII-29.

3. SR, VI, 80-81.

4. Leibniz-"Monadology etc."- English Translation and Notes by R. Latta, p. 27 et seq. Oxford, 1925.

so, he threw overboard the concept of quantity so far as the world of things are concerned and confined it merely to the 'intensive' factor of the mind. Jīva and Baladeva did not however substitute 'power' or 'energy' for substance, but tried to reconcile the two by making the former essential to the latter, and by making it non-different from it. It brought together the concepts of quality and quantity, by making the cause quantitatively equal to, but qualitatively richer than the effect. It has the power (śakti) in itself of assuming different forms. It has potentialities which the effect does not have. We may therefore say, in the terminology of the Scholastic philosophers, that the cause is not merely 'formally' but is 'eminently' present in the effect.

Thus what is meant by saying that the cause is transformed into the effect is that its power(śakti) has transformed, for power by nature is dynamic. It is not a transformation either of qualities (guṇa-pariṇāma) or of states (avasthā-pariṇāma) or the manifestation of latent qualities(lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma). If we accept the first alternative and say that there is transformation from one guṇa or quality to another, that would be as good as admitting that what was not real becomes real. Nor is there any change in the state (avasthā) of the cause: the cause remains eminently the cause. Otherwise we shall not be able even to say that there is a causal relation as such. We have noticed how Baladeva admitted that the Spirit alone is the Cause, because matter is constantly changing. The third or the lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma is itself not possible unless we admit the existence of some power or śakti that makes such an operation possible. The manifestation of something latent is not mere appearance. There is real transformation and the emergence of new qualities (not of course from absolute non-existence). This transformation is the transformation of the Śakti. Thus Jīva and Baladeva try to explain what Pringle-Pattison calls "the continuity of process and the emergence of real qualities", by this peculiar relation between the cause and the effect. The continuity of the process is preserved by the continuity of the Substance or spirit and the emergence of difference is rendered possible through the category of Śakti. To understand therefore fully this causal relation and before we examine how far Jīva and Baladeva are justified in holding it, it is necessary that we must understand what exactly is meant by Energy(Śakti), which is the "power to produce"¹ that a cause is supposed to have.

1. Fleming, "Vocabulary of Philosophy", p.77.

The Doctrine of Śakti:

The concept of Energy (Śakti) is fundamental not only to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism but to almost all the sectarian Vedāntic systems, that came into existence after the Purāṇic period. In fact the doctrine itself is very much older, but it was for the first time given currency through the revival of the Bhāgavata cult, atleast in its ontological and cosmological significance.¹

Jīva Gosvāmin defines śakti in the words of kāmānuja as follows: "By śakti is meant that special quality of substance (or thing) without which its effect is unintelligible. It is to be accepted as essential to all material and efficient causes. Otherwise, if when there is some specific effect we trace it to some specific causehood (Kāranatva) of the thing in respect of that effect, we shall not be explaining anything at all. Even in the case of an illusory effect as in the perception of the silver in a piece of shell, we see it in the shell and not in cinder (for the latter has no power or śakti)."²

It follows from the above definition that 1) it is not an object of perception but that it is to be presumed as otherwise the causal relation cannot be explained.³ It is clear that the śakti is not an object of cognition, for we do not cognize it. Its existence is deduced from the fact that without it, the existence of the effect becomes inexplicable. We do however perceive causes and effects. Any cause whether it is the causa materialis or the causa efficiens, could be the cause only because it has the power to produce the effect and as such the power is not something external to it, but is its very essence as cause. Some philosophers - the Naiyāyikas - hold that there is no necessity of positing a new category called śakti. It is nothing more than the quality of causality (kāranatva) that resides in the cause. Though this doctrine is not explicitly stated and then rebutted either by Jīva or by Baladeva, it is

1. For the historical origin and development of the doctrine see P.C.Chakravarty, "The Doctrine of śakti in Indian Literature". Calcutta, 1940.
2. SS, p.29. See also BS, p.33. According to the śakti-viśiṣṭādvaitins (Śrīkanṭha) also, it is not an object of perception
3. Cf: "Substance synthesizes conditions into a sufficient condition. This capacity to synthesize conditions into a sufficient condition is the essence of power. To say that something has certain power is to say not only that it has certain characters which when supplemented by others constitute a sufficient condition of the specified result but also that it has the capacity to synthesize. . ."- E.J.Nelson: "A Defence of Substance"-The Philosophical Review, Sep 1947. pp.500 ff.

clear that ^{they} would abhor such a doctrine.

Jīva Gosvāmin argues: If an effect is produced and if we say that it is due to some peculiar quality of the cause, how can we say that it is the cause of something. Even if we say that being-the-cause-of-Y is a speciality (viśeṣa) of X, it does not explain anything unless we take it as a potency or power. Further, if being-the-cause-of-Y were an intrinsic feature (vastu-viśeṣa) of X, how can it produce Y which did not exist? Further again causality (kāraṇatā) itself cannot be proved unless the energy-to-produce-the-effect (kriyā-śakti) is admitted. Till the effect arises the causality is not proved: and as long as the causality is not proved, that Y is the effect of X is also not proved. This kriyā-śakti exists both before and after the effect is produced. It is manifested at the suitable time and place when the proper conditions are there. Causality (kāraṇatā) itself has no meaning unless the dynamic movement towards the effect (kāryonmukhatva) is there.¹

In spite of the fact that it is in the cause before and after ie., that it is of the essence of the cause, it cannot be said to be merely a special feature of the cause or the thing considered as the cause (vastu-viśeṣa). If it were so then the mere presence of the cause must produce the effect. But this is not always the case. For example, fire has the power to burn. But when a certain kind of gem (maṇi) is brought into contact with it, that power is suppressed during the period of contact. Now, fire as a thing is still there, but the power to burn is suppressed. Remove the gem and the power to burn will once again manifest itself. The fact that the thing (vastu) continues to be, while the śakti may or may not be operative, shows that it is not the same as the thing but is a different category.²

2) The second point that follows from the definition is that śakti is neither different from nor identical with the essence (svarūpa) or the locus of the śakti (śaktimat). In other words it is inexplicable (acintya). Power (śakti) never presents itself with the thing except where work is done. It is true that we sometimes think of the power as qualifying a thing, but we

1. PS, pp. 263-264. The "dynamic course of action" is always from cause to effect and yet the course itself cannot be understood without the effect, as it is impossible to have movement without direction. See Eli Karlin, "The Nature of Causation"- The Review of Metaphysics, Sep. 1948. p.71.

2. SS, p.36.

must keep the distinction between quality and power clear.

Now what is meant by saying that this Power is acintya is not that it is inconceivable or self-contradictory. What is meant is that it is not known by the ordinary means of knowledge. The relationship is irrational and so can be an object not of rational knowledge, but of non-rational (or intuitive) knowledge (acintya jñāna-gocarāḥ). According to Jīva Gosvāmin how this comes about is that the relation between the śakti and the śaktimat is said to be different because it cannot be perceived to be non-different, and it is said to be non-different because it cannot be perceived to be different. The influence of the Advaita commentator on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Śrīdhara Svāmin (who is sometimes quoted both by Jīva and Baladeva with approval) is evident.¹

We have to admit the presence of such śaktis which are different from one another and which are deduced from the effects, in all real things. For we find that everything that is, has powers of producing effects.² If everything thus has powers of which we do not know ⁱⁿ advance except when the effect actually takes place, how great and how variegated must be the Powers of God, who is superior to all things of the world and who is the Source ultimately of all that is. He has infinity of Powers far beyond all human comprehension.

Jīva Gosvāmin, having stated that there is difference as well as non-difference between the śakti and its locus, now proceeds to remark, lest he be taken to be opposing Rāmānuja, that though according to the latter, there is difference between the śakti and the śaktimat, yet the standpoint of the two are not different. For Rāmānuja too the concept of śakti is essential and it is said to be of the nature of an inseparable quality (apṛthak-siddha-viśeṣaṇa) and they as-qualifying-the -object, as well as the object-as-qualified (viśiṣṭa) are constant (avyabhicāra), in the sense that their essence remains the same. Thus for both, śakti being internal (antarāṅga) is of the nature of the essential form (svarūpa).³

Power (śakti) is therefore of the essence of a thing, as burning is a power essential to fire.⁴ Therefore it cannot be

1. BS, p.32: also SS, p.149.

2. SR, VI-45. sarveṣāṃ bhavānām pāvakasyoṣṇatā-śaktivad acintya-jñāna-gocarāḥ śaktayah santy eva: BS, p.32.

3. SS, p.33.

4. SR, VI-43.

dealt with as we ordinarily deal with qualities and relations. It is a different category altogether. A contemporary Western philosopher states the same problem as follows- "Though having a certain power does involve certain necessary conditions, power itself is not a set of conditions in the same sense but is of a different order from that of the conditions or of the consequent manifestation. It is not a set of qualities or relations, but is that which makes qualities and relations relevant to other qualities and relations. Hence to have enumerated a set of qualities or relations in answer to the question as to what a power is, is simply to expect the wrong kind of answer. Such a set of qualities or relations would miss entirely the power."¹

While realizing this peculiar nature of śakti or power, Jīva however like Rāmānuja, tries to explain the relation between the power and the possessor of the power, in terms of the relation between the substantive and the quality. For example, in speaking of the Powers of God, he calls them qualities (viśeṣaṇam) and God the concrete qualified object (viśiṣṭa).² That is, like Rāmānuja therefore he admits that there is internal difference (svagata-bheda) in a concrete entity. (This, it must be remembered is not the expressed intention of Jīva. He believes that this relation does not lead to the admission of svagata-bheda, which he expressly denies.) What forms the essence of a thing, can be conceived also as an attribute of the thing. For example, we assert the attribute of 'existence' to a thing which is devoid of the six kinds of change, like birth, growth etc. There is nothing wrong in attributing qualities like 'existence', 'power' etc. to a thing, though they cannot be conceived as different from the thing itself on account of their inseparability. We find similar usage for example, when we speak about the subtle state of existence called 'tanmātra'. A distinction is drawn between say, smell (gandha) and the subtle state of existence of smell (gandha-tanmātra), though there is no perceptible difference between them. What we know, we know only through the sense of smell and there is no other source of knowledge. We

1. E.J.Nelson, loc. cit.

2. BS, p.2. Baladeva also says exactly as Rāmānuja does, that just as there is real difference between the staff and the man, though no difference between the 'qualified object' (dandin) and the person (puruṣa); so is there non-difference (abheda) between Brahman and the 'Possessor of śakti'; though there is difference between Brahman and śakti as such- GB, II, i-13. Nevertheless Baladeva would not admit that there is internal difference (svagata-bheda) within Brahman or God. He differs from Jīva only in so far as he tries to preserve this unity of God through Viśeṣa.

say for example 'the earth having smell' (gandhavatī prthivī). There is no separability here between the two¹, but still we speak about the smell as a quality of the earth-element. In the same way is śakti a quality of its locus though it is inseparable and so cannot be pointed out with the finger (ie., is not possible of being perceived by any other source of knowledge except that by which śakti itself is known.)² Elsewhere therefore Jīva calls it a speciality of the basic function or the nature (dharma-viśeṣa) of a thing.³

In spite of the emphasis on the essential nature of the śakti the interpretation of Rāmānuja and Jīva have to admit an ontological rift between the power and the ground and the assertion of an internal relation or an internal difference is only verbal patch-work. Hume it will be recalled rejected Locke's concept of 'Power' on similar grounds. If 'power' were a quality it could qualify only the cause and not the effect and thus fail to explain the relation or connection: as otherwise "we could foresee the effect, even without the experience"⁴. Madhva also had noticed the unsatisfactory nature of the solution given by Rāmānuja. The notion of something qualified (viśiṣṭa) necessarily involves that of difference, or else it remains understandable. It is only when the two notions, the quality (viśeṣana) and the thing qualified (viśeṣya) are distinct that the relation has any significance. There is however no such difference. The thing is its power: it is its peculiar or special nature (viśeṣa). In this, Baladeva is one with Madhva and so far goes further than Jīva. He does not speak of śakti as a quality (viśeṣana) of its ground. The difference between them is only a 'formal distinction' as that between the waves and the water. Thus also he avoids the admission of svagata-bheda, which otherwise follows logically from the admission of the śaktis.

This had lead some scholars to think that this school has accepted the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the non-difference (abheda) between the power and its ground⁵. This is far from the truth. We have already pointed out that no theory that asserts the transformation of the cause into the effect is acceptable either to Jīva or to Baladeva. The transformation of the śakti does not

1. Jīva is here referring to the doctrine that the different elements of earth, fire etc. have specific qualities like smell, colour, touch etc.

2. SS, p.37-38.

3. TS, p.73.

4. "Hume - Theory of Knowledge": Ed. with Introduction by D.C.Yalden-Thomson. Nelson, 1951.

5. P.C.Chakravarty, op.cit., p.97. For a different appraisal see Dasgupta, History of Ind. Phil, Vol.III, p.35. Cambridge 1952.

mean the transformation of the ground also. The ground does not change, it is only the power that does. Such a theory is not certainly consistent with the Sāṃkhya doctrine that there is identity between the two. Neither Jīva nor Baladeva say that the śakti and the ground are identical. There is non-difference in the sense that power does not exist independent of the ground (śaktimat). Its function is however independent of the latter. There are certain places, where even Jīva speaks of the "non-difference between the power and the essence" (śakti-svarūpayor abhedāt)¹, but if we try to understand such statements in relation to the context, we shall see that what Jīva is trying to do is to distinguish God's essential Power (svārūpa-śakti) from His propriostatic (tatastha) and external (bahiranga) powers. In all these cases however, the relation between these powers and the Ground (God) is one of non-rational difference and non-difference (acintya-bhedābheda).

Thus in explaining the concept of Causality we were led to Jīva's and Baladeva's theories about the nature of power. It is this power that makes causation possible. It has no existence independent of its ground. Nevertheless it is distinguished from its ground by its function and form. Now, is such a theory of relation possible? Is it not a mere confusion of thought and mixing up of categories into an irrational mess? We must thus turn to the theory of relations and the peculiar notion of viśeṣa that Baladeva takes over from Madhva.

The Nature of Viśeṣa : The Nyāya posited two kinds of relations one external (samyoga) or spatial and the other internal or inherent (samavāya). The former was accepted not to be a separate category but to be the same as a quality. The latter was accepted as a separate category. The Vedānta did not find the necessity of the second type of relation. All relation was external in the sense of spatial or existential separation. From this standpoint, the Advaitin was led to the conclusion that all relations are therefore mere appearances. Rāmānuja however admitted the reality of relations which are of the nature of qualities (dharma-svarūpāḥ) and therefore are perceived along with the object qualified (dharmin). Whatever might be the particular kind of relation, each according to Rāmānuja is an instance of the general class-relation of difference (bheda). Difference is the universal (prakāra) and it occurs in different

1. Srīkrṣṇa-sandarbhā, p.13.

modes (prakārin).¹ The difference of A from B, and the difference of A from C are two instances of the same relation, the same jāti.

Such a theory ought logically to lead to the denial of all relations for reasons which the idealistic monists all over the world have so exhaustively put forth. This is the conclusion which Śaṅkara and the Advaitins drew. But Rāmānuja, in order to save his theism, was constrained to explain this by introducing the unanalysable concept which he called inseparability (aprthak). The essence of a thing therefore is its inseparable quality (aprthak-siddha-viśeṣa). It does not however mean that the attribute in every case is inseparable from (or in other words identical with) the substantive, like say the 'blue' and the 'jug' in my perception of the blue jug.² According to him a relation can exist only 'between' two separate or different entities. This difference means non-coextension or mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva). Take for example, the relation between the man-with-the-staff (dandīn) and the staff-the-man-holds (danda). The relation between the two is one of mutual non-existence; that is, there is difference between them (danda-vyatirikto dandītivad bhinnah). But the relation is however a separable relation. The absence of the staff does not bring about any change in the man himself. But the relation between 'man' and the quality 'humanity' is of a different nature, in so far as man cannot be man without humanity and the two cannot be conceived as separate. They are thus, though external to each other (in so far as we have different notions about them), still inseparable. The relation between God and His attributes ~~is~~ of this nature.

Such an interpretation is based on the theory that all relation is ultimately of the same nature and is perceived as a Universal (jāti). Madhva however gives a different interpretation. He also admits that difference involves mutual negation (anyonyābhāva). But he makes difference an object of perception which takes place in the same psychological act as that of the cognition of the object itself.³ It is not the result of a subsequent operation. Whereas for Rāmānuja all difference could be included under the same universal, the specific differences being determined by the relata, for Madhva, the relation in a

1. Nītimāla of Nārāyaṇārya Ed. with Introduction by R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasachari.

2. S. N. Dasgupta: A History of Ind. Phil, Vol IV, p.96. Cambridge 1949.

3. Dharmi-pratītir eva bheda-pratītir iti- Quoted R. N. Sarma Op.cit. p.283.

given situation is not general at all. Whatever is perceived, is perceived as distinguished from everything else. Each instance of a relation is a realised instance of that relation.¹

This standpoint has been worked out by one of the followers of Madhva, Trivikrama, in his Tattvapradīpa in the following way: There is no difference between the quality and the ground (guṇa and the guṇin). For example when we say 'white cloth', it does not mean that whiteness is something that inheres in the cloth. Instead of 'white cloth', we can also use the expression 'white colour'. Here whiteness does not inhere in the colour! White colour has significance only as a determinate of colour. That is, colour has co-extension with white colour (the converse may not be true, but that is not relevant here). We had previously stated that for Madhva also difference means mutual non-existence. But in this case there is no mutual non-existence. And where there is co-extension (sāmānyādhikāraṇam) evidently there is no difference.² Between things as such, or objects of the physical world, we perceive the difference and this difference is essential to the nature of the thing; thus for example the difference between one person and another. But so far as the analysis of a thing and its attributes are concerned, we do not perceive the difference. For instance, we do not perceive any difference between man and the quality of humanity. We are capable however of distinguishing between the two. How is that possible? Is it mere appearance having no foundation in the nature of the thing? Madhva cannot say so in the light of the realistic epistemology he had adopted. He rests it squarely in the thing itself and calls this peculiar relation of distinction without difference- speciality (viśeṣa).

This acceptance of viśeṣa has been criticised as being only a substitute for the Nyāya category of samavāya (inherence). Says Dasgupta, "the Madhvas were more or less forced to this position of accepting the viśeṣas, as they could not accept the samavāya relation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which is rejected by the Brahmasūtras".³ This does not appear to be a correct appraisal. Rāmānuja also for example, in opposition to Śaṅkara adopted the Nyāya epistemology to a certain extent, but did not

1. Cf: "The particular is not something which has a quality or qualities, it is the particularized quality. This animal is particularized animality"-Cook Wilson, "Statement and Inference", Vol.II, p.713. Oxford, 1926.

2. loke ca śukla-pāṭa ity ādyām. tatra śauklya-sambandhāpekṣa-ya śuklatvam iti cen na 'śuklo varṇa' ity prayoga darśanaṭ... sāmānyādhikāraṇam hi sarveṣam abheda pramāṇam".

3. S.N.Dasgupta, Op.Cit., Vol-IV, p.127.

feel compelled to posit anything like the viśeṣa. It is not a substitute for samavāya, for their natures and functions are different. As the same writer explains,¹ "each whole or unity may be said to possess as many viśeṣas as there are qualities through which it expresses itself and each of these viśeṣas is different from the others according to the difference of the quality with which it is associated." This is exactly what is denied by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. They argue that it is cumbersome to assume an infinite number of self-samenesses as the relations in question. Therefore for the sake of simplicity (lāghava), samavāya, which is a single generic relation had to be admitted. The plurality of qualities could therefore stand in one self-same relation.² Then again samavāya was introduced to connect or relate two discrete things (not of course discrete in the sense in which Madhva would use it but as referring to the atoms) and therefore the criticism that it leads to infinite regress is justified.³ The samavāya(inherence) being itself a category had to stand midway between the ground and the quality and could not succeed in bridging them. The viśeṣa is not a third entity, it is not independent and its nature is determined by the object itself. It is this viśeṣa that reveals the difference of the cloth from everything else in the world i.e., it reveals the object's cloth as a distinctive entity and so there is no question of establishing the relation between the object and its difference (from other objects or from its own qualities) by means of a third relation.⁴

The second reason that made Madhva posit this category of viśeṣa was the co-ordination of various Scriptural statements that mention God as possessing various qualities (guṇas) like those of consciousness, generosity and so on. Such a personal God had to be admitted by the sectarians who were by conviction Theists. But a personal God is often difficult to reconcile with the logical and metaphysical theories of Him as the Ground of the Universe. The former requires human qualities and the latter the denial of all such. The difficulty further was that if with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, samavāya(Inherence) is admitted, then the Attributes of God become themselves things (vastu) and so God's possessing these qualities (guṇavatvam) ought to be

1. Loc. cit.

2. Bhāṣāpariccheda(with siddhānta muktāvalī), 11. Calcutta.

3. Vyāsatīrtha; Tarkatāṇḍava, samavayavāda. Mysore, 1932.

4. viśeṣa-pratītiḥ eṣa paśasya tveda iti vat. na hi patad bedasya bhedaḥ anavasthanat- Tattva-pradīpa.

rejected (as the Advaitin does). If however this gunavatva was accepted, then (as in Rāmānuja) God's Essence (svarūpa) is in jeopardy. For Essence implies unity and if this unity is disturbed by the admission of internal difference (svagata-bheda), how then can we say that He has an Essence (svarūpa)? Therefore, the only way to reconcile these two aspects of God - the Unity of His Essence and the variety and richness of His Attributes - is through the concept of viśeṣa. God is one and indivisible and yet it is His nature that He manifests Himself through the viśeṣas in various forms.¹

This rather longish account of Madhva's theory had to be given because there are certain other vedāntins, not belonging to his school, who accepted his theory of viśeṣa, in the modified form that he gave to it. Among all the writers of the other schools of vedānta, there are three who accepted this doctrine. The first is Rādhā Dāmodara to whom we had already referred. The second is an unorthodox follower of Nimbārka, called Hari-vyāsa-deva.² The third writer of importance is Baladeva.

Baladeva takes the doctrine almost as it was put forth by Madhva (with slight difference of emphasis to which we shall refer later). Jīva who seems to have been more influenced by Rāmānuja than Madhva does not appear to have adopted it. According to Baladeva, when we say that the pot is not the cloth, ie, when we perceive the relation of difference or mutual negation between two distinctly existing things, the difference itself is not to be related to the thing. The 'difference from the pot' is perceived in the cloth and is not different from the cloth. It is the nature of the cloth to be different from the pot. Now, the use of this difference, as something other than the cloth itself which is to be related thereto despite its identity, is due to the viśeṣa. Among the various specialities that underlie or constitute the thing called 'cloth', this is one. These specialities are the viśeṣas. Where difference is cognized, as for example between two distinct things, it is not necessary to explain the relation with the help of viśeṣa. In this case there is difference. Viśeṣa is therefore a substitute for difference or is a quasi-difference (bheda-pratinidhiḥ).

1. See Tattva-mañjarī tīkā on Madhva's anubhāṣya by Rāghavenāra Tīrtha. Ed. Anantavasudeva Vidyabhūṣaṇa, p.304. Calcutta.

2. See his Śrutyanta-kalpavallī, pp.9,20 & 21.

Thus where there is difference, there is no viśeṣa. (If we may put it in modern terminology, we may say that it is not a relation of one thing to another (for that is possible only when there is a perceived difference) but is the relation of a thing to itself and thus one type of what Ewing calls "Internal relation".¹ We must however remember that neither Madhva nor Baladeva would call it a relation.

That this relation of a thing to itself (or better the reference of a thing to itself) is not mere possibility, but that we really make use of statements denoting such relation is clear from examples like "Reality is real" (sattā sati), "Difference is different" (bhedo bhinnah), "Time always is" (kālah sarvadā asti). In these examples the reference is to the same object. Hence there is no difference. At the same time they cannot be taken to be purely tautologous. The usage is due neither to delusion (buddhi-bhrama) nor to deception (āropa). The statements are further never contradicted and their contradictories never used. There is thus justification or ground for the use of such propositions. To the Advaitin who would define existence as pure unqualified Being, the motive for such usage is inexplicable. When two words denote the same object, there is tautology. In this case however there is no tautology, because though there is no difference or rift within the Object- Reality or Time, there is still, 1) the use of the relation of Ground and Characteristic (dharma-dharmivavahārah) and 2) the effect of a difference-as-it-were (bheda-kāryah). This dual function is due to the viśeṣa.²

Though we have to explain such statements with reference to the Supreme One or Transcendent objects like Existence, Time and so on, it is not necessary in the case of ordinary objects of every-day experience. So far as the empirical objects are concerned, Baladeva admits that when different words are used, there is always a difference in the objective reference. For example, if we speak of Dittha, being a Brāhmaṇa and being dark-complexioned and being a cook by profession the words Dittha, pācaka (cook), śyāma-varṇa (dark-complexioned) etc. all indicate different objects, as the grammarians say.³ Further in the case of empirical objects, since there is inter-individual differences (sajātīya and vi-jātīya-bheda), the

1. A.C.Ewing: "Idealism", p.119. London

2. SR, I-19. See also tika. GB, III, ii-31.

3. SR, I-29.

attribute is not found in this individual alone, but in others as well. Baladeva would seem to apply the term viśeṣa only to the relation between a subject and a predicate, where the latter has no other subject i.e., where the predicate exhausts its significance in the subject. Scriptural statements like "the True, the Conscious, the Infinite" (satyam jñānam anantam) etc. could be correctly interpreted only with the help of this doctrine. Otherwise the charge of verbosity and tautology have to be levelled against Scriptures, which is absurd : or like Rāmānuja, one has to admit the existence of internal difference in God.

Here we arrive at a point of difference between Jīva and Baladeva. The attribution of different terms like satyam jñānam etc. to God will be accepted by the former in a manner very much similar to that of Rāmānuja and he tries to justify the unity of this object by asserting that despite the different qualities, the locus is the same (samānādhikaranyā).¹ In the same way as we speak of the whiteness and of the brightness of the same moon-light, so do we speak of Truth, Wisdom, Infinity etc. as the qualities of the same God. This does not mean duality (dvya-ātmakatā). The object is one God, one and the same locus. In thus following Rāmānuja, Jīva is naturally forced to admit that there is internal differentiation (svagata-bheda), though he would explicitly deny it.² Baladeva might have been aware of this inherent contradiction and since he wanted to avoid the admission of any difference either within or without God, he adopted the other method pointed out by Madhva.

Though the doctrine of viśeṣa as it is expounded by Baladeva is essentially the same as that of Madhva, we can discern certain minor differences in the application: i) We had noticed that as Trivikrama analyses it, the Universal say, white exists in the cloth, not by qualifying it, but by being realised in the cloth. When Baladeva adopts the empirical standpoint with regard to the ordinary objects of cognition, he seems to hold that one and the same universal is realized in different instances. In concrete things the difference is perceived. The only integrate object (nirbheda-vastu) is God and viśeṣa is the only differentiating principle therein. The other examples that Baladeva gives like Reality (sattā), Time (kāla) etc. are also Transcendent entities, that have no other co-ordinate species. It would thus appear that Baladeva's viśeṣa

comes nearer to the original meaning given to it by the Vaiśeṣika and from which Madhva widely departed.¹ This should not however be taken to mean that Baladeva attributes viśeṣa to the atoms. The similarity lies only in this, that both refer to objects which do not have ~~not~~ more than one referent. (The Vaiśeṣika found it in the irreducible minimum, the atom; and Baladeva in the maximum or the totality, like existence etc.)

There are however two exceptions. Baladeva would seem to explain the relation between empirical objects and certain relations with the help of viśeṣa. They are:- i) the relation between a thing say a pot and its difference from other things, say the cloth. This he does in order to avoid the absurdity of infinite regress. The cloth has in its very constitution, "the difference from pot" (ghaṭa-bhedavān paṭa).² ii) The relation between a thing and non-existence (abhāva). For example when I do not see the jar or am aware of the non-existence of the jar, what happens is that there is sense-object contact between my eye and the ground qualified by the absence of the jar. Here the relation between the ground and 'the absence of the jar' is not one of difference for we do not perceive it, but is explained by viśeṣa.³ This is certainly a departure from Madhva, for the nature of perception was explained in a different way by the latter, as we have already seen.

ii) Baladeva admits the possibility of perception of difference and non-difference at the same time through non-rational knowledge (acintya-bhedābheda). There is no such concept in Madhva. The pluralist that he is, Madhva would admit cognition of difference everywhere. Only where such difference is not cognized, he explains the relation through viśeṣa. It would appear therefore that in Baladeva, this doctrine of viśeṣa is redundant. At most, it is a purely formal principle, giving his system a semblance of rationality.

Lastly, what is the ontological status of this viśeṣa? All the arguments that Baladeva had advanced in his polemics against the Advaitins a propos of the latter's concepts of avidyā and māyā can all be repeated against viśeṣa. But Baladeva had not anywhere clearly stated as to what the metaphysical status of this is. Perhaps he meant it merely as a convenient way of explaining certain of our linguistic usages.

1. Dasgupta, op.cit., IV, p.154.

2. SR, loc. cit.

3. SR, VI-24(tika).

Svarūpa:

Baladeva posits the category of viśeṣa to explain the unity or the individuality of God. All our knowledge of God whether it is derived from the Scriptures or through direct knowledge points to the same God. The diversity of form in which God reveals Himself does not make Him different. His svarūpa is the same. The different manifestations are due to viśeṣa- the principle of plurality that is inherent in the svarūpa.

Thus svarūpa is an important concept in the vaiṣṇava philosophy of Bengal. Now what is meant by this term? Literally it means "own form", but it is not correct to take it as the same as our normal use of the terms "form" or "essence", though we cannot understand the meaning of the term without the help of these terms.

The word "essence" had been used in slightly varying senses by various philosophers. Aristotle himself is supposed to have used the word in three different senses- a) as the form or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of a thing, b) as the matter in which those qualities manifest themselves- the substratum or subject and c) as the concrete individual as constituted by the union of the two preceding¹. The last of the above comes nearest to the meaning of svarūpa. But later again the polarity between essence and substance came to be overemphasized and the infinity and eternity of this Substance was often supported at the expense of the finite and the individual. Thus in modern times the general usage has always been to indicate the common qualities of a thing as a type, without which it will no more belong to the class, for example the essence of a triangle is to have three sides. This is not the sense in which the word svarūpa is used by Baladeva.

'Form' is a more abstract term and is put over and above 'matter'. But this opposition is wrong. There cannot be any such distinctness between the two. "Pre-existing matter could mean only matter existing in another form".² Similarly 'Form' is always of some 'matter'. What we are aware of are individuals and the individual is the concrete entity. This concrete entity or the concrete unity is the svarūpa. That it cannot be taken to mean essence or form is clear from an example given by Rāmānuja and approved by both Jīva and Baladeva. He says,

1. Fleming, loc. cit. p. 166.

2. M.B. Forster, "The Concrete Universal- Cook Wilson and Bosanquet"- Mind, Jan. 1931. p. 2.

"there is no identity of svarūpa in the air element that exists in all the notes produced by the escape of air through the holes in a flute: there is merely the similarity of shape (Ākāra) There is difference of svarūpa between the different tunes thus produced!"¹ As individual tones they are different, though there is substantial unity in that they are vibrations of air. We may therefore define svarūpa as that which makes an individual what it is. We may call it the Principle of Individuality or to use a german word, we may call it the "Eigenheit".²

It is clear therefore that svarūpa cannot be taken as a Form or Universal (neither samsthāna nor jāti). There is svarūpa-bheda between one individual and another. There is difference not only between God and the individual soul, and God and the world, but also between one individual and another and one thing and another. Pluralism is the natural result of such an interpretation. And the pluralism is defended with the help of the doctrine of viśeṣa. But no difference is admitted between the thing itself and its svarūpa, for that would lead to an infinite regress, as the monist rightly remarks. Our knowledge of the svarūpa of a thing is not due to our cognition of the two as different but due to the fact that the thing is by nature so that it reveals its individuality. And this "nature" is the speciality or viśeṣa (svabhāvas tu viśeṣātma).³

Similarly, Baladeva preserves the unity of God's svarūpa, that is, His Personality, by means of the doctrine of viśeṣa. God reveals Himself as the Creator, as the Preserver and in various other forms of incarnations for the welfare of mankind. We do not therefore really know God. Since we perceive different forms of God and since they are different from one another, it follows that we do not know Him as He is. We know His different manifestations (vigrahas) but not His svarūpa. But Baladeva would contend that there is no difference between God's svarūpa and His manifestations (vigraha). His Personality and our knowledge thereof through His cosmic operations are identical- the apprehension of difference rendered possible through viśeṣa.⁴ Here again we find Baladeva making use of the mystic concept of viśeṣa in order to avoid all agnosticism and relativism concerning our knowledge of the real nature (svarūpa) of God.

1. SB, p. 53.

2. The word 'eigenschaft' means the same as viśeṣaṇa.

3. SR, I-19.

4. SR, I-12. See below p. 91.

Svabhāva:

Svabhāva is what follows from svarūpa. We may call it nature. It is the nature of the miraculous power (māyā-śakti) of God that it produces the three basic elements (guṇas) of the physical world - sattva, rajas and tamas, from which the physical objects take their origin. It is the svabhāva of the individual soul (Jīva) that it is overpowered by the cosmic Power (māyā) of God. The svarūpa of māyā-śakti is to be turned outwards (bahiraṅgatva) and so it creates. The svarūpa of the jīva is to be imperfect (amśatva) or limited and so it is overpowered or deluded. Hence wherever there is difference in the 'Eigenheit' or svarūpa there is bound to be difference also in the nature (svabhāva) .

The Categories:

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had given a list of six categories, Substance(dravya), Quality (guṇa), Action (karma), Generality (sāmānya), Particularity (Viśeṣa) and Inherence (samavāya). Of these the last is not accepted by the Vedāntins for reasons we had stated before. Also we had seen that Jīva and Baladeva add that of Power (śakti) to which again later following Rādhā Dāmodara, Baladeva adds still another, or to be more precise, modifies the doctrine of viśeṣa in an entirely different manner. Thus the categories of Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Power and Individuality may be said to be accepted by Baladeva. We do not however find any clear explanation of these terms, except that of Individuality and Power.

Both Jīva and Baladeva following the Purāṇas (and here again in the same manner as Madhva) posit still another Category which they call amśa¹. It is applicable however only to the individual soul and the Incarnations of God. The physical world is never spoken of as an amśa perhaps because, it is a transformation only of God's external Power and does not effect His Essence (Svarūpa). The individual soul though also śakti, is an amśa as it is located in God². Baladeva defines an amśa, i.e., an individual-soul-as-part-of-God as that which is different from God and yet whose existence cannot be explained without Him. The word literally means 'part'. But following the use to which both authors put it, we may call it the Category of "Limitation" or "Quantity". Nimbārka who also accepted the category of śakti, does not consider this new category necessa-

1. GB, II, iii-41. Śrīkrṣṇa-sandarbhā, p.26:p.37.

2. Brahma khalu śaktimad-ekam vastu. Brahma-śaktir-jīvo Brahmaika-deśatvāt brahmāṁso bhavati- GB, II, iii-41.

-ry.¹ He considers it to be the same thing as śakti or Power. (amśas tu śaktir eva). Baladeva following Madhva draws a distinction between two kinds of amśa- the individual parts which are limited by external factors (vibhinnāmśa) ie, the individual souls and those that are limited by nothing other than the svarūpa (svarūpāmśa) ie., the Incarnations and the Descents of God. The former though of the nature of consciousness, which they share out of God's nature are yet extremely limited by being subject to the influence of the physical world. In fact they are qualitatively different in the sense that whereas God is universal/ all-pervasive consciousness, the individual soul is atomic consciousness. Thus the name different or disconnected part (vibhinnāmśa) comes to be applied to it. The latter are the partial manifestations of God and hence limitations: but there is nothing limiting God except His own Nature (sva-rūpa) and His own Will. They are not atomic as the individual souls are. Hence they are not vibhinna. The manifestations of God in the form of the different Incarnations are manifestations of His Omnipotence, Omniscience and other auspicious qualities and they are not due to limitations imposed, but due to His desire to save the good and punish the evil.

Thus the amśa cannot be taken to be the same as the other categories. It cannot be substance for, it is not independent, nor quality for it is not different. They are ofcourse caused by the Power of God and proceed therefrom - the individual soul (vibhinnāmśa) of the propriostatic (tatastha) power of God and the Incarnations of the Inner (svarūpa) Power of God. We cannot however identify amśa with Power. Power like God is infinite. Even the external Power (bahiraṅga) of God is infinite and powerful. But the amśa, the individual soul is weak and atomic in nature. The amśa therefore is different from the Powers.

The Tattvas: The foregoing account was of the epistemological categories. In fact much attention is not paid to them, either by Jīva or by Baladeva, except where they had to indulge in polemics against the non-theistic systems. They were more interested in the ontic character of the objects than in their ontological characters. These ontic objects are the Tattvas. The most fundamental of them ofcourse is God. In the Bhagavat-sandarbhā, Jīva mentions the following four tattvas; God,

1. See Umesh Misra: "The Nimbārka School of Vedānta", p.39. Allahabad.

the manifestation of His svarūpa, the individual soul and matter.¹ In his commentary on the Tattva-samdarbha of Jīva, Baladeva gives a slightly different list - God (Īśvara), the individual soul (Jīva), delusion (māyā) and time (kāla). At the end of the account he however introduces still another, desert (karma), though the last is not eternal like the others. It is beginningless but has an end.² Baladeva's list is thus the same as that of Rādhā Dāmodara.³

The entire literature of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, is an account of these entities. The knowledge thereof is obtained not from experience, except in an extremely fragmentary way, but from the Revelations of God in the form of the original Scriptures (Śruti) and the latter clarifications of the same given by Him through His various Incarnations (Śruti, Purāṇa etc). They thus built a natural as well as a supernatural cosmology to explain man's status in the world, his relation to God, his existence after death, the reason of his separation from God and the means of his reunion.

Cosmology:

God is the Supreme Reality and He supports the entire Creation- He is possessed of all good qualities in an infinite measure and is identified with the Person of Kṛṣṇa. The non-dualist (Advaitin) describes this Supreme Reality as devoid of all qualities and as such ineffable (aśabdām). When the Vedānta Sūtras say that it is aśabdām, what is simply meant is that he cannot be fully described. It is just like people saying that Mount Meru cannot be seen. What is here meant is that it cannot be fully seen or known.⁴ There are ofcourse statements in the Scriptures that say that the mind cannot comprehend Him. This does not mean that He does not have comprehensible qualities but only that the individual soul, being a limited part (vibhinnāṃśa) and thus possessing extremely limited consciousness cannot comprehend all His qualities. It is of the essence of man that he is limited. The Advaitin would argue that such statements in the Scriptures are only of a figurative nature and repititive in their function. Baladeva's reply is that it is only when a thing is known through some other means that

1. BS, p.33.

2. karmāpy anādi vināśi cāsti, TS, p.76.

3. See above p.7. It is interesting to compare the list with that given in the Yatindra-mata-dīpika, for an account of Rāmānuja, see P.N.Srinivasachari, op.cit. p.521.

4. GB, I, i-5. It may be noticed that Madhva and Baladeva interpret this particular sūtra in a way different from that of all other vedāntins. All others explain it as referring to matter.

figurative statements or repetitive statements are possible.¹ But when even the existence of something is not known, the question of repetitive statements does not arise. And so far as the knowledge of God is concerned, there is no means of knowing Him except through the Scriptures. This 'awareness of God' which had been described as the fundamental nature of Hindu Theism is much more true of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism than of any other school of thought.²

The ascription of attributes to God is not meant only to be an aid to facilitate worship and thus worship in its turn to help man purify his self. The Advaitin argues that if we take it not in this heuristic sense but as referring to reality as such, then the principle of interpretation is wrong, for we shall be committing the fallacy of deriving two meanings from the same statement (vākya-bheda), one, that there is God qualified by attributes and two, that that God is the object of worship. But Baladeva would argue that the object of the Scriptures is not to incite people to worship, but to reveal the nature of God in all the richness of His svarūpa (Essence). And if the attributes like Knowledge, Infinity, Bliss etc. be true of God, why not then the other ones of Creatorship, etc as well? Attributes like those of Omniscience are of the same status as those like knowledge.³ The former have the same relation to His svarūpa as the latter. They are not different but distinguishable through viśeṣa. Hence all attributes are true of God, except the inauspicious ones which are incompatible with His nature. All words and all the Scriptures have for their object the same God.

These different statements cannot also be explained by adopting a relativistic standpoint⁴ and saying that from an empirical or lower level we perceive God as possessing attributes and from a transcendental or higher level we perceive him as pure Being (sat). In the case of an existent reality (tattva) such relativism is not possible. It is only possible in the case of a potential reality, like the performance for example of a ritual (yajña). What is real is always real. It cannot be real (sat) once and non-real (asat) later. At the same time Baladeva would not agree to the Advaita view that the real must be eternally so. It is necessary at this stage to see what

1. SR, IV-11 to 14. Also Introduction, GB, III, iii-1.

2. "Hindu Theism tends to be emotional or intellectual rather than ethical and it is based on an 'awareness of God' rather than on a passion for righteousness"-E.C. Dewick, The Indwelling God, p. 43. Oxford, 1942.

3. GB, III, iii-14.

4. ānūvādika vyavahārikas ca guṇā iti kalpanaiva: GB, III, iii (Intr.)

exactly Baladeva means by sat or real.

According to the Advaitin only that is real (sat) which exists at all times, past, present and future i.e., which is eternally real and that is asat or unreal which does not exist at any time and is never an object of cognition, like for example the 'son of a barren woman' or 'a sky lotus'. There are certain other things that are in the above sense asat, for they are contradicted, but which nevertheless are objects of cognition. For example, the 'silver' in the case of an illusion of silver in the shell, was an object of cognition, but is not real as it was contradicted when I saw the real shell there. Since it can be classified neither as real nor as unreal, the Advaitin calls it the ineffable (anirvacanīya). Baladeva contends that the invention of this new category is necessary, just because the original definitions of the real and the unreal were mistaken. It is not necessary that the real must be eternal- It was shown before that for Baladeva all cognition is cognition of the real. The unreal (asat) only means that which is not eternally real. It exists for a time. Reality is thus common both to the eternal as well as the non-eternal.¹ When the world of things are said to be asāt, this is what is meant- that they are not eternal as God is. But not that they are unreal in the sense that they are false or illusions. False (mithya) in the sense of illusory is that which never exists.² All that we can say about the physical world is that it is fleeting or temporal (naśvara).³ Jīva Gosvāmin also calls his own system 'the doctrine of the temporality of the world' (naśvara-vāda).⁴ The unreal (asat) for him is the subtle (sūkṣma). The unreal, that is, that which is in a subtle state manifests itself as the real (sat) or the ostensive (sthūla). This modification of the sūkṣma into the sthūla is possible through the Power of God, who is the underlying source of all reality. It would thus be seen that though Jīva and Baladeva differ from the Advaitin and interpret the physical world in a realistic sense, yet they differ from Madhva. For him unreal (asat) means that which never existed in any form whatever, like the silver in the illusory cognition. But due to the will of God, the unreal silver becomes real at the moment of perception. Thus though Madhva would admit creatio ex nihilo, Jīva and Baladeva are more orthodox and cannot conceive of it.⁵

1. satyatvam nityānitya sādharanam - SR, VI-43.

2. tri-kāla-bādhyam tu mithyā - l.c.

3. tasman nāsty-asatya-śabdabhyam prapañcasya naśvaratvam uktam, SR, VI-83.

4. PS, p.232. Also BS, p.92.

5. See B.N. Krishnamurty Sarma, l.c.

According to the definition given above, the world is real, but the Supreme Reality is God. It is on account of and through God that the world is revealed. It is said to be divine (brah-mātmaka) because it is controlled by Him (brahmāyatta-vrtti-katvāt) and is pervaded by Him (brahma-vyāpyatvāt).¹ As the locus of the world God is not exhausted in the world. The fullness of His nature cannot be known by us. His qualities and Powers are eternal in number and infinite. Of these we know only three. They are the inner (antarmāga), the intermediate (tatastha) and the external (bahiramāga) Powers of God. Though they are not different from God, yet are they all not of equal rank. They are arranged in the order Superior, Middle and Inferior respectively (uttama, madhyama and kaniṣṭha).² The importance and the relative values of the three is explained by Baladeva by comparing the first to the married and the rightful Queen of the King, God- and the last, to the slave-girl who is not permitted into the inner sanctuary of the King.³

These Powers are further analysable. For example, the first viz., the antarmāga-śakti is to be analysed into existence, consciousness and bliss (sat, cit and ānanda). There are no traces of the gross elements or material qualities sattva, rajas and tamas. There is nothing of non-consciousness and sorrow in it. The spiritual world of God (Vaikuṇṭha) where He sports with His devotees is an emanation (vaibhava) of this Power and so is devoid of the crass elements of sorrow etc. As opposed to this, the world of material things is the emanation of His external or the lowest of His Powers (bahiramāga), which expresses itself through the three strands of Sattva etc. Thus though the material world is in a way opposed to the Spiritual, it is nevertheless real, for it is the manifestation of the Power of the same God, the same Spirit. There are thus two levels of Creation, one, that reveals God's svarūpa as it really is in itself, and the other the lower also reveals God, but as in a mirror, inverted.⁴

The gross world, the manifestation of the external Power of God is also controlled by the svarūpa Power of God. All its variety, its Beauty, its Values in general are due to the Power of God. Thus corresponding to the three manifestations of existence, consciousness and enjoyment, there are again three aspe-

1, SR, VI-27 & 28.

2. BS, p. 29.

3. TS (tīkā), p. 67.

4. Radhakrishnan says that the Pāñcarātra school propounded this theory of two levels of Creation and that Bengal Vaiṣṇavism has accepted it. Op. Cit. Vol. II., p. 698-699.

pects of the svarūpa-śakti of God. They are the sandhinī, samvid and hlādinī Powers inherent in it. They may be translated as the supporting, enlightening and jubilating Powers. The 'existence' of the world is due to the first, the 'consciousness' to the second and the 'bliss' to the third.

An attempt is sometimes made to arrange these three aspects again in a hierarchy like the three Powers of God already mentioned. Ofcourse all the three are the aspects of the same Essential Power of God, but of the three the hlādinī, the bliss producing aspect of God is the highest.¹ Baladeva defines these Powers thus. Sandhinī is that on account of which, though God is of the very nature of the Real and not a possessor of Reality, He yet becomes the locus of Reality and confers reality on the things of the world. He pervades everything at all places through this Power. (This is also the Brahman aspect of God). Samvid is that by which, though He is of the nature of knowledge, yet He knows and makes others known. (This is the Paramātmān aspect of God i.e., of God as the indweller). hlādinī is that by which though He is of the very nature of Bliss, He enjoys and makes others enjoy; that is, gives joy to His devotees.² We may therefore say with Leibniz - "In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also knowledge whose content is the variety of ideas and finally Will which makes changes or products act to the principle of the best. These characteristics correspond to what in the created monads form the ground or basis to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Apperception. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect and in the created monads or the Entelechies they are imitation of these attributes according to the degree of perfection of the monad."³

The second, the taṭastha-śakti of God, as the name indicates is so-called because it is intermediate and is in contact with both of them. At one end it touches the spiritual sphere of cit and at the other end it is in contact with the world of gross nature. It bridges the gulf between the two. It can thus be identified neither with the one nor the other. It is, to use a spatial analogy, at the border or edge of both of them (taṭastha). This Power is the source of the origin of the individual

1. CC, p.35.

2. SR, I-43.

3. Principles of Nature and Grace- 48. Latta's trans.

souls (Jīvas) and so is called the jīva-śakti. The individual soul also shares this dual nature. He shares with God, his consciousness and so is capable of spiritual values: at the same time, he shares with nature, a body and all consequents thereof.

Thus God is the material cause of nature, through His external or projecting Power (māyā-śakti), and of the individual, through His differentiating Power (ie., differentiates the separate individual souls, jīva-śakti) and is the efficient cause of all that is, through His Inner Power (svarūpa-śakti). Radhakrishnan states it as follows: " God's svarūpa-śakti, according to Jīva supports His jīva-śakti (also called taṭastha-śakti) by which the souls are created. This latter in its turn supports māyā-śakti (or bahiranga-śakti). None of these can exist apart from God."¹ But the statement is misleading. We do not find any evidence of māyā-śakti being supported by jīva-śakti. Unfortunately both in Jīva and Baladeva, we hardly find any attempts at architectonic. And particularly in the discussion about the śaktis, we find, probably due to the influence of the Purāṇas, often differing and usually figurative statements. What Jīva and Baladeva would hold is that both the projecting Power and the Differentiating Power of God are operative simultaneously. It is true that jīva-māyā is said to be the efficient Cause (nimitta) of the cycle of Creation (samsāra) but this does not mean that the individual soul is the cause of its own world.² That would be more like the non-dualist and appearance theories that Jīva and Baladeva contend against. The world of things is real, for it is pervaded by the Power of God.³ The external or the Projecting Power of God is ultimately real. The individual differentiations are due to the beginningless deserts (karman) of the individuals but they are not responsible for the world of things in which they are placed. That is wholly the work of God. (śaktimad-Īśvara-hetukam jagat).

As in the more popular Purāṇas, Jīva and Baladeva also use different words for these Powers of God. There is no

1. Op.cit., II, p. 763.

2. ya tv iyaṃ sātṭvikādi-rūpādhyātmādi-rūpā vā tri-vidhā bhatir atmani jīva sva-karma-matra-hetuka iva ajñair nirupita sa tu nirmula - SR, VI-41.

3. satyeśvara-śakti-mayatvād jagat satyam - SR, VI-43.

fixation of terminology. This makes their system appear verbose and sometimes fragmentary. For example, they are sometimes called Supreme(parā), Ordinary (aparā) and Ignorance(avidyā): sometimes they are called parā, kṣetrajñā and avidyā: and sometimes cit-śakti, Jīva-śakti and māyā-śakti. But the meaning is always the same.

Not only are the names of the śaktis different in different places, they are sometimes said to be innumerable and sometimes are said to possess different modes(vṛttis). Jīva for example, speaks of the two vṛttis of the māyā-śakti of God, viz., māyā and pradhāna. The former may be taken to be the efficient and the latter, the material cause.¹ But nothing more clear is said on the subject. The description or the analysis of the Power of God sometimes enumerated, is again rendered ineffective by the mystic statements like "various are said to be the Powers of the Supreme One" (parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate). Sometimes attempts are made to relate the cosmological functions of the Powers but never carried to their logical conclusion. For example Jīva in his Bhāgavata-sandarbhā draws a distinction between the two aspects of the third or the bahiranga-śakti, in explaining the origin of the gross world.² He distinguishes between what he calls the yoga-māyā or ātma-māyā (ie., māyā connected with God or located in God, which is the efficient cause of the world of things) and jaḍa-māyā or guṇa-māyā, the non-conscious gross principle (which is the material cause of the objects of the world). From this the gross factors like sattva, rajas and tamas are evolved through the movement (kṣobha) caused in it by Time (kāla).³

As thus opposed, in a way, to God's spirituality it appears to be independent of Him. But it is not so. Jīva explains its nature by quoting a verse from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.⁴ It is something that is perceived as opposed to God, and yet is not perceived when there is knowledge of God: that is, it is perceived as being outside God just as the shadow is outside the source of light, but which nevertheless cannot exist without the light. And yet it does not exist in the presence of light.

1. SS, p.64. Cf. also CC, pp. 366-367.

2. BS, p.99. Also PS, p.171.

3. This movement through time is said to distinguish this theory of Creation from that of the Sāṃkhyas - See Dasgupta, Op. Cit. Vol. IV, p. 397. fn.4.

4. rte artham yat pratiyate na pratiyeta cātmani tad vidyāt ātmano māyām yathābhāsa yathā tamah / BS, p.38

Similarly māyā, though it depends on God for its existence, nevertheless is perceived to be independent of God and thus of being opposed to Him. It is thus an appearance (ābhāsa) or darkness (tamas). It is not however a case of non-existence (abhāva). Baladeva while admitting the reality of world of things and while making it dependent on God, he yet does not call it māyā. He uses the less spiritualistic and more naturalistic terms unborn (ajā) and Matter (prakṛti).¹ It is interesting to note here that Madhva would also make Prakṛti or Pradhāna, the material cause of the world, but for the latter it is different from, though not independent of, God.

The karman of the individual which is eternal, expresses itself in the form of desire to enjoy knowledge spiritual (vidyā) and empirical (avidyā).² This desire to enjoy the latter is also beginningless and turns the attention of the individual away from God and the Spiritual Values and is the cause of its birth or contact with the material body (anādy-avidyā-vijṛmbhitam).⁴ It ceases when the individual returns to Him.⁵ The real delusion does not consist in taking the objects of the physical world to be real, but in taking the soul to be identical with the body.⁶ To the question why and wherefore comes this beginningless avidyā and since it is so whether it is not co-eternal with God, we do not find an answer. It seems to be as mysterious and as inexplicable as the 'Fall' of man. The only thing that is of interest to these theologians is that God is not responsible for it but the individual himself.

Taken in its barest outlines, this distinction of māyā into avidyā and vidyā or ātma-māyā and jada-māyā and tracing the origin of the world of things to them, may seem to be similar to some of the Advaita theories thereon.⁷ There is however a fundamental difference. For the Advaitin the question is one of explaining the plurality of the world of things. For Bengal Vaiṣṇavism this plurality is no problem. Nor even is its reality the problem. For they grant both the reality as well

1. GB, I-iv, 8-10.

2. PS, p.175.

3. TS, p.73. Also CC, p.358.

4. GB, II, iii-46. Jīva says "jadām prakṛtīm udgirati".

5. SR, VI-33.

6. CC, p.189.

7. For example Cf. the theory of the author of the Tattva-viveka. See Siddhāntaleśa-saṁgraha Ed. S.S.Suryanarayana Sastry, Madras, 1955. These terms avidyā and māyā, even inside the Advaita school have undergone modification in their meaning and function. For a careful distinction of the usage in Śaṅkara, as well as certain latter usages see, P.Hacker: Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Iśvara. ZDMG, Band 100, Heft, 1. 1950.

as the plurality of the world of things. What they would however object to is the independent reality of the samsāra. It has only a dependent reality. The only Independent Reality is God.

God is therefore both the causa materialis as well as the causa efficiens of the world.¹ We have already stated the general theory as to how through the Powers of Sandhinī, Samvid and Hlādinī, He creates the world of things, from dead matter to the self-conscious spiritual souls. So far as the further question of His causality purely in a physical sense is concerned, Jīva explains it thus: God is the efficient cause as the Supreme Self (Paramātmā) and the material cause as the Power-qualified Concrete Entity (śakti-viśiṣṭasyopādānatvam).² However when we say that God is both the material and the efficient cause, it does not mean that He or His real nature undergoes change, for what is perfect cannot undergo change. What changes is His Power. "God" said Philo, "touches matter not through His Essence but through His Power."³ Nevertheless we say He is the cause, for His Powers have no existence apart from Him.

In his Paramātmā-sandarbhā,⁴ Jīva makes a very interesting suggestion, but like most of the other theories not connected directly with the problem of God, not much is said about it. He says that there are two kinds of knowledge (jñāna): One located in God and the other in the individual soul. The former he calls Time (kāla) and the latter he calls the individual desert (karman). The following conclusions can be drawn from it. a) The former or the knowledge of God is not determined by anything. There are no events in the temporal or in the empirical sense. It is just Time. For the individual, this is determined by his karman. And then this Time causes the movement in the original Matter (prakṛti). In the spiritual world of God too there are events and things⁵ but they are not determined in Time. They are, if we may say so, sub specie aeternitatis. b) There is nothing even a priori that limits God's knowledge. The individual on the other hand has to have knowledge in terms of his karman. Thus he cannot but think in certain ways as a consequence of his deeds in the previous life. (Perhaps we may call them his 'innate ideas'!)

1. GB, II, 1-14 (Madhva would hold that God is not the material cause, but merely the efficient cause.)

2. tataḥ kevalasya paramātmāno nimittatvam śakti-viśiṣṭasyopadanatvam ity ubhaya-rūpatvameva manyante. PS, p. 201.

3. Quoted Radhakrishnan, "Eastern Religions and Western Thought" p. 194. Oxford 1940.

4. PS, p. 175.

5. See below, p. 92.

The world of things cannot be said to be in any way identical with God, though they are the products of His Power. It follows that it is both different as well as non-different from Him. It is different because it exhibits qualities which are contradictory to those of God. Further this difference is eternal, for the difference between His inner Power and the projecting Power is eternal. There are many statements in the Purāṇas as well as in the writings of Jīva and Baladeva which describe the Powers of God to be eternal like Him. The world of things are ofcourse, brought to manifestation, but are not created ex nihilo. Even in the stage of disappearance (pralaya) these things do not vanish altogether. They continue in a subtle form. Thus the plurality and the individual differences last for ever. At the same time there is non-difference (abhedā) because it is controlled entirely by God. The world is located in Him, reveals His nature and does not in the least excel Him (tadāśraya, tat-prakāśa and tad-avyatirikta).¹ In the CC also God is described as the material cause (upādāna), the efficient or instrumental cause (karana) and also as the locus (adhikarana).² Similar is the relation between the individual souls and God.

A recent writer³ has however said that while according to Jīva, there is identity and difference (bhedābheda) between God and the world as well as between God and the individual, according to Baladeva there is bhedābheda only between God and the world: and so far as God and the individual souls are concerned, there is difference (bheda) between them. To us it appears there is no such difference between the two teachers, though it is true that Baladeva emphasizes the essential difference (svarūpa-bheda) more than Jīva. This will be clear after we have examined the nature of the soul (jīva) according to both Jīva and Baladeva.

The individual soul is different from God in the sense that it has characteristics which are fundamentally or essentially (svarūpataḥ) different from those of God.⁴ This difference (vailakṣanya) means eternal difference due to the fact that God is of the nature of the master and the soul is the eternal servant, God is all-pervasive and Infinite while the soul is atomic and this difference is also eternal.⁵ Even when the

1. PS, p.255.

2. CC, p.187.

3. Rajendranath Ghosh, Preface to Advaitasiddhi. Calcutta.

4. jīvasya svarūpata eva parameśvarād vailakṣanyam apaśyad-
TS, p.70.

5. sevaka-sevyatva aputva-vibhutva-rūpa nitya-dharma-hetukāḥ
bhedam ity arthaḥ—Baladeva's tika on TS, p.71.

soul is released from bondage of material nature, even then this difference from God and the smallness of man will continue to be.¹

We have shown earlier in Chapter II, that the individual soul is not the material ego (ahamkāra). It is not the body nor even the totality of the experiences of the individual nor even the mere epistemological point of reference of these experiences. It is as both Jīva and Baladeva explain, the field (kṣetra) of events as well as the self-awareness of the field (kṣetra-jñā). The field is not merely the physical body that we see. It is the combination, both of the gross (sthūla) as well as the subtle (sūkṣma) bodies. The self-awareness is that of both these aspects and not merely of the gross body.² Though this point has not further been clarified we may presume that Jīva is using the terms gross and subtle in the accepted sense of the terms. So what follows from the above is that the individual soul (jīva) is aware not only of its daily activity as a corporeal thing and the object it encounters but also of itself. It encounters itself, for example in deep sleep or in the state of end-of-the-world (pralaya).³

How is then the relation between the two aspects of the Jīva explained. Both the extreme views to wit that of the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita are renounced. The former says that both are absolutely different though real. The latter makes the field (kṣetra) an illusion and what remains is the pure objectless awareness (kṣetra-jñā). Both the theories are unacceptable to Jīva and Baladeva. They say that both are real but that there is no such absolute difference as the Sāṃkhya says and thus no independence of the individual soul. The difference between the two, the body and the soul is reconciled through the ground, for both are the effects of the

1. TS, p.78. Baladeva would therefore join issue with the other bhedābheda-vādins (like say, the Pāśupatas) who hold that after release the soul is powerful and creative like God.
2. sva-śarīra-dvaya-lakṣaṇa-kṣetrasya jñātrtvāt. PS, p.4.
3. In this encounter the existentialist philosopher discovers Anxiety, Nausea, "Sorge" and so on. The theist Jīva and Baladeva discover in this, Bliss (rasa or ananda.)

Powers of God; the field, of the Projecting Power (māyā-śakti) of God and the awareness, of the Conscious Power (cit-śakti), one of the Inner Powers. Thus this awareness is not only of the individual but also belongs to God. In fact, Jīva says that there are two knowers of the field or two aspects of the awareness of the field - one, the universal awareness (mukhya-kṣetra-jñā) and the other individual awareness (vyakti-kṣetra-jñā). As opposed to the latter he sometimes calls the former samaṣṭi-kṣetra-jñā.¹ It is God as the inner Ruler of all individual souls (Paramātmān). This awareness of God extends as said above both to the gross as well as the subtle body. Jīva explains with the help of Kṛṣṇa myth. Consciousness (buddhi) is the nature of the subtle body and ego (ahaṁkāra) that of the gross body, and God Kṛṣṇa as the emanation Pradyumna is the presiding Deity of the former and as the emanation Aniruddha is the presiding Deity of the latter.² (And the mythology is that the former is Kṛṣṇa's son and the latter is his grandson. One can discern the metaphysical ideas clothed in the language of myth.) Thus God is the universal knower (samaṣṭi-kṣetra-jñā) and the individual, being a part (aṁśa) of God, participates in this awareness and as such "it is not only a mirror of the universe of created things but also is an image of the Deity. The mind has not merely a perception of the work of God, but it is even capable of producing something which resembles them although in miniature."³

The jīva is therefore said to be an aṁśa or a part of God. It does not mean that the individual soul is cut out from God like a chip out of a stone nor that he is God Himself, but under limiting conditions (upādhis). Baladeva defines it as follows: "To be a part (aṁśa) means capable of being limited to a specific part of a certain (other) thing." (eka-vastv-ekadeśatvam aṁśatvam.)⁴ He proceeds to give the example of the statement, "the disc of the Jupiter is one hundredth part of that of the moon". It is clear from the example that Baladeva does not mean anything like a physical or extentional participation. The soul is thus in its spatial limited field independent and not a mere reflection.⁵ At the same time it would be wrong to say, as some do, that Baladeva holds with Madhva that there is difference between God and the individual soul

1. PS, p.7.

2. Ibid., p.36

3. Leibniz: Principles of Nature and Grace-14

4. GB, II, iii-41.

5. GB, II, i-22.

and that in this, he is different from his predecessor Jīva.¹ In fact Baladeva is quite explicit in denying the final dualism between God and the self.² The self though different is pervaded by God (jīvas tu tad-vyāpyah).

In explaining the relation between the individual soul and God two theories might be held- one, that of creation and the other that of emanation (we are not taking into account here the other theory that the individual is an illusion or a delusion). The former would draw a clear line of demarkation and fundamentally divide the two. 'God creates' would mean that He creates out of nothing. The creation is different from God in the sense that whereas God is of the nature of the real (ie., eternally real), the creature is different from Him in that it was non-real (asat). This possibility of the non-real (asat) to become real (sat) was admitted by Madhva but Baladeva would not appear to have accepted such a theory. Though the eternal and the fundamental difference between God and the individual, viz., that of the master and the servant, that of the creator and the created (ie., the creature) etc. is made use of by Baladeva in bringing out the essential (svarūpa) difference between the two. (srastr-srjyatra niyantr-niyam-yatra etc.),³ in view of the theory of causation that he had put forward we cannot say that Baladeva would contribute really to a theory of creation ex nihilo. Further, he would also not admit that there is mere difference between God and the individual. For there is a real sharing in the knowledge and activity of God. As consciousness (cit), the Jīva is, despite its atomicity, of the same nature as God.⁴

The second theory is to take the other extreme of that of emanation, which would thus make the individual a part or an aspect of God. That would lead to complete identity atleast in the existential aspect. That Baladeva would not accept it either, is clear from the fact that he describes the individual as 'a limitation or a part different ⁱⁿ nature' (vibhinnāmśa) to distinguish it from the real emanations, which are called 'a limitation or a part identical in nature' (svarūpāmśa), the latter are the Incarnations of God and have the same attributes that God Himself has viz., those of Omniscience etc. It is⁵

1. Mahendranath Sircar: Studies in Vedantism, p.140ff.

2. SR, VI-86 (tīka).

3. GB, II, iii-41

4. SR, VI-80 to 87.

5. See Latta's Commentary on Monadology-47.

said that Leibniz also wanted to avoid a similar dilemma, and thus came to his theory of 'fulgurations'. "He wishes to maintain both the individuality of the monads and their essential unity with God. Thus he seems to take fulgurations as a middle term between creation and emanation. 'Creation' would mean too complete a severance between God and the other monads: 'Emanation' would mean too complete an identity between them. 'Fulguration' means that the monad is not absolutely created out of nothing nor on the other hand merely a mode or an absolutely necessary product of the Divine nature." Thus for Baladeva also the jīvas are the vibhinnāmśa or the fulgurations of God. There is no identity between the two but difference in tattva.¹

In order to explain this peculiar relation between the jīva and God, of difference-cum-indifference, another analogy is used both by Jīva and Baladeva. God is like the sun, while the individual is like a spark of light. It is different and yet its origin is in light which emanates from the sun. This light emanating from God is the Brahma-śakti² or Jīva-śakti and the individual is a point in this light (Brahma-śaktir jīvo). Hence he is said to be on the border (tatastha). Jīva seems further to hold that between the individual and this border-lying power of God, the relation is one of totality (samaṣṭhi) and individuality (vyakti). Therefore is this power of God Infinite like Him while the individual soul³ not only finite but is in fact atomic.³ This Power of God is not external to Him like His Projecting Power (māyā) that is compared to the reflection of the sun. The fact that the individual is not a part of this last but of the tatastha Power is what makes him share in the consciousness of God and thus is responsible for his being a knower. It is the Spirit in man.

Not only is the soul (jīva) the knower, he is also the doer (kartr).⁴ But we should not confuse this doer with the mind (manas) which appears to be so in the empirical world. Ordinarily when we do anything, it appears that the mind decides this, wills that and does the other thing. Really however the jīva is the real doer (suddha kartr) and as it derives its capacity from God, performs only such actions as are conducive to his proper

1. GB, II, iii-45. Tattva literally means "that-ness". God as such is different from the individual as such.

2. On the difference between the notions Brahman, Paramātmān and Bhagvat see below p.98.

3. PS, p.130-131.

4. GB, II, iii-31. So far however as the creative activity is concerned the Self is inactive. GB, II, i-23. Here again we find the two levels to which we referred. p.74 above.

relationship with Him. That is in fact the essential nature (dharma) of a jīva. The nature of a jīva is to serve God and therein lies the justification as well as the source of its activity. But in the state of bondage as it is clouded by the material strands of sattva, rajas and tamas and as it mistakes the body for itself, it identifies itself with the mind (manas) which is itself a material product. Thus the manas is the secondary or impure agent (avisuddha-kartr). The source of all activity is really in the jīva itself.

Thus the question of the freedom of the individual soul is not one of determinism or indeterminism, as it has often been envisaged in theological literature of the West, as well as in most metaphysical (ie, meta-psychological) studies of the self. This dichotomy would apply to the manas and not the self. The latter is free in quite a different sense. It is free because it is cit- it is consciousness ie., it is spontaneous. The individual soul is not however an unconditional free agent, for its very existence (sattva) is due to God: and so is its freedom. The individual participates in the conscious Power (cit-śakti) of God and it is the nature of this power that it acts- that it has spontaneity.

Now, when it is said that the jīva's freedom is not an absolute freedom it is not meant that his real nature is to be passive like a log of wood. He is active- an actor as well as an enjoyer: and the action and enjoyment is in accordance with his deserts (karman). That is what is meant by saying that the individual is free but is not absolutely unconditional. God is for all individuals and at all times the ground of activity as well as that of enjoyment. It is the individual who acts with a view to obtain certain ends or enjoy certain objects, but the ground of such thinking and doing is God. Baladeva calls the individual 'the purposive agent' (prayojya-kartr) and God 'the ground agent' (hetu-kartr).¹

We must remember that neither Jīva nor Baladeva were really interested in the question of the freedom of the individual, which plays such an important role in European Theology and ethics. There are two limitations to this freedom, one from the side of the control of nature over man and the other from the side of the control of God and the fact of His Omniscience, Baladeva is simply interested in denying the first. He is also interested in establishing the reality of the individual self.

It is with this object that he establishes the attributes of doerhood (kartṛtva) and that of enjoyer-hood (bhokṛtva) as true of the self. He would however remind us that we cannot attribute these qualities merely to the individuals turning away from God or to his deserts (karman), but we have to trace them ultimately to the Power of God that operates through them.¹

We can summarize the characteristics of the jīvas by recounting the twelve characteristics that are attributed to it by Jīva himself. These are:²

- 1) 1) it illuminates objects of the world for its own sake and without the help of any other medium (svasmai svayam-prakāśaḥ)
- 2) it is of the same nature and changes of the body do not affect it (eka rūpaḥ)
- 3) the svarūpa of each is its own and it maintains its identity even in different incarnations (svarūpa-bhāk):
- 4) it is conscious, for it is an amśa of God (cetana)
- 5) though it is atomic it spreads throughout the body (vyāpti-śīla)
- 6) it is of the nature of "awareness" and "bliss" (cidānanda-tmaka)
- 7) it is aware of itself as an ego (ahamārthaḥ)
- 8) it is different in different fields (prati-kṣetra-bhinnaḥ)
- 9) it is atomic in nature (anu)
- 10) despite its bondage it is eternally pure (nitya-nirmala)
- 11) it is of the nature of the knower, doer and enjoyer, (jñātrtva-kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-nijadharmakaḥ) and
- 12) it is of the nature of the servant of God alone (paramātmaika-śeṣa-bhāvaḥ)

Though not conclusive, we can see even here the influence of the Rāmānuja school on Jīva. This list of the characteristics of the self are very similar to the thirteen enumerated by the well known follower of Rāmānuja, Piḷḷai Lokācārya.³ Also we do not find any discussion of the intrinsic difference between different jīvas to which Baladeva explicitly refers.

Certainly we cannot say that this idea was a new discovery by Baladeva nor even that he had borrowed it from Madhva who also holds a similar doctrine. In fact the whole pilgrim's progress

1. SR, VI-41.

2. S.K.De, Op.Cit.p.227

3. P.N.Srinivasachari: Rāmānuja's Idea of the Finite Self, p. 55. Madras 1928.

of the Brhad-bhāgavatāmṛta of Sanātana, as well as the sankse-bhāgavatāmṛta of Rūpa is based on this individual difference between different souls.

Thus despite the common qualities or characteristics of the souls, there are individual differences and thus the distinction of superiority and inferiority among them (tāra-tamya).¹ The status of a particular jīva, what kind of disposition it has, what are its pleasures and pains etc. are all determined by the deserts (karman) of the person.² His past actions determine what he thinks, feels and does now. This karman like the jīva itself is without beginning and it subjects the latter to its rule since time immemorial.

If the distinction of superiority and inferiority were due only to the karman, then we expect it to vanish in the state of release. But Baladeva holds that it persists even then. That is, the superiority of certain souls and the inferiority of others is eternal.³ On what grounds can we justify this eternal difference between the jīvas? If as was stated the differences were due to karman, they ought to go with the destruction of the latter. That is what certain other sectarian schools like the Pāsupatas, śakti-viśiṣṭādvaitins and others do. Madhva, who held this eternal ordering of the souls to be a fact also had to face a similar difficulty. What he did was to hold that the karman was something in the very essence (svarūpa) of the soul itself. That is, for Madhva karman would be eternal like the soul. This appears to lead to a circularity. It is said the deserts (karman) is of the nature of the svarūpa of the individual: and again that the essential difference (svarūpa-bheda) between the different souls is due to the individual karman.

Baladeva gives a different answer. He says that this tāra-tamya is a difference in the spiritual level. All souls released from the bondage of this world had not or could not be said to have attained the same level of spirituality. There are as we see in this world different means of attaining salvation

1. PR, VI-1. This also is the view of Madhva, the difference being that whereas there are some souls which are damned for all time according to Madhva, there are no such souls for Baladeva. See Glasenapp, loc.cit. p.64.

2. GB, II, iii-49 to 51.

3. PR, VI-4.

that is, different kinds of devotion (bhakti). Devotion as we shall see later is classified into different kinds and some are considered superior to others. Naturally a higher spiritual level is obtained by one who adopts the higher type of bhakti. As the man seeks God, so does he find Him after release. Baladeva's explanation is ⁱⁿ no way more rational than that of Madhva. The fact of the spiritual hierarchy of the souls is beyond reason. The difference is that whereas Madhva makes this non-rational element reside in the individual, in the form of the element of karman, in his svarūpa, Baladeva makes it depend on the Will (icchā-śakti) of God. If God wills, He can destroy all the karmas of an individual and thus put an end to the cycle of birth and death. But the jīvas always return with a balance (anuśaya) of their karmas. That is, an individual's station in life is determined by this karman. Whether a man is born as a Brahmana or a sūdra is already decided and with that also the kind of bhakti (devotion) he may have, his associations and so on. Hence the responsibility devolves ultimately on God and not squarely on the individual soul.¹

Further making karman a manifestation of the Will of God also means making God responsible for Evil. We must however remember that the problem of Evil was never realised and never given the same importance as in most European philosophies and theologies. So far as Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is concerned, it is only the sport (līlā) of God. Evil is not really evil. It is only like the separation of lovers that makes love more enjoyable. God fulfills himself in many ways and what we call evil appears so to us from the worldly standpoint, but God has no ill-feeling even to the lowliest of men. All men have the hope ultimately of reaching God. Only the ways are various, as the men are various. There are some, the superior who are enlightened and who teach and there are others, the inferior, who are to learn. That is why, the Bengal school lays so much emphasis on the company of the learned and the true (sat-saṅga) devotees of God.

The concept of līlā (sport) we mentioned above is also employed to explain the creation of the variegated world. For, the

1. GB, III, i-8. Also IV, i-13 to 19. Dr. M.N. Sircar finds traces of "pre-established harmony" in Bengal vaiṣṇavism, op-cit, p.141.

question that is likely to arise is, if God created this colourful world with really different souls and different and real physical objects, why did He do so? He is as we had stated both the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. But when He is Omniscient and Omnipotent and has no deficiencies, why should ^{He} have found it necessary to create at all? When there is no motive, how can we say that He is the Creator? The answer consists in the idea of Sport or play (līlā) This again was a doctrine that was popularised by the Purāṇas and which Rāmānuja had accepted. He explained it by means of an analogy. Just as a prince who has no needs, nevertheless engages in a game for the sake of sheer amusement, so does God create the world. For Baladeva, the creation of the physical world is like the dance of a man, who does so out of sheer joy. The dance is not motivated but is spontaneous. It is an effect of his exuberance of energy.¹ Baladeva would thus agree with the definition of līlā given by Vallbbha- "by līlā is meant the will to enjoy. It is of the nature of mere act but not an effect of a cause. No external effect follows from it. Even if it is, it is not intended. It does not cause exhaustion. It is like the action of a man who is simply full of joy."² We may ofcourse say that there is a Cosmic purpose, but the purpose is not that of God, but that of the jīvas.

1. GB, II, 1-32 & 33.

2. "līlā-nama vilāseccha. kāryavyatirekena kriyā-mātram. na tayā kṛtya bahiḥ karyam janyate. janitamapi karyam nābhipretam. nāpi kartari prayāsam janayati- See Subodhini III, skanda.+

felix smile 3. SR, VI-80 (vijñānārtham jīvārtham vijrmbhitāni).

Chapter V

G O D.

What is true of Indian Philosophy in general, is much more true of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, viz., that the concept of God plays an extraordinarily important role in the system. We have already seen in the previous chapter how their metaphysics though pluralistic is yet unified in God through His śaktis or Powers. He is the ultimate source of all that is or all that could be. He is also the ultimate goal of all human effort. With this theocentricism it combines an extreme form of emotionalism and the concept of God is therefore coloured by that attitude. We thus find an attempt to reconcile a highly mystic God with extremely personal and human qualities. The ascription of an essence (Svarūpa) to God as well as Personality (vigraha) and the doctrine of Incarnation (avatāra) are all motivated primarily by this God-consciousness.

God's svarūpa is explained by Baladeva¹ to be of the essence of knowledge and bliss (viññānānandaś tasya svarūpam) and the reason that is adduced to show this, is that it is so mentioned in the Scriptures. So far as our experience of these very qualities of God is concerned, we had seen that three qualities of existence, consciousness and bliss are the operations of the three powers sandhinī, saṁvid and hlādinī. Thus though it is true that He shares existence with the entire material world and knowledge and bliss with the atomic souls, they are found in their fullest measure in God alone.

This God is not a Logical Absolute and is therefore not knowable by ratiocination. He is known directly, for He reveals Himself through His vigraha or mūrti - ie., His human form, over which Bengal Vaiṣṇavism places very great emphasis, following the religious lead given by the Bhāgavatas. Now, what is the nature of this vigraha or mūrti? We must at the outset warn that the term does not mean 'idol' as it would ordinarily be accepted. It is not something material or non-conscious. The words are to be understood in a spiritual sense. Baladeva says that this "expression" of God ie., the vigraha is not different from Him (yad-ātmako bhagavān tad-ātmako vyaktiḥ).² His vigraha therefore consists of the same three Powers or

1. SR, I-12.

2. Ibidem.

the three qualities that God Himself is supposed to have viz., those of knowledge, majesty and power.¹ Hence it is clear that the vigraha of God though an object of worship is not non-conscious like the shape of material bodies, the stone or the wood there. It has all the psychic qualities which the human body has, like consciousness, mind and the limbs (anga etc.). This is also what according to Baladeva, the author of the Brahma-sūtras states in the sūtras III,ii-14 to III,ii-17. The vigraha of God is visualized in the same way as that of the sun which we visualize for the sake of meditation. The nature of the sun is just to shine and spread its rays all round, but we still conceive of him as having ostensibility (rūpa: it is not ofcourse, the disc of the sun). This image is not merely what one sees or hears, but something whose presence is felt. As a wife separated from her husband and meditating on him, has his image before her, so does the devotee (bhakta) meditate on the image of God.²

Hence the image (vigraha) of God is not to be understood in the sense of a gross image or a merely visible shape. If it were so we could not have said the image of God is identical with Him. Among empirical objects we find that qualities or formal characteristics like "having a dew lap" (in respect of a cow, say) are distinguished from the object and do not touch its essence. But there is no such distinction in God.³ God and His Image are identical. We had seen that the Powers of God are related to Him by viśeṣa. These, therefore Baladeva calls the inseparable characteristics or anubandhis.⁴ Or as he in a different context says, these Powers also are called Supreme (Bhagavat) because they are qualities not outside His essential nature (svarūpa).⁵ But the Image is God Himself, as possessing the Powers of knowledge (jñāna), Rulership (aiśvarya) and the Supreme one called parā.

This conception of the image is not as mystic as it sounds. Even in our empirical world we do speak of the form or image of a sound or a musical phrase. We speak also of a painting

1. Cf. Otto's analysis of our knowledge of God or the 'mysterium tremendum! Idea of the Holy. Oxford 1925.
2. GB,III,ii-15.
3. loc. cit. deha eva dehīti labdham, III,ii-16. In the CC also we find this explicitly stated: nāma bigraha svarūpa tina eka rūpa/ bheda nahin tina cidānanda rūpa/ p.321.
4. SR, I-12 (tika).
5. svarūpābhinnā-dharmatvāt. SR,VI-46.

as being passionate or of a piece of sculpture, as being a feeling in stone. In the same way God is described as being dense with knowledge (viññāna-ghana) and dense with enjoyment (ānanda-ghana). Baladeva explains that we have to understand this statement to mean that the form or image of God is experienced in the same way as the form of an emotion (rāga) is experienced¹, that is, the form or better the ostensity is not of the form of an external object but is of the consciousness and enjoyment inherent in the individual. Hence when we hear description of God as "having the eyes of a lotus-flower" or "having the colour of the nimbus-cloud" etc., we should not think of them as being natural characteristics (prākṛta). Natural colours or shapes are limited by space and time. Not so the Image of God, which is perceived simultaneously at different places by millions of his devotees (bhaktas) not only in this world but also in the spiritual world (aprākṛta) where individuals go after release. It has therefore not the element of sattva, rajas and tamas (the three strands of which matter is composed) but is of the nature of pure enjoyment (ānanda). We have to interpret the Scriptural statements sometimes attributing hands and feet and other physical features to God and sometimes denying them. What it means is that the Form is not a human form. If it were, it could not arouse the sense of enjoyment or relish. It is because this expression or ostensibility in the form of human figure is of the nature of Bliss, that it arouses the same in the contemplator.²

Hence God's Image or vigraha is not an object that it can be revealed by the sense-organs: for they are of the nature of matter and so are the objects revealed by them. It is the Spirit that receives this Image directly: and it could do so, for it is itself of the nature of consciousness and bliss. The eye receives light, for it is ^{of} the nature of light and the ear receives sound, for it is of the nature of sound. So do the nose and the tongue. The soul receives the Image of God for it is of the same nature. The Image of God is not thus "a dead thing",³ as it is to most other religions, but is living in the sense that it is God Himself.

1. PR, I-12- "murttatvam pratipattavyam cit-sukhasyaiva rāgavat".

2. "ānanda-mātra-kara-pāda-mukhodarādi sarvatra ca svagata-bheda vivarjitātma"- Naradapancaratra, Quoted PR, I-17.

3. Cf. "For the prophetic religions an image means a dead thing, but the Lord is living and active"- N. Söderblom "The Nature of Revelation" (Eng. Tr. F.E. Pamp) p.61

When the Image is thus revealed to the soul, it is found to possess like other objects in the world certain qualities. God is not, as the highest or the most Supreme Object devoid of all qualities. On the contrary He is rich with extraordinary qualities that no empirical object of everyday life can possess. As the source of all that is, He possesses infinite number of qualities and as the end or the goal He has the finest of them. What He is devoid of, are the undesirable (heya) qualities. He is thus not an empty concept, He is not perceived as mere existence. Too much has been written in the Purāṇas as also by the Gosvāmins of the School about these qualities of God. Rūpa Gosvāmin for example gives a list of 64 qualities,¹ while Jīva gives a longer one of 85.² It is not necessary to detail all these, for they are nothing more than an exaggeration of all excellence of the human virtues.

Apart from these God has also the Powers (śaktis). We had seen that God's relation to the world is explained with the help of the three Powers svarūpa, tatastha and bahiranga. Apart from these many other Powers are also attributed to God and it is impossible to make a cogent presentation of the same, though we can very well understand the motive behind this multiplicity of Powers. Rūpa following the Purāṇic literature attributes sixteen śaktis to God. One can force an explanation and say that they are the functions of God as He appears to men. But there seems to be no such presumption at making an exhaustive list of His Powers. The number sixteen appears to have been arrived at simply in accordance with the sixteen kalas or sub-divisions into which God was supposed to have differentiated Himself at the beginning of Creation. It is thus only an extension of the same process which started thousands of years ago in the doctrine of the four emanations (vyūhas), corresponding to the four parts mentioned in the Puruṣa-sūkta of the Rg-veda:³ and then just as the vyūhas were later on fixed as the brother, son and grandson of Kṛṣṇa, so that the unity is maintained, so also these Powers are made into feminine deities and are fixed as the wives of the Supreme God. Thus we find the religious counterpart of the ontological theory that there is non-difference between an object and its power and so between God and His Powers.

1. Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, vibhāva-laharī, 19-24. Berhampore 1924.

2. Pr.S, pp. 640-645.

3. See Schrader, op.cit., p. 145.

Thus on account of His being the source of all, He is not removed from us into the rarefied atmosphere of abstract ideas, but is as real an object of experience as any other object of nature and His relation to the individual soul (who is an amśa or part) is comparable to the best of human relations. Just as the cowherd maids in Vṛndāvana were fully aware of God in their midst, so can we be. But just because of these human qualities of the Supreme Person, SrīKṛṣṇa, the non-believers or those in whom religious consciousness is not yet developed, would say that such qualities as perplexity (moha) lassitude (tandrā), delusion (bhrama) etc. which one sees in God (and as described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) are blemishes (doṣas) of His nature. But really these are meant only to arouse our human feelings, they are an expression of His sweetness (mādhurya).¹ This notion of mādhurya is again very important in Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. We must hence turn to this in greater detail and see what influences were effective in the origin and growth of this idea.

God's majesty (aiśvarya) and His sweetness (mādhurya):-
This brings us to a very important and distinctive trait of Bengal school of vaiṣṇavism. No other system of Indian Philosophy with the exception of Vallabha lays so much emphasis on the sweetness aspect (mādhurya) of our God-consciousness. It is more necessary to have human feelings based on human relations than the understanding of the nature of God which would reveal the awe-inspiring knowledge of Him as the all-powerful and all-knowing Ground of the world. Such an understanding would at best chill our hearts or at worst strike us with terror. Real and warm attachment to God is possible when one loves Him. Hence it is said, "of all sects and religions which without contact with revealed religion, have grown up on a soil that had been prepared by the higher intellectual culture in India and the ancient world, two viz., Kṛṣṇaism in India and Mithraism in the Roman world, have shown a remarkable power to make vivid the certainty of the comforting nearness and living presence of their deities in a way that has given to these a characteristic difference from the ancient national divinities."² In saying this the author is not referring to the school here in view but to the earlier Kṛṣṇa-worship. But what started in the early days of Kṛṣṇa was carried further through the Bhāgavata and found its culmination in Caitanya.

1. SR, II, 7&8.

2. Söderblom, op.cit., p.22.

The doctrine is indeed very old. We find ^{it} in the Harivamśa and the Nārāyaṇīya. It is also to be seen in the extremely emotional songs of the mystic ālvārs of South India. We find it as the motive in some of the plays of Bhāsa. But it seems explicitly to be stated in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the main source of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. In this book we have a large number of instances where the Majesty of God is relegated to the background in order to make him as human as possible. In spite of the superhuman deeds of the boy Kṛṣṇa, it is said that the cow-herd maids (gopīs) who are the most beloved devotees of Kṛṣṇa, were not aware of his power (aprameyam balam tasya na te viduḥ)¹. The mother Yasodā did not realize the superiority of the child whom in the strength of her maternal affection she considered to be her child.² Even such a terrible task as lifting the hill and thus afford shelter could not strike terror in their hearts, though they witnessed the act themselves, performed before their own eyes.³ Nothing could shatter their conviction that he is a friend, a son, or a lover.

The description of His līlā(sport) in the book throws much light on the attitude of the dwellers in that spiritual world called Vraja. When the little boy Kṛṣṇa kills the demoness Pūtānā, the womenfolk of Vraja do not come down on their knees and adore Him. On the other hand they perform certain rites to obviate evil augured by this instance and thus to protect Him. When Yasodā sees the Universe in the mouth of the infant she is taken aback, and lest this end the maternal affection of the mother and convert into awe, the Bhāgavata atonce proceeds to say that she lost remembrance of it atonce (sadyo-naṣṭa-smṛtir-gopī)⁴. In the Bhāgavad-gītā we also have a similar description of the revelation of the entire Universe, or God's Majesty to Arjuna, but the reaction in Arjuna was different from that of Yasodā and he begs pardon of Kṛṣṇa for having treated Him like a friend.⁵ It is clear that at the time of the Mahābhārata, this doctrine of the superiority of the Mādhurya-jñāna of God was not yet known. Thus many more examples can be cited from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where this peculiarity and intensely human relation is illustrated.

1. BP, X, vii-10.

2. Ibid. viii-48: ix-9.

3. Ibid. xxvi-1.

4. Ibid. vi-9 et sec.

5. Śrīmadbhāgavad-gītā, XVI, 41-42.

This teaching of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa became at once popular and even before the advent of Caitanya, many other religious teachers like Jayadeva, Vidyāpati, Līlāśuka and others had popularised it. In Jayadeva's gīta-govinda which was one of the favourite books that Caitanya used to read we find a similar description of religious-consciousness in an extremely human form. Throughout the work the fact that the hero is the Supreme God is kept in mind and references to His Godhood are made now and then¹ (as it is also the case with the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) but always as a Person and there is no evocation of awe. Another favourite book of Caitanya viz., the Kṛṣṇa-karnā-mṛta of Līlāśuka also follows the foot-steps of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. In fact it goes further. In describing the incident of the revelation of the Cosmos when the child Kṛṣṇa opens His mouth, Līlāśuka altogether suppresses the expression of surprise. The only difference between Jayadeva and Līlāśuka is that whereas the former described the relation as an erotic one, as between two individuals intensely loving one another, the latter takes it as the affection of a mother for the child (what is called vātsalya). Līlāśuka mentions as his object- "let the knowers of the Self worship the Supreme Person hidden in the cave, we shall sport in the ocean of the story of the baby of Yasodā".² Even among the religious teachers who have had direct influence on Caitanya this doctrine was accepted. For example, it is reported that Mādhavendra Puri, one of the predecessors of Caitanyism, also emphasized the tender sports (kaiśora-līlā) of Kṛṣṇa.³

Thus there was a long tradition not merely of a Personal God but also of His intense human relations which Caitanya could fall back on. This doctrine was however not acceptable to the then reigning schools of Vedānta (Vallabha, who in this respect agrees with Caitanya was an older contemporary of the latter) nor was it crystallised into religious dogma, by its sponsors who were primarily poets. This crystallisation into dogma, with exact definition of aiśvarya and mādhurya and linking up of these two types of religious consciousness with a complicated classification of the different types of the

1. But the references are by Jayadeva the writer, who returns at the end of each section to bow to Kṛṣṇa.
2. upāsataṁ ātma-vidah purāṇaḥ param puṁamsaṁ nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ/
vayaṁ yaśōda-śiśu-bala-līlā-kathā-sindhuḥ līlayāmaḥ//
Kṛṣṇa-karnā-mṛta, II-55.
3. CC, p. 360.

devotees (bhaktas) was the work of the immediate followers of Caitanya- the Gosvāmins of Vṛndāvana. Numerous fat volumes were written by these Gosvāmins giving meticulous descriptions and hair-splitting and often abstract distinctions, into the details of which we cannot enter here, nor is it necessary to do so.¹ We shall concern ourselves merely with the question whether there is any conflict between these two types of God-consciousness and what the relation between them is.

At first sight it would appear that there is conflict between them and that the two cannot exist together. The earlier writers and Caitanya himself denied that the dwellers of the spiritual world of Vraja had any knowledge of God's Majestas at all.² The statements cited before from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa seem to lend support to this view. It is here that Baladeva adopts a different standpoint. It is not that he altogether denies what Caitanya had said: his interpretation of the religious consciousness of the Gopīs is different. He holds that there is no conflict between the aiśvarya and the mādhurya knowledge of God and that the ideal devotees of Vraja were aware of the aiśvarya of God. Between the two, the knowledge of God's Sweetness (mādhurya-jñāna) is superior. The person who has it must necessarily have had the knowledge of God's Supremacy as well. To deny that the ideal devotees are aware of God's Greatness is to make their relation to God a false one. It is in fact on account of our awareness of His greatness that the personal relationship is better enjoyed. Baladeva draws our attention to the fact that the admission of mādhurya-jñāna by him does not thereby make his theory different from that of his revered predecessor Rūpa Gosvāmin. When the latter denied the existence of the knowledge of God's Rulership, what he meant was that they did not have the fear and trembling and such other unfavourable feelings; for such feelings instead of drawing the devotee nearer to God, puts a barrier.

Now, what does this aiśvarya mean? Baladeva quotes a statement from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa which says that it consists in His Might, Glory, Excellence, Omniscience and His Detachment from this physical world⁴ and defines it as the manifestation of the Supreme Glory of God, independent of the human phenomena (nara-līlām anapekṣya paramaiśvarya-virbhāvaḥ).⁵ Of the manifestations mentioned above and the manifestations of His aiśvarya the

1. See S.K.De, Op.Cit., pp. 123 ff and 268 ff.

2. CC, Madhya-līla, Chap.19.

3. SR, II-5.

4. Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, VI-5.

5. SR, II-1.

Gopīs were certainly aware. Otherwise we cannot explain some of the statements in the Bhāgavata itself, as the one about Nanda, the father running to his own son for help and all the people running to Kṛṣṇa for help when the forest caught fire.¹

Baladeva would therefore hold that there is no conflict between the two. The mere knowledge of the Power and Greatness of some one dear to one does not evoke any fear. On the other hand that only makes the bond stronger.² It is only when one comes to know that what one thought to be a friend, or a son or a lover, is not a person at all, is not flesh and blood, that there arises fear and anxiety. It is such knowledge that is denied of the ideal devotees. Their firm faith in God never falters. On the other hand even the real parents of Kṛṣṇa, Devaki and Vasudeva (who are described as the dwellers of Mathurā and not Vraja, and so of a lower spiritual level) could not retain the parental attitude when the aiśvarya of Kṛṣṇa was revealed to them. The significance of these examples is that in true faith the knowledge element never displaces the feeling element. Thus we may say that "the feeling element in religion involves then, a genuine 'knowing' or awareness though in contrast to that knowing which can express itself in concepts it may be termed non-rational."³

Thus feeling and knowledge of God are together in the devotee's mind but God manifests himself in different forms according to the spiritual level of the devotee concerned. These levels also should be interpreted from the two standpoints of aiśvarya and mādhurya. From the stand-point of the former aspect of God, He is perceived either as Brahman, or Paramaśvara or when there is fulness of knowledge as the Bhagavat. Brahman is the partial manifestation of Kṛṣṇa and is the object of pure knowledge. Nevertheless, He is not altogether devoid of ostensibility, for He is said to be of the nature of Light.⁴ It is significant that the Advaitavāda's ultimate reality, the non-dual characterless One is also Brahman. This ultimate Reality of the Advaitin, is for Bengal Vaiṣṇavism only the outer radiation (tanu-bhā) of Kṛṣṇa. This is the form that the friends as well as the enemies of God perceive. In other words, that is the least of Him, that all men can see.

1. BP, X, xxxiv-6.: X, xvii-22.

2. SR, II-3. There is one instance where Rūpa also seems to admit this- See laghubhagavatāmṛta, I-285.

3. J.W. Harvey- "Introduction" to Ottōs "Idea of the Holy" p. xvii.

4. SS, p. 76.

As Paramātmān, God is the inner Ruler of the individual soul. He is known not in such an empty form as before, but is known as possessed of God's māyā-śakti in full and also a part of His cit-śakti (antaryāmitva-māyā māyā-śakti-pracura cit-śakty-amśa-viśiṣṭam paramātmā). He is the source of Creation and of the Avatāras or the Incarnations. Though no personal relation could be established with God as Paramātmān He is conceived as the real Cause of the world and His Superiority and yet the nearness to one's heart is realized. Like Brahman however He is also a partial manifestation of God.¹

God as Bhagavat, the Lord, is possessed of all Powers in the fullest extent. He is the object of religious consciousness at its highest and sharpest level. This ofcourse does not mean that Brahman and Paramātmān could be taken to be the descents or avatāras of Bhagavat. All Incarnations or Descents have a definite time and place of manifestation and there is some purpose for which the Incarnation takes place. These three however are metaphysical components of Godhead or rather are three levels of comprehension and thus no cosmic purpose is relevant to them. We may say that these two, Brahman and Paramātmān, are the understanding of God merely as transcendent (Brahman) and of Him merely as immanent (Paramātmān). God however is both transcendent and immanent.

Even if a person had obtained the knowledge of Kṛṣṇa, as the Bhagavat, that is, has obtained true knowledge of God, still there are further distinctions according to the level of consciousness achieved so far as His mādhurya (tender or sweetness aspect) is concerned. How intense a man's relation to God is, depends on the intensity of his spiritual life. This is explained by taking the three places or the spheres of Kṛṣṇa's activity as levels of spiritual awareness. For example, the Kṛṣṇa of Vṛndāvana where he spent His childhood is the highest and is compared to Vaikunṭha or the Highest Heaven. The next place where Kṛṣṇa was active is Mathurā. His role here was to kill the evil in the person of Kaṁsa. We thus perceive God here not as the object of tender love but as the preserver of the world-order. The second is therefore less human and less exalted consciousness of God. The last is the town of Dwārakā, where Kṛṣṇa spent His last days. Nothing is now left of the tender

1. Brahma anga kānti tāñr nirbiśeṣa prakāśe/ sūrya yena carma-
cakṣe jyotirmaya bhāse/ Paramatma jenho tenho Kṛṣṇer eko
amśa/ atmara atma haya Kṛṣṇa sarba abataṁsa/ CC,p.361

2. CC.p.375.

-ness of Vṛndāvana. Here His aiśvarya stands out almost to the exclusion of His mādhurya. Hence Kṛṣṇa at Dvārakā is said to be full (pūrṇa), at Mathurā He is said to be fuller (pūrṇatara) and at Vṛndāvana, He is said to be the fullest (pūrṇatama). And it is this last which is the object of the most highly developed religious consciousness of the Gopīs.¹

This rather long account of the notion of the tender and sweetness aspect of God (mādhurya-jñāna) and the different manifestations thereof had to be given, because it appears to us that this is the most important and the central theme of the bhakti cult since very ancient times, but which was not adequately emphasized either by Rāmānuja or by Madhva. The only Vedāntin who came nearest to this was Vallabha, but he confines this tender God-consciousness to the feeling of affection of a parent or the Madonna aspect. He recognizes only the parental (vātsalya) sentiment, while Caitanya would accept the whole gamut of human relations giving the highest place to that of the amorous or the love relation. What Baladeva had done was to accept Caitanya's theory and to point out that there is no conflict between such an attitude and the other one of awe and reverence. Just as there is no conflict between devotion to God (bhakti) and the true knowledge of God (jñāna), so also is there no conflict between the aiśvarya and the mādhurya knowledge of God.

The Incarnations: Apart from the eternal manifestations of Kṛṣṇa mentioned above, there are also the historical or actual descents (avatāras). The first clear and unequivocal statement of the nature and function of these Descents of God is given in the famous verse in the Bhagavad-gīta (IV, 7 & 8)-"Whenever there is decay of righteousness, O Bhārata, and there is exaltation of unrighteousness, then I Myself come forth: for the protection of the good, for the destruction of the evil-doers for the sake of firmly establishing righteousness, I am born from age to age." This was an attempt at reconciling a Personal God with a Moral Order. Barth says of this doctrine, "by permitting the worship of the Deity under a series of hypostases no longer abstract such as those which the ancient theology had conceived but such as were highly concrete, highly personal and what is better still human, they resolved in a new manner

the old problem so often attempted of reconciling aspirations after a certain monotheism with an irresistible tendency to multiply forms of worship. In a way which surpasses the clumsy device of divine genealogies or the conception of different 'forms' of the same God which still prevails in the Śaivite religion, it responded by its elasticity and its affection for mystery to all the instincts of the people who are at once so sensual, so superstitious and so speculative."¹

The doctrine of the Incarnation therefore became very popular and the Purāṇas gave it very much wider currency. And in the widening of the scope of the doctrine, certain changes in the basic concept were also introduced. Instead of its purpose being confined to the Preservation of the Moral Law and the Creation of the Universe, which are still more or less metaphysical in their nature, the third, the human and the spiritual element of His relationship to man was introduced. Man's spiritual consciousness and his intimate, warm and living awareness of God, cannot be understood unless He is admitted to have come down, descended or incarnated Himself. For Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, the third element is even more important than the previous two, as it considers the mādhurya knowledge of God to be of a higher order than His aśvarya. Baladeva² gives three grounds for the Incarnation of God: 1) for the sake of imparting the necessary movement to Nature without which it cannot create (prakṛti-kṣobha mahad-ādi utpādanam), 2) destruction of the malicious and the promotion of the happiness of the Good (duṣṭa-vimardanam devādīnām sukha-vivardhanam) and 3) propagation of pure devotion (bhakti) for Himself and to give happiness to His devotees who are always eagerly looking forward to His manifestations (samutkanthitānām sādhanakānām premānanda-vistāra visuddha-bhakti-pracāraṇam ca). In all these cases there is the descent of God from His spiritual world to the material world-level in which man is situated. This descent of Spirit into Matter is the meaning of descent or Incarnation.³ We thus find that the theory put forward by Baladeva in accordance with the principles of Caitanyism is in certain ways different from that of the older sectarians like Rāmānuja. The followers of Rāmānuja, for example, following the lead of the

1. Barth, "Religions of India", p.169 - 170. London, 1891.

2. Baladeva is combining the two ideas of vyūha and avatāra which most Vaiṣṇavas do. The first is the vyūha of the āgamas; the second is the Gīta idea; the third, purāṇic.

3. aprākṛtāl-lokāt prākṛte-loke avatāran hy avatārah - SR, II-

āgama literature, speak of five kinds of avatāras, Supreme Godhead (para), emanations (vyūha), effulgence (vibhāva), Inner Ruler (antaryāmin) and the object of worship (arca).¹ Iruṣṣotta-mācārya, a follower of Nimbārka, draws a clear distinction between vyūhas and the avatāras — the former are forms assumed for the Creation of the world — (viśva-sṛṣṭy-ādy-artham tathā-vidhopāsanārtham) and the latter for the preservation of the moral law and to fulfill the wishes of the devotees (svecchayā dharma-saṁsthāpanārtham adharmopasamārtham svīyam vāñchā-pūrti-artham ca vividha vigrahair āvirbhāvaḥ).²

It might be asked, how is it possible that God who is Infinite and eternal can really Descend into the finite and the temporal world. Either we have to say that these descents are illusory in nature or that God is material and finite. It is alright to say that Kṛṣṇa's sport (līlā) is extremely engrossing, but we have at best to give a figurative interpretation of it. We cannot take it literally when we find descriptions like Kṛṣṇa's stealing butter or being bound by Yasodā to a post. Bengal Viṣṇavism would take these descriptions literally. It is real situations like these, when God becomes subject to man through bonds of Love, that arouse the sublime feeling which we call bhakti (devotion). The Gosvāmins in fact have written numerous dramas and literary and quasi-philosophical works to describe the various daily chores and practical jokes of Kṛṣṇa, as the cowherd boy, in great detail and meticulous care.³

The reconciliation between the Infinite God and the finite material world, the bridge between man's bodily existence and God's non-material, spiritual reality is made possible through what is called spiritual Substance (aprākṛta or viśuddha-sattva). Though God's Personality is embodied like mine (on account of which It is ostensible to the devotee), the difference is that His embodiment is of the nature of this spiritual Substance devoid of the material elements of sattva, rajas and tamas. (That is, to put in other words, we may say that God is ostensible, is an object of our spiritual cognition and so is embodied. And yet He is not physical, in the same way as a log of wood is.) It is because God is embodied that the encounter of the devotee with Him, could be so real and so warm.

1. Yatindra-mata-dīpikā, p.83 et seq.

2. Vedānta-ratna-manjūṣā, pp 107-113.

3. For full account see S.K.De, Op. Cit.

While therefore the spiritual meeting between God and man is not only admitted but is made the central theme, the possibility is not due to the ascent of man to God, but His Descent, in the form of material objects. This is not something peculiar to Vaiṣṇavism, but is said to be the theme of the Christian doctrine of Incarnation as well.¹ In fact, all religious experience seems to point to this. Watson says, "the doctrine of Incarnation must therefore be understood as implying the indissoluble unity of God and man, not in any artificial and external sense, but as an expression of the principle that God is at once immanent and transcendent. It brings to light the divine element which is involved in the nature of man and the human element inseparable from the nature of God."² Nevertheless we find that actually in Christianity with its complete severance between Matter and Spirit, it was difficult to conceive of the Incarnation of God in flesh. That is why Paul found it difficult to conceive of the earthly incarnation of God in Christ. John tried it, but he had to leave out anecdotes like that of Temptation, Agony etc, out. From what we had said before, it is quite clear that a unique explanation was given by the Vaiṣṇavas with the help of their peculiar theory of the mādhurya-jñāna of God and the real non-separation between Spirit and Matter. The first move is of God who descends from the super-natural (aprākṛta) to the natural (prākṛta) level.

The third cause given by Baladeva for Incarnation is that God descends sometimes just to give pleasure, to increase the spiritual consciousness of His devotees. We called this Purāṇic, because we find the mention of such an attitude in some of the Purāṇas, specially the Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas. And this has been not only adopted, but worked out in an entirely different manner by the Gosvāmins. In fact, this is one of the special features of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, often not emphasized, but is we think, one of the few original and symptomatic features of the school. The approach of the Gosvāmins to religious consciousness, is aesthetic. The only true happiness we have in our everyday world which corresponds to the happiness constitutive of the essential Power of God (Hlādinī aspect of the svarūpa-

1. G.F.Scott, "The New Testament Idea of Revelation", p.165.

2. Interpretation of Religious Experience - Vol.II., p.289.
Glasgow, 1912.

śakti) is the happiness which we call aesthetic enjoyment (rasa) The pleasure we have in our relation to God as a Person, is exactly like the pleasure we have in the contemplation of a well-written play, depicting the very same human relations between the lover and the beloved, between the mother and the child and so on. The whole gamut of these sentiments are covered in the various religious plays and lyrics (padas) that came to be written after Caitanya and the theories of the older authors on Poetics are adopted with slight modifications and the drama of the spiritual relation between God and man was described with their help. We shall refer to this again in a later chapter.

Since the relation between man and God was made close and unmediated, there is no need for Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, of a Mediator. For different reasons it was said that Judaism also "did not need a mythical Saviour God to be the Intermediary between man and the Supreme Deity. For Jehovah, the one true God, had on complex occasions intervened to deliver his people from the oppressors."¹ According to Christianity however God does not intercede but sends His Son to share the sorrows of man. This is considered very important as solving the problem of creation and generation, or the transcendence and immanence aspects of God.² In Bengal Vaiṣṇavism as indeed in all the forms taken by the Bhāgavata Cult, there seems to be no such need of a Mediator. The Descent (avatāra) is sometimes a partial manifestation of God but is nevertheless God Himself and though different in manifestation (ākāra) is the same in its essential nature (svarūpa).

The problem of the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God is answered not through the avatāras, but through the doctrine of the Powers, to which we had already referred. It might be said that these Powers (śaktis) which are female counterparts of God or as are popularly called the wives of God, may be said to be the Mediatrix between man and God. Such an interpretation is far-fetched. It is true that in some of the popular Purāṇas and also in the theories influenced by the Śākta doctrines we might find such instances. But in none of the writings of the Bengal school is there any such notion entertained. Rādhā who is said even to be superior to the wives of Kṛṣṇa is the ideal devotee only. Though the image of Rādhā itself was worshipped in some temples, the Gosvāmins never

1. W.Knox, "St.Paul", p.20-21.

2. C.C.J.Webb: God and Personality, p.163. London, 1918.

worshipped the image of Rādhā.¹ As the most passionate and devoted worshipper of God (Kṛṣṇa) she is to be imitated, but she is not the meadiatrix.

As in the case of other religions in India, Bengal Vaiṣṇavism has no place for a Suffering God. For it is incompatible with the Infinity, Omniscience and Infinite Capacity of God. In the CC. an anecdote is described where one of the followers of Caitanya, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma tells him that for the sake of mankind he is prepared to suffer and requests Caitanya to let him (Sārvabhauma), do it so that others might be spared it. In reply Caitanya tells him that there is no need for such vicarious suffering, for if God wills, all suffering will vanish.² Neither God nor His devotees and representatives or avatāras had to suffer.

If we examine we can easily find the ground as to why the idea of a suffering God was not acceptable. There are two grounds on which the doctrine is based - 1) the Reality of Evil and 2) the Eternal struggle between good and evil. That Evil is a reality will not be denied. In fact this Evil, in the form of the turning away from God, is said even to be beginningless (anādi). But the second viz., that there is an eternal struggle between them will not be admitted. Evil, though beginningless, is said to be capable of being ended. Thus though there is the fact of Evil, there is no problem of Evil, for the ultimate solution is bound to be its destruction and the triumph of God.

This should not make one think that though the Vaiṣṇava religion admits the fact that evil exists, it is just blind to the ideal of human service. In fact the object of Caitanya's renouncement of the world and acceptance of the asceticism (sannyāsa) was to help the other deluded people.³ We must also remember that the very incarnations of God are motivated to help other people, suffering humanity. Man suffers because of his own fall. That does not make suffering an eternal entity, and since it is of the nature of man's karmam it can never touch God. Thus God can never suffer.

From what we have said it is clear that God possesses Personality: the God of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is a Personal God. But

1. S.K.De, Op.Cit. p.386.

2. CC, p.299. It is difficult to say whether such a notion is or is not due to Christian influence.

3. CC, pp 123-124. Caitanya says that the vedic practice of killing cows was to help old cattle, p.127- he also says that he would help even the people that hate him.

what is meant by this Personality? Broadly speaking there are two widely diverging standpoints, 1) that of the abstract monists who would identify Personality with Individuality and 2) that of the pluralists who accord a more variegated and richer meaning to the term, but for whom He becomes a prius inter pares.¹ From the description we have given as well as from the general metaphysical standpoint of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, it is clear that what they would try to do, is to adopt a middle course consistent with their doctrine of non-rational difference-cum-non-difference (acintya-bhedābheda).

Now whatever Personality may or may not include, it must at least be self-conscious and free-choosing. We have seen that both these characteristics belong both to the individual soul and also to God. Further both these basic concepts of free-choice and self-consciousness have significance only in a social being. As has been said "Personality is essentially individual and essentially social. To deny either is to deny both."² Both these attributes continue to be in the possession of the individual soul, even after release. The souls preserve their individuality and enjoy bliss in the company of God. There is no losing oneself in God: there is purer and more intense enjoyment of God's company. At the same time, they would not make God only an "end" to strive after. He is not one of the four objectives or ends, like dharma, artha etc., nor even like mokṣa or release. God's Supremacy as the Supreme Person (Puruṣottama) remains and so thus His efficiency in the guidance of the other persons whom He rules, as the Inner Ruler (antaryāmin). Thus God is not merely the "Substantial Cause" in which all else is absorbed nor is He just the Perfect Monad.

We may therefore say that Bengal Vaiṣṇavism makes an attempt like Lotze to reconcile the two extreme standpoints. For Lotze also God as well as the individual souls are Persons, but "Perfect Personality is in God only: to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof: the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of the Personality but a limit and a hindrance of its development."³ We should however remember that with Lotze, they would not go to the extent of

1. It is impossible to explain it fully without introducing psychology, and the psychologists are not however, agreed as to what Personality is. For a learned exposition from the standpoint of Theology, See: C.O.J. Webb: "God and Personality". London, 1918.
2. E.G. Braham, "Personality and Immortality", p.122. London.
3. Microcosmos, (Eng. Tr), II-688. New York, 1909.

positing that the goal of the individual is to be one with Perfect Being. We had said that the ideal of some of the other bhedābheda schools, either of becoming identical with, or becoming similar to God, was not acceptable.¹ Further though for Lotze, the Ego has no non-Ego "which is substantially opposed to it", for Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, the projecting Power (māyā) of God is really opposed in the sense that it is always directed outside. The individual personality always shares therefore this limitation due to this non-ego principle. It would be more correct to say therefore "our personalities are self-conscious, but not self-existent. They are only imperfect images and as it were separated fragments of the infinite Personality, God."²

1. See ~~above, pp.~~ below, p.110.

2. See, "Concept of God" by Josiah Royce and others. Ed. by Le Conte, p.68.

Chapter VI
The Nature of Devotion (bhakti).

If the nature of God and the individual is as described in the previous chapters, what then is the goal of the individual and what is the means of attaining it? Men toil either for merit(dharma) or wealth(artha) or pleasure (kāma) or release from bondage and the consequent enjoyment (mokṣa). The first three cannot be accepted for they are ephemeral and so cannot be the true object of the soul which is eternal. Hence the real aim of the individual should be to attain salvation, i.e., to get rid of the cycle of births and deaths and realize ones true eternal self. So far, there is unanimity among the vedāntins. But when the question is raised as to how this can be achieved or what means of mukti is best suited, there is wide divergence of opinion.

We have seen that the individual soul, as well as the Supreme God are "Persons" in the fullest sense of the term, i.e., there is cognitive, conative and affective faculties and the intercourse between them involves all these three factors. If the soul is to realize the Supreme Person, it has to approach Him, search for Him with the aid of all the three. But emphasis has always been laid either on the one or the other. Three different methods have thus been recognized- the jñāna-mārga or the way of knowledge, karma-mārga or the way of action and bhakti-mārga or the way of devotional love. Some schools of thought have accepted one to the exclusion of the others, some have subordinated one to another and some have tried to synthesize all the three.

In agreement with the basic methods first propounded in the Gītā and later revived in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and in accordance with the example set by Caitanya, Baladeva denounces karma, for it is so recommended in the Scriptures.¹ Performance of ones duties is ofcourse necessary and is also useful, but only as an ancillary.² When as a consequence of such actions knowledge (vidyā) arises, the duties (karman) are to be abandoned.³ Bhakti is therefore not pure activity (pravṛtti) nor

1. SR, I,30-35.

2. Ibid. I-31.

3. GB,III,iv-8. Also III,iv-35.

pure passivity (nivṛtti) but is an activity motivated by faith which leads to, the renouncement of activity and its consequent attractions or bonds.

Baladeva however would not go to the extent of denouncing knowledge (jñāna) altogether. There is, according to him really no conflict between knowledge and devotion (bhakti), as there is between activity and devotion. Activity (karman) can never be disinterested and as long as the interest is there, one can never have true devotion. knowledge can be disinterested. Further, this knowledge is not to be understood to be of the nature of "logical reasoning" (tarka) but is of the nature of knowing (vidyā). Taken in this comprehensive sense even bhakti also may be said to be a special kind of knowledge.¹ Just as the name Kaurava denotes in its wider sense, both the sons of Kuru as well as of his brother Pāṇḍu so also the word vidyā denotes both: though sometimes it is used to denote only the cognitive attitude.² In the GB, Baladeva says that vidyā (true knowledge or correct knowledge as opposed to the generic word knowledge) really means devotion preceded by knowledge, faith that arises as a result of the study of the necessary literature (śāstras).³ It is to be noticed therefore that when Baladeva makes devotion a special kind of knowledge, he is using the word not in its usual sense, for example as the Nyāya uses it, but in a more or less gnostic sense of the term.

The two kinds of knowledge are sometimes distinguished and the names knowledge (vidyā) and gnosis (vedanā) are used. The former is abstract and the latter concrete: or as Baladeva would put it the former is like the unwinking and steady gaze, empty of content while the latter is meaningful, like the stolen sidelong glances. Of these the latter is superior, for the followers of this path have a variegated and intense personal and emotional intercourse with God. The spiritual life is richer in its content. The former is also one way of spiritual salvation. The followers of this path also get release from the bondage of the world of things: but their spiritual life is void. Their life is not enriched by the Grace of God.

1. Bhaktir api jñāna-viśeṣo bhavati: SR, I-32.

2. SR, I-32.

3. śāstra-jñāna-pūrvakam-upāśanam vidyocyate- GB, III, iii-48

Once again to put it in the words of Baladeva, in the state of release they lead a lonely life like a wife who is not cared for or is deserted by her husband. This vedanā is a very much more effective means, because it is capable of controlling the Supreme Deity, Kṛṣṇa Himself. This lower that the devotee wields is that of love, the same that a young-woman wields over her lover.¹

The state of release consists in this attainment- in having this attitude of loving devotion. It is an attitude which is also its own goal. There is nothing else for which this can be a propaedeutic. That is why the five theories of the state of release so far advanced, viz., that of attaining God's world (sālokya), that of attaining his nature (sārūpya), that of reunion in Him (sāyujya), that of nearness to Him (sāmīpya) and that of knowing with Him (sārṣṭi) are ^{not} acceptable to him. There is undoubtedly some satisfaction in attaining one of the above stages. But there is a higher satisfaction in the service of God just for the love of Him. This higher satisfaction comes not because one aims at it, but is automatic.² Thus this devotion (bhakti) is called non-motivated (niṣkāma). It consists in loving God, just for the love of Him and not for the sake of some end in the form of pleasure or something else. It is thus therefore called devotional love (prema-bhakti), as distinguished from others which aim at one or the other states mentioned above. They are not aims in themselves but are means (sādhana) to some other end. Therefore they do not represent true love or devotion and so are called (sakāma) motivated devotion or devotion as a means (sādhana-bhakti). True devotion is like true love and end-in-itself and so is called devotion as an end (sādhya-bhakti).

Such devotion therefore cannot be confined to any particular field of human activity. It does not involve merely the intellect or merely the emotions. It involves the whole personality of the individual. Only that love could be great and matchless which brings into action the senses, the intellect and the emotions or in short, the whole man.³

1. SR, I-33 et seq.

2. Ibid. I-36. (also tīkā).

3. Hṛṣīkeśasya Kṛṣṇasya hṛṣīkena srotrādīndriyena sevānam kayikam vacikam manasikam ca pariśīlanam: Ibid.

This emphasis on direct sensual presence was also the goal of mystics like Eckhart, who wanted to "see, feel, taste the presence of God". See Prof. Dr. Günther Müller, "Deutsches Dichten und Denken vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit", p.11 Berlin, 1949.

Devotion (bhakti) being thus a total experience, there could be no absolute contradiction between it and knowledge (jñāna), asceticism (yoga) and performance of duties (karman) to which Kṛṣṇa Himself referred in the Bhagavad-gīta. They are after all partial manifestations of this all-consuming and all-engrossing Love. One who already possesses this Love, ipso facto has the other virtues. The converse is not however the case.

Both Jīva and Baladeva agree in holding that though devotion is the most efficient in revealing God's Personality, there is however difference in degree between different individuals according to their fitness (puruṣa-yogyatā-bhedena). The lower type of devotion is essential to the normal man before he attains the higher type of devotion. In the earlier stages a man has to take the help of jñāna and karman. They are to be renounced only in the latter stages when devotion has reached the highest stage. To distinguish between these two stages, Jīva speaks about the devotion that is found along with the desire to enjoy the result of this action (sakāma-karma-sahita) and the devotion which involves the performance of works but is devoid of all desire (niṣkāma-karma-sahita). Baladeva as we had seen, admitted differences between different individuals in so far as their spiritual awareness is concerned. He also divides them into the self-centred (sva-niṣṭha), the other-regarding (pari-niṣṭha) and the independent (nirapekṣa). The highest type of bhakti is however that of the One-engrossed (Ekāntin).¹ Thus except in the last and perfect stages, the performance of karmans is a proper ancillary to the development of bhakti. Baladeva calls it an aid (sahakārin)² to knowledge. It is clear from the above that two points have been emphasized in connection with the ideal means of salvation, i.e., bhakti. They are 1) that it must not be motivated by anything other than itself and 2) that it must involve the whole man or that the devotee should think of nothing else but the object of worship. It is in this sense alone that we can rightly explain the statements of some of the earlier Gosvāmins, who explicitly state that bhakti is devoid of jñāna and karman.³

1. GB, III, iv-19: 32-38.

2. vidyaiva svatantra phala-hetuḥ karma tu tasyāḥ saha-kārīti, ibid, III, iv-33.

3. See for example Rūpa's Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu, Pūrva-vibhaga, I, 9 and II-35.

GB I, 1.1

It is thus clear that the devotion of which Jīva and Baladeva speak, is different from that which Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja also admit. For instance even for Śaṅkara devotion is a very useful and effective means. But it is only an ancillary.¹ When true knowledge of the identity of the individual self with the Universal Self arises, then who is the devotee and who the Object of devotion? In order that this knowledge may arise, we have to purify our minds through devotion. Thus the roles of knowledge and devotion are almost reversed.

Rāmānuja though inspired by the same literature and though he accepts devotion (bhakti) as highest means, is however desirous of giving equal importance to knowledge and karman as well. Hence his theory has been called the theory of co-ordination of knowledge and action (jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda). Baladeva contradicts such a view.² Further for Rāmānuja, devotion is not primarily an emotional affair. It is upāsana or prayer and is more like the vidyā of Baladeva as distinguished from vedanā.³ It is not the love of God that reveals knowledge; it is based on the other hand on a proper study and understanding of the Scriptures. As Bhandarkar says, "the tendency of Rāmānuja's system seems to be to give an exclusive Brāhmanic form to the traditional method of bhakti or devotion to God".⁴ Rāmānuja therefore recommends a new form of devotion which he calls self-surrender (prapatti).

This prapatti also is not in any way similar to the bhakti of the Bengal school. We have seen that for the latter, specially in the form given to it by Baladeva, devotion involves knowledge too. It arouses the relish of enjoyment called rasa. The more intense the feeling and the clearer the apprehension of Kṛṣṇa, the stronger is the enjoyment (rasa). In prapatti however there is no realisation of rasa. It does not have the warmth of relationship that is envisaged in true bhakti. If at all, we may compare it with the lowest form of bhakti, called dāsyā-bhakti (the devotion of the servant).⁵ Rāmānuja in fact considers it inferior to what he calls bhakti (ie., upāsana), for he thinks that prapatti is for those whose spiritual awakening is not yet full, like sūdras, women and so on.

1. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, IV, i-1.

2. GB, III, iii-48.

3. See above p. 109.

4. Bhandarkar, Op. cit.

5. For a full analysis of the different types of devotion and devotees and their merits, see S.K.De., Op.Cit.

The only Vedāntin whose concept of bhakti comes near that of the Caitanya school is that of Vallabha. His concept of Puṣṭi-bhakti and particularly his emphasis on the parental (vātsalya) love is reminiscent of the Bengal school. But even Vallabha did not consider the emotional life and the sympathetic relation to God to be of supreme importance. He developed not the emotional content of this attitude to God, but the ceremonial side. To quote Bhandarkar again, "the prominent distinction between the two appears to be, that while Vallabha and those who followed him developed the ceremonial side of the religion, Caitanya and his successors, devoted themselves to the cultivation of the emotional side."¹

In our every day life, the only attitude that is similar to it or may be said to be of the nature of this emotional experience is that of aesthetic enjoyment. The whole gamut of human emotions that we project towards God are also those that we experience in the hero and the heroine in a play. The classification of the different types of this devotion and its nature, as developed by Rūpa Gosvāmin who did it very thoroughly, is based on the previous literature on Poetics, specially the Nāṭya-śāstra of Bharata and the sāhitya-darpana of Viśvanātha.

Now what is the ontological status of this devotion (bhakti) which in the empirical world is similar to aesthetic enjoyment? Baladeva says that this attitude arises only when there is the Grace (prasāda) of God either directly or through one of His devotees. This attitude of enjoyment is constituted both of a feeling and a knowing. We may interpret this knowing and enjoying in different ways: either as gross (prākṛta-sattvamaya) knowledge and pleasure or as God's own Essence (svarūpa), or as subjective knowing and enjoying or finally as the working of the appropriate Powers (ie., those of saṁvid and Hlādinī) of God. Baladeva accepts the last alternative.² Its immateriality as well as its emotional reality can be understood only in this way. It is God's Grace and yet it is man's Faith. The love with which we love God and the aesthetic

1. Bhandarkar, Op.cit.

2. SR, I-38 et seq.

enjoyment (rasa) that we have are aspects of the Love with which He sports with His devotees in the spiritual world of Vaikunṭha. What we experience in the material world as rasa, either in the experience of love or in the enjoyment of a work of art is due to the descent (avatarati) of the same divine Power.¹ Once again, as is so common with the writers of the Bengal school of Viśṇavism, Baladeva illustrates with this shared experience, this intercourse between the individual soul and God, with the help of a peculiar analogy from the erotic field. Just as when the lover puts his hand on the shoulder of the beloved, there is the upsurge of pleasure in both of them, so also when God in His Grace extends His Love, there arises the enjoyment both in Him and in the individual soul as well.

That explains why this enjoyment arises without the help of a material object (vaiśayikam) as in the enjoyment of a play. It is not like the pleasure of eating good food for example. It is on a different level altogether. In fact, this higher level of enjoyment arises only when the distracting things of the world are not strong enough. That explains why true devotion is devoid of all desire for some end (niṣkāma). Thus though there is intense enjoyment, there is no "paradox of hedonism".

If then devotion (bhakti) is of the nature of God's Power and its existence in the individual soul is due to its Descent why then is not every man capable of having it in the same degree? We have said that according to Baladeva there continues to be even in the state of release, differences between different individuals. We might then aswell say, that the origin of bhakti, is thus purely an act of Grace and that the individual had nothing to do but to accept it when it comes. That would be pure electionism like that of Pīṭai Lokācārya, who accepted prapatti as the only means of salvation. This would not seem to be acceptable to Jīva and Baladeva. The latter is quite conscious of the spiritual statements like Mundaka, III,ii-3 and kaṭha II,23-7, which seem to favour

1. Ibid. I-41. Cf. what Aquinas is reported to have said, "since the Holy Ghost proceeds on the love wherewith God loves Himself and since God loves with the same love Himself and other beings for the sake of His own Goodness, it is clear that the love wherewith God loves us belongs to the Holy Ghost. In like manner also the love wherewith we love God." - Quoted E. Underhill, - *Mysticism*, p.117:fn.4. London 1911/49. Miss Underhill shows that this theory is common to all mystics, but there is no precedent of comparing it with aesthetic enjoyment.

electionism. But what such statements mean is that election is the last step in the causal chain. It is true that unless God chooses there is no salvation. But the necessary merit must be achieved through proper association and proper study before one can be a candidate for such election. The process how this devotion arises is described as follows- first there is the keeping the company of the right sort of people (sādhū-saṅga) and serving them. By this means arises, the knowledge of the essential nature of the Self and that of God. With the realisation of the true nature comes dis-regard (vairāgya) of the material things of the world and the consequent longing for God. Now is the person fit for God's Grace. And when he has God's grace, he then enjoys the Presence of God like the Gopīs in Vr̥ndāvana or the spiritual world.¹

No statement of the notion of bhakti can be complete without reference to the peculiar idea of enjoyment of forbidden love (parakīya-rasa) which is in a way peculiar to the teaching of Caitanya. It is true that even before him, some of the popular writers of devotional verses like Candīdāsa, for example, had compared the love of the individual soul for God to that of two persons who are socially prevented from doing so. Even in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa itself, though adultery is denounced in no uncertain terms², the Gopīs are stated to have been married to others. Following Bharata, the father of Sanskrit Poetics, Rūpa defines the most intense kind of love as that "which is concealed (from others), which is prevented (by others) and which is ever un-fulfilled".³ Evidently one finds here an extremely difficult/situation, if one wants to find a human analogy for the love of God. This is exactly what these writers wanted. Rūpa tried to explain it away by saying that though the love-relation between forbidden people is bad, in the ordinary world, it cannot be said to be so where Kṛṣṇa, the Supreme God is concerned. It is the nature of the soul to be in love with Him.

But in making such comparisons they were treading on dangerous ground and they knew it. That is why now and then we find certain safety clauses always inserted. For example, Rūpa says that the Gopīs were not married in the true sense of the word.⁴

1. GB, III, iii-54.

2. BP, X, xxviii-26.

3. Ujjvala-nīlamani: (Nāyaka-bheda), 15.

4. Ibid. Sriharipriya, 32.

Jīva tries to explain this peculiar relation in a different way. He says that the Gopīs were really married. But he draws a distinction between the manifest (prakāṣa) and the non-manifest (aprakāṣa) activities of God. In their non-manifest activity they are the married wives of Kṛṣṇa, in their manifest day to day life however they are married to or think that they are married to others.¹ The idea is that the soul is eternally attached to God, but thinks that it is attached to other things of lesser consequence, viz., the objects of the physical world. Thus both Rūpa and Jīva evidently felt uncomfortable with this peculiar theory. But they cannot be said not to have put it forward, as De thinks.²

We must however remember that the development of this devotion to God is to be taken not so much as practice, as an attitude. It is an attitude which involves certain feelings and some ideas about the object of the feeling. And this idea of a lover (jāra) is to be understood in this restricted sense. There is the Love towards Kṛṣṇa who is looked upon as a lover, but when true bhakti brings the union, it is seen that He is not the forbidden person at all.³ It is this attitude that is to be developed and the man/^{who}succeeds in achieving the intensity that Rādhā is supposed to have had, would be attaining the highest place. That is however an ideal which not only do the devotees in the lower plane, but even those who have attained the higher spiritual level, aspire to achieve.

The levels of spiritual attainment, the different kinds of emotional attitudes, their relative merits and capacities are all very carefully elaborated by Rūpa and Jīva, the former in his two books, the bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu and the ujjvala-nīla-maṇi and the latter in his prīti-sandarbhā. These classifications are based on those known to the writers on poetics (alankāra-śāstra), but restricted to the case of this single relation between soul and God. We shall not refer to the minute classifications which ^{are} ~~is~~ not relevant to us here, but shall see merely how the principle itself is applicable.

According to Bharata, the father of Indian Poetics, the relish (rasa) or aesthetic enjoyment is due to a mental combination of the vibhāvas (what with Woodworth we may call 'exter-

1. Pr.S., pp.936 ff.

2. Op.Cit., p.312.

3. jāra itī ya buddhis tayāpi tan-mātrenāpi saṅgataḥ na tu skṣat eva jāra rūpeṇa praptah.

nal situation'), the anubhāvas (which again with Woodworth we may call 'overt responses') and the vyabhicāri-bhāvas or the accessory feelings, which follow when the suitable vibhāvas are presented either through word of mouth or a picture to the eye or a smell and so on. He also held that there are eight such basic sentiments which can be used as the leitmotif by a play-wright and would produce different aesthetic enjoyment.¹ But the most intensely excitable and the best is the first or the sentiment of love (sṛṅgāra). When proper presentation of these factors is there, the sympathetic hearer (sahṛdaya), on account of sympathy has the same feelings and thus the permanent attitude (sthayī-bhāva) that exists in him is now excited and he has the pleasurable relish. So is the case with this attitude of bhakti. It is also aroused on hearing the descriptions of Kṛṣṇa's beauty and charm, of His dalliance with the Gōpīs and so on.

A question that is often found difficult to solve by the ālaṅkārikas, is how the same rasa or relish could exist in the work of art, the hero of the work, the author and the reader or the hearer simultaneously. It cannot certainly be said to be the same. The permanent attitudes (sthayī-bhāvas) of the different persons are private to each of them. It is this attitude that is transformed or developed into the aesthetic relish. But such an explanation is not possible in the case of the bhakti rasa, which as we had pointed out is of the nature of Grace, or the essential Power of God. It descends from God and hence is it supernatural (alaukika) and exists in the hero, as well as the reader or the on-looker and the actor.² Further though there are different forms of this attitude or relish and it may have for its object other individual souls, Rūpa and Jīva reduce them to one basic one, Love for Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇa-rati). Thus in taking the help of poetics, instead of aestheticising religion they divinised aesthetics.

Though this Kṛṣṇa-rati is one, it is expressed in different forms in different people. In some it takes the form of friendship, and in some affection and so on. Of these the attitude of Love of Rādhā called (madhurā) is the best; this gain is of different degrees of prema, sneha, raga, anurāga and mahā-bhāva. The ideal of the greatest devotees is to attain the last stage. These however are of no consequence to us here.³

1. Nāṭya-śāstra, VI, 15 & 16.

2. Pr.S., pp. 594-595.

3. See De, Op.Cit.

Lebenslauf.

Ich, Sreenivasa Sahu, bin in Berhampur (Orissa, Indien) am 9.10.1923 als Sohn von Radhakrishna Sahu und seiner Ehefrau Radharani geboren. Ich besuchte die City High school und machte das Abschlussexamen (Secondary School Leaving Certificate, 1937). Ich studierte an der Andhra Universität und legte nach dem B.A.(Hons) (1942) das M.A (Master of Arts) Examen (1943) in Philosophie ab. Danach erhielt ich an derselben Universität ein Forschungsstipendium für Philosophie (1943/44), wurde 1944 Dozent (Lecturer) für Logik am Sambalpur College und bin seit 1946 Dozent (Assistant Professor) für Philosophie am Ravenshaw College, Cuttack. 1952 kam ich nach Deutschland, um im Rahmen eines Stipendiums des deutsch-indischen Studentenaustauschs an der Universität Bonn Philosophie studieren. Ich möchte an dieser Stelle den Herren Prof. Dr. Saileswar Sen, Prof. Dr. Thyssen und Doz. Dr. Hacker für ihre überaus wohlwollende Förderung danken.